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4Abstract
C hap ter 1; The d issem in a tio n  of th e  rh e to r ic a l su b jec t(iv ity ) 
Through an analysis of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic and de Man’s notion of 
prosopopeia I demonstrate how modernist discourses construct a figure [face] 
of/for the artist and cover up [entomb] the recalcitrance of his or her 
corporeal body to be the [ontological] site of meaning. Through Derrida’s 
notions of klang and force I investigate the ways in which the disintegration 
of material objects interrupt the whole process of facing  the art work in this 
way. Derrida’s notion of hauntology is also utilised to argue that the self­
identical subject(ivity) is in fact a semiotically induced spectre.
C hapter 2: Rothko, D eath and  P rosopopeia
Again de Man’s figure of prosopopeia is explored to demonstrate how the 
artist Rothko is discursively posited as overcoming his own death. I argue 
that Rothko’s paintings ‘act’ as self-portraits and ‘figure’ his [enduring] 
presence. Through Derrida’s notion of the paragon [the frame] I also 
investigate how the propensity of the material to disintegrate ruptures the 
circularity of the discourse on Rothko and thereby undermines the 
transcendental moment proffered by his paintings. However, I also show, 
through an analysis of Derrida’s notion of the pharmakon, how discursive 
strategies keep raising the spectre of the transcendental artist to keep the 
fallacy of the self-identical subject(ivity) ‘alive’.
C hap ter 3: M ichaux’s insom nia: The p le n itu d e  of the  void 
I argue that the Mescaline drawings, made by Michaux in the 1950s, cannot 
be interpreted through a ‘standard’ modernist framework. In trying to 
construct an alternative interpretation for Michaux’s work I demonstrate 
how his drawings can be viewed as an attempt to articulate the excessive 
nature of corporeality and the impossibility of transcendence. Blanchot’s 
notion of insomnia is used to go beyond the polarities of the negative and the 
positive to the neutral and excessive zone of indeterminancy. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notions of the tonal and nagual, becoming-animal and Bergson’s 
notions of extensity and duration are also utilised to [theoretically] access 
this zone of indeterminacy, as that of the insomnious subject(ivity). 
C onclusion: Face to de-face
Firstly I reiterate the claims made in chapter 2, that modernism, as a circular 
discourse, constantly offers the ‘presence’ of Rothko as proof of his 
enduring transcendentality. As a contrast I use Deleuze and Guattari’s notion 
of faciality to argue that Michaux tried to de-face his art, but failed. I will 
therefore indicate the impossibility of totally de-facing the subject(ivity) 
within any  discursive system where the name acts as primary signifier.
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One of the main concepts under scrutiny in this dissertation will be that of 
Modernism. Modernism takes on many guises, and tends to transform itself 
into something different once you are certain that you understand what it 
‘is’. Modernism can be reduced to an epoch, an artistic ‘style’, an ideology, a 
mode of criticism, a fallacy. There is a long ‘version’ of it that spans over two 
centuries, and a shorter version that only covers a few decades. Its ‘origin’ 
can be traced back to Paris in the nineteenth century, and/or American in 
the twentieth. It can be discussed within the ‘domains’ of formalism, social 
and political history, feminism and psychoanalysis, philosophy, politics, 
literature and/or music. The list is endless. So in the name of clarity, if only 
for the duration of this dissertation, I will outline my ‘version’ of Modernism 
as a specific approach.
My concept of Modernism will always be based on the writings of Greenberg, 
as a form of art practice and criticism, and on the philosophies of Hegel and 
Kant. In turn Modernism, as a transcendental logic, will also be seen as 
symptomatic of a wider mode of seeing, representing and making sense of 
the world. Although it is fundamental to my overall argument that no 
ideology or culture is all-encompassing, and always contains the 
mechanisms of, and for, its own undoing; it would be expedient to keep this 
reductive sense of a Greenbergian/Hegelian Modernism, even if only in the 
margins, as you read through the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
As the epitome of Modernist art practice I have chosen to concentrate on the 
‘life’ and paintings of Mark Rothko. There are various reasons for this, 
mainly because I have always loved his paintings and wanted to find out why 
I found the authorised interpretations of/on his life and work so irritatingly 
repetitive. I have yet to find a critique of Rothko’s paintings that doesn’t, at 
some point, refer to his suicide in 1970, or his alleged preoccupation with 
mortality as the ‘universal condition’. I initially felt that such repetition was
symptomatic of something else and I wasn’t quite sure what, but I felt that 
Rothko’s critics were somehow stuck within a philosophical paradigm of 
perception, validation and reciprocation which warranted further 
investigation.
I first came across the drawings of Henri Michaux, my second artist for 
consideration, I’m ashamed to say, by accident. The morning after attending 
a Pollock retrospective, held at the Tate (Millbank) in January 1999,1 went 
along to the Whitechapel Gallery where there was a small exhibition of 
Michaux’s work, an artist I’d never heard of before. The contrast between 
the endeavours of Pollock and Michaux was overwhelming, especially given 
that what Michaux was offering was a completely different vision of the 
world in the 1950s and seemed to find his place within it a precarious and 
unstable one. His drawings were small and intricate, unfocused and 
incoherent and they completely undermined the kind of narrative of ‘being’ 
expounded by the Modernist critics of/on Rothko.
*  *  *  *  *  *
When I was a small child, I used to lay in bed, in the dark, and pretend. I 
wasn’t allowed a night light, or have the curtains open, so the night 
enveloped the room and me within it. I would remain very still with my eyes 
wide open and see nothing. I would pretend that I was dead, that I was 
floating in a vast sea of nothingness. Of course I couldn’t articulate it as such 
at the time, my vocabulary was rather limited at the age of five (unlike my 
imagination) but these early ‘voyages’ fed into a later fascination with, and 
dread of, my own death. Such dread and fascination was augmented by the 
intensification of the nuclear arms race in the late 1970s and 80s and the 
environmental damage inflicted on the world by man and his machines. On 
top of this a number of close family and friends died in quick succession.
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The aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner 
is to practice for dying and death.1
It wasn’t until 1992, when I began to study philosophy as an undergraduate 
at Leeds University, that I was facilitated with a vocabulary on/of ‘death’ and 
could attempt to project a theoretical distance between me and ‘it’.
The first philosopher I encountered who dealt with the subject of death was 
Martin Heidegger. ‘Existentialism’, the module, introduced to me in eleven 
short weeks the theoretical delights of Heidegger, Husserl and Sartre. During 
that time I encountered a new vocabulary of uncertainty, of angst and 
nausea and the impossibility of ever being separate from the decaying flux 
of the material world.
Heidegger, was the philosopher that I found the most interesting in that with 
finding himself in the increasingly secular world of the twentieth century 
he turned towards the ‘problem’ of a death without the reassurance of God.
Death ‘itself, as a process, had, in the twentieth century, been ‘appropriated’ 
by the clinical and the scientific. The western world was being 
systematically purged of the messiness of death, especially in a society 
driven by the ‘progressiveness’ of the modern and the commodification of 
the cadaver and its attendant rituals.2 The promise of an ‘afterlife’ came 
under review, especially given the fact that now you didn’t have to wait for 
heaven - there was the increasing promise of a spectacular3 paradise here 
on earth. The question ‘What is death?’ thereby shifted in twentieth century
12
1 Plato, ‘Phaedo’ in Five Dialogues, page 64. My italics.
2 The growing num ber of undertakers, for instance, and the increased ritualisation of 
mourning ‘proper’ meant that, in the twentieth century, the business of death became 
based on the exchange of money and (safe) platitudes. Any excess of mourning seemed 
(and still seems) to be improper and repugnant. The quickest and most efficient method 
of disposing of the now deceased ‘loved one’ is preferred (for the right price).
3 I use ‘spectacular’ here in the Debordian sense, where the dazzle of the commodified 
world, and the objects it contains, covers the mass/mess of unfulfilled and unequal 
social relations and the demise of ‘traditional’ institutions and belief systems (e.g. the 
church).
philosophy,4 from the idea5 that it was the moment when the corporeal body 
is released the soul into the eternal realm of the god(s), to being a matter of 
the hygienic and inconvenience.
Since the times of Socrates and Aristotle the concept of the soul has travelled 
largely intact, through the texts of Western philosophy and theology, as an 
indelibly immortal, commutable and indestructible essence. Life, 
accordingly, was seen as the imprisonment of such an essential being within 
the encumberment of the material and temporal.
Heidegger, in Being and Time, moves away from this vision of life and death 
as well as the forceful Aristotelian idea that essence [ousia] equals actuality 
[energeia] . According to Aristotle essence endures as existence within the 
temporality of here and now (life thereby becomes a stable succession of 
‘nows’) through which it reinforces its knowledge of itself and the world 
around it. Heidegger argues against this legacy of Aristotle by positing the 
notion of Dasein. Dasein, for Heidegger, is an existence rather than essence, 
which although is embodied and somehow understanding of its position in 
the world prior to any epistemological or logical frameworks of meaning, is 
not an enduring soul. Death, within Heidegger’s theory cannot be held  or 
contained within any metaphysical or transcendental framework of 
meaning as it is beyond any system of representation or knowledge, yet is 
(almost) instinctively felt, and then acknowledged, by those wanting to lead 
an authentic life. Nevertheless, dasein is driven by death, as its possibility, 
and thereby constitutes its very being (as being-towards-death).
Yet death, according to Heidegger, as a concept, is 'non-relational’ in that it 
cannot be contained or made meaningful within the daily events or rituals of 
life; it can only be represented as the death of the other, and only becomes 
one’s own when you or I (paradoxically) cease to be. T can never own my
4 It needs to be noted here that the slow and steady move away from the grip of the 
ancient Greeks happened later for philosophy (c20th), than say art or literature (cl9 th).
5 The idea of the immortality of the soul can be traced back to the writings of Socrates 
and Aristotle, through the vast body of Western philosophy and theology.
13
own death whilst I am alive, although I can sense its proximity and 
inevitability.
In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically 
constitutive for death. Dying is not an event; it is a phenomenon to 
be understood existentially.6
Death thereby, according to Heidegger’s theory, becomes a non-event, and 
has no-place, no-where and no-being, however it is certain that T  will die 
and that certainty that drives my life. Anxiety comes about because I do not 
know when or how death will occur, and when it does eventually occur I 
know it will sever me from everyone and everything that I know and am 
certain of. Heidegger thereby argues that as there is no transcendental or 
enduring soul, but only dasein, death offering nothing  but absolute and 
irreversible oblivion.
It was on this brink of nihilism therefore, with the discovery of Heidegger, 
that this particular philosophy student began to find her vocabulary on/of 
death. However, it is fair to say that the majority of philosophical texts being 
fed to me during that time did not sit comfortably with Heidegger’s theories. I 
was instructed to wade through the texts of a number of dry, analytical 
philosophers; Quine, Frege, Russell and the like. Heidegger became 
marginalised accordingly. In retrospect I think that he was introduced into 
my thinking only to be dismissed and ridiculed, definitely not to be taken 
seriously, as a ‘proper’ philosopher. Nevertheless, in 1995,1 embarked on 
my MA in the Social History of Art and discovered other ‘improper’ 
philosophers’ such as de Man, Derrida and Foucault. Heidegger came back in 
from the cold and my intellectual activity and research has largely remained 
within the province of twentieth century continental philosophy ever 
since.7
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6 Heidegger ‘Being and Time’, in Existentialism: Basic Writings, page 293. My emphasis.
7 It is im portant to stress, however, that the division between philosophers such as the 
‘analytic’ and the ‘continental’ is a false one as all such bodies of thought feed into and 
‘contam inate’ each other. Philosophy for me is bigger than its discipline, although others 
may not agree and have a rather narrow concept of its field and importance.
It may surprise the reader to discover that I will not be concentrating on the 
theories of Heidegger for the duration of this thesis, and that there is one 
fundamental reason for this. Heidegger will be mentioned occasionally, and 
his presence is definitely an important one, but Derrida and de Man have 
become, during the thinking through and writing of this dissertation, more 
useful allies. Nevertheless I do not take on their theories wholesale so cannot 
say that I am a resolute ‘Derridian’ or ‘de Manian’, instead I consider myself 
as a scavenger picking up on the more useful elements of their philosophies 
and using them to spur on my own thoughts and theories.
One of the most influential texts by Derrida, on my project, is his book 
Aporias. Within this text he thinks through to the limits of truth and then 
discusses them in relation to the unknowability of death. The etymology of 
the word ‘aporetic’ is of an inconclusive argument, a stalling point in 
thinking which provides no movement towards a solution, literally a non- 
passable situation, or a place without pores [a-poria]. Death according to 
Derrida is the aporetic. Therefore life knows no resolution or absolute end 
(or beginning) constantly unravels itself in /as an infinite number of ends, 
which lead to a no-place and to no-knowledge. Death in this ‘context’ 
becomes both the (non)foundation of truth, life, and its limits:
Although Derrida (rightly) takes on Heidegger’s project on/of death as a 
non-event, or the ‘possibility of impossibility’, he steers it away from any 
nostalgia for presence (as dasein), and away from necessarily linking the 
philosophical pursuit of knowledge with anthropology. Derrida does not posit 
an end to man as death, but the ends of man as the impossibility of ever 
knowing the truth. To posit an end, according to Derrida, would be to 
construct a finality to the pursuit of knowledge, as well as a beginning, 
neither of which exist in relation to life and death. The idea of a circularity 
of time, of beginnings, ends and beginnings again, is an anathema to 
Derrida’s deconstructive processes. For Derrida the end of life is a plurality of 
ends, social, epistemological, physical, which in turn are endless; positing
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that such plurality is evident in any  system of meaning. Although Derrida 
acknowledges the importance of Heidegger’s theories on death, he points out 
that one fundamental flaw in his argument is that he posits the certainty of 
the end (as death) as, paradoxically, both the beginning, and the beginning 
of the end, of an authentic life. Dasein as existence becomes authentic when 
it grasps the reality of its eventual death thereby making its life meaningful 
through the kinds of choices he or she consequently makes. However, this 
means that life (as authentic) only begins to have meaning once death and 
its uncertainty is embraced, which also heralds the beginning of the end of 
life:
In the thinking and the language of Being, the end of man has 
been prescribed since always, and this prescription has never 
done anything but modulate the equivocality of the end, in the 
play of the telos and death. In the reading of this play, one may 
take the following sequence in all its sense: the end of man is the 
thinking of Being, man is the end of thinking of Being, the end of 
man is the end of the thinking of Being. Man, since always, is its 
proper end, that is, the end of its proper. Being, since always, is its 
proper end, that is, the end of its proper.8
Heidegger, therefore implies the complicity of both beginning and end in 
allowing the thinking of being to occur, and it is the claim, or potential of, 
‘proper’ presencing, which hints at essence that remains as a fundamental 
flaw in his thinking. Derrida is (rightly) suspicious that Heidegger argues 
that the ends might meaningfully meet the beginnings in a fuller realisation 
of the presencing of being and thereby becomes both a (potentially) 
essentialist theory of being and a tautological one at that - Heidegger thereby 
‘risks sinking into the autism of closure.’9
The reason why I chose the theories of Derrida rather than of Heidegger, 
therefore, is because Derrida is doubtful of any ‘proper’ foundation of 
humanity, and instead affirms a radically non-foundational notion of play  as 
the de-focusing and deconstructing of stable essences.10 The notion of the
8 Derrida,’The Ends of Man’ in Margins o f  Philosophy, page 134.
9 Derrida, ’The Ends of Man’ in Margins o f  Philosophy, page 135.
10 Although I have myself been accused of trying to reclaim this ‘proper’ humanity in my 
work, I will continue to resist in order to continue this particular project.
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aporetic, as death and as the limit(s) of truth, is one that will reoccur 
throughout this dissertation as the ‘possibility as impossibility’; where the 
possibility becomes that of playing with institutional structures of 
(impossible) meaning and knowledge of being.
Within the context of my dissertation I will be showing how interpretations 
of art inhabit such an aporetic space, as an entombment - as a place of 
impossibility, yet as a place from which the spectre of the artist emerges in 
order to validate our own spectrality of being. The persona of Rothko for 
example, is given as a certainty of its ability to endure physical death and 
maintain itself within the structures of artistic production and (consequent) 
interpretations.
One more caveat: Throughout this dissertation I use two concepts; the subject 
and subjectivity. A false dichotomy is constructed here in that the subject, as 
the socially and culturally constructed notion of self is part of the same 
process that enables subjectivity to emerge and consolidate. At certain points 
in this dissertation I become uncertain whether to use the concept of the 
subject or that of subjectivity. This indecision can radically alter the ways in 
which my argument is read and understood, however after much 
deliberation I decided to, at times, combine the two as (the) subject(ivity) and 
at others to just use the subject or subjectivity.
It is with this notion of the subject and subjectivity that I will begin.
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Within the next chapter I outline the methodologies to be utilised in the 
remaining chapters. The primary concept under investigation here is that of 
a modern subject(ivity) and its relationship to art objects. By exploring the 
crucial, yet illicit, alliance between Hegel's notion of the self-identical 
subject, and the rhetoric of the aesthetic, I will demonstrate how cultural
production reinforces the belief that consciousness and subjectivity coincide 
in a mutually reciprocal and dialectical relationship. This belief, I will 
contend, enables the otherness of the art object (its materiality) to be 
overcome, in order for the viewing subject to recognise itself. Within the 
philosophical rhetoric of the aesthetic, I will argue, it is believed that the art 
object is constituted in the same way as the encountering subject, that art 
somehow has the potentiality for a transcendental subjectivity or 'presence' 
of being. However, by utilising the theories of de Man, Derrida and Nietzsche, 
I will also argue that both subjectivity and 'presence' are only ever partial, 
constituted through a process within which numerous semiotic, material and 
rhetorical components accumulate onto, and into, the 'individual' or indeed 
the 'art object’. Such ‘components’, I argue are neither unique or stable. It 
will be my contention that instead of finding recognition within the art 
object, the subject coincides with these multiple, discursive and material 
‘components’. The subject butts up against the art object’s blind materiality 
and coincides with the 'memories' of a disparate, disembodied and 
rhetorically induced subjectivity (that of the artist). By approaching the art 
object in this way I will argue that subject(ivity) is in constant danger of 
uncovering its own, and the object’s instability and becomes open to other 
(potentially deathly) possibilities. The transcendental aesthetic is instantly 
put into place, ironically through the same rhetorical structure that 
threatens to unravel the subject, in order to cover up, or overcome, this lack 
of essential (self-identical) being. Creating and viewing art begins as a 
process of mourning. It is within the rhetoric of the aesthetic that the 
repetition of the promise of reflection and redemption occurs. The modern 
subject keeps creating and approaching art in a process of forget fulness, 
believing that one day such a promise will be kept. This promise, I have 
contended, is 'made' in the name of the artist (as origin), where the aesthetic 
constitutes the pleasure of overcoming otherness and the viewing subject 




The dissemination of a rhetorical 
subject(ivity)
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1.1 In m em ory  of w ritin g  th is  th e s is
To write (of) oneself is to cease to be, in order to confide in a 
guest/host [hote] - the other, a reader - who will henceforth have 
as charge and as life nothing but your inexistence.11
An imagined performance will occur every time this thesis is read and 
‘understood’. The performativity of each statement will operate within an 
envisioned scene of originary writing. Within this process both ‘you’ as the 
reader and T as the writer will consent to an abuse of time where the 
temporal chaos of ‘life’, the life and time that it has taken to write this thesis, 
will be swallowed up into an uninterrupted and intimate sequence of mutual 
reflectivity - an imaginary and dialectical crossing of proprietorial borders,12 
between what is ‘mine’ and what is ‘yours’. This will also necessitate the 
abstraction and spectrality of both of us: ‘you’ as the generic reader and ‘me’ 
as the named writer.
The thing (the referent) is relieved (relevee, aufgehobene) in the 
sign: raised, elevated, spiritualised, magnified, embalmed, 
interiorised, idealised, named since the name accomplishes the 
sign.13
However, post-structuralism has shown us that such an ‘encounter’ has to 
continually reposition itself within various contexts, depending on when and 
by whom it is read. The same text, the same life, ‘mine’, will be ‘lived’ out 
through the thoughts of others, yet it will deviate and transfigure with(in) 
each and every reading.
Within the context of my life, as contrived through and by discursive 
strategies, the writing of this thesis can be seen an important event. My 
name will be inscribed in the performance of not only this dissertation, but
11 Derrida, Demeure, page 45.
12 ‘... the rhetoric o f  borders ... the lines that delimit the right to absolute property, the 
right of property to our own life, the proper of our existence, in right the property of 
our own life, the proper of our existence, in sum, a treatise about tracing the traits as 
the borderly edges of what in sum belongs to us [nous revient], belonging as much to us 
as we properly belong to it.’ Derrida, Aporias, page 3.
13 Derrida, Glas, page 9.
the larger critical, cultural and theoretical contexts within which it can, and 
will, be placed. Even after my death, if a student decides to pull this text down 
from some dusty library shelf, the process will happen all over again; the 
‘moment’ of writing will be re-imagined and T  will haunt its every 
articulation. Even though I will no longer exist in the world as a corporeal 
body, ‘I’ will still ‘exist’ as a spectral fiction. Even when 1 am alive the 
existence of my physical self is not strictly necessary, as the the mechanisms 
involved in the articulation and understanding of ‘me’ and my life are only 
dependent on my existence as spectre. We are all writers and readers of 
fiction, ostensibly writing for, and reading from, others, but always on 
behalf of ourselves in an attempt to validate our very being-in-the-world.
So what does it entail to write a dissertation? To place oneself, or to abide 
within the text and within the context of a particular discipline, or 
disciplines? Who  performs its exegesis? Whose voice is ‘heard’? Is it one or 
many voices, one or many narratives and is it the same ‘performance’ every 
time?
These may seem impossibly large questions to answer, especially in the 
opening paragraphs of a thesis on/in  art history. I am not sufficiently 
arrogant to believe that I can, or even want to attempt to, resolve any of 
them. At this juncture, I only want to indicate how the issues raised through 
the thinking of these questions are important, indeed fundamental, for an 
even partial understanding of my project. Furthermore, it will have now 
become evident that one of my principal arguments is that any  subject 
position is unstable, that the pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’ and ‘we’ are always open to a 
complex system of appropriation and contextualisation - a complicated state 
of affairs that will be explored, but not repudiated, within this dissertation. 
There is, therefore, no primary reading of this text, no one ‘correct’ way of 
understanding it. I can only ever envisage, indeed welcome, mis-readings of 
my work, as any truths on offer will themselves be spectral.
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The text you are about to read (to yourself) can be reduced, if needs must, to 
one name, life and education: mine. But what I am about to ‘give’ you, in the 
name of ‘death’ and ‘art’, is not strictly mine to bestow. In researching this 
thesis I came across the ideas of many theorists, artists and historians, the 
appropriation of which allowed the concepts I use to function on a variety of 
different levels, as well as manoeuvring through a variety of disciplines. For 
this project I have journeyed through subjects as diverse as philosophy, art 
theory, literary criticism, theology, art history, sociology and anthropology. 
It is partly because of this complexity of references and ideas that I have 
only ever been able to access incomplete traces that frustratingly lead 
everywhere yet nowhere. Some of the concepts I use and explore will 
conflict, making uneasy bed-fellows, butting against each other in an 
unequal and asymmetrical fashion. Also, it is important to point out that the 
discourses into which I make a brief foray are too large to subsume into any 
slick and over-arching argument; indeed, each concept will transform 
within every new context it is discussed:
In our starting p o in t... we will dogmatically begin with the axiom 
according to which no context is absolutely saturable or saturating.
No context can determine meaning to the point of exhaustiveness. 
Therefore the context neither produces nor guarantees impassable 
borders, thresholds that no step could pass [trespasser] ...'4
‘What makes ... words effectively transformative is too big to fit into a single 
mind’,15 or indeed a single context or thesis.
Some of the concepts, words and theories are thereby temporarily homed 
within this dissertation, explicitly called upon and transformed according to 
the context within which they are discussed. Just as importantly there are 
others that hover at its temporarily delineated borders, never finding a 
resting place within it. Explicit, implicit, they all aid me in the construction 
of a rather bizarre version of the world and somehow simulate, with all their 
imperfections, the ‘realities’ reproduced within it. Primarily, though in
14 Derrida, Aporias, page 9.
15 Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, page 28.
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relation to art history, the ‘subjects’ under investigation are two very 
different artists: Mark Rothko and Henri Michaux. Within such an 
investigation I will touch upon their art, lives and bad habits, as well as 
question their very existence(s), the penetrability of their borders, singular 
or multiple. At the same time I will also inquire into differing histories and 
conflicting philosophies, as well as the particularity and peculiarity of 
concepts and discursive strategies. To give an overall ‘theme’ to this thesis 
however, I would also say it is about the concept of death, a concept which 
creates a ‘space’ from which a spectre of subjectivity emerges. I will also be 
looking at how death figures within the discourses that encircle and 
informed the production and interpretation of mid-twentieth century 
abstract art. Within a wider philosophical context, it is also about the role of 
death in certain vital processes - the creation of art and in turn reality, even 
the composition (and decomposition) of our very own subjectivities. This 
then is a rather disjointed project in that the concepts I struggle with 
throughout - death, life, truth, subjectivity etc. - are all large and complex 
and are appropriated, abused and articulated through, and within, many 
different discourses. Because of the predilection of this project perpetually to 
disjoint, it will become impossible to give the words and concepts I use a 
definite, ‘appropriate’ meaning or to place them within a coherent 
discursive or analytical structure. This is especially so within the 
overlapping but disparate contexts of art theory, history and philosophy 
which make this dissertation, and my ‘position’ within it, unceasingly 
unstable, and necessarily inappropriate.
From the outset, therefore, I wish to acquiesce my place as source or origin. I 
refuse to try to, indeed cannot, be a conveyor of meaning or truths, nor to 
give conclusions about what the concepts or processes I discuss are, what 
they have been, or what they are about to become. Instead, my intention is to 
map out an uneven terrain, create a territory within which concepts such as 
subjectivity, death, the soul and temporality are ruptured, delved into, 
mutated, even atrophied. Also, because of the unconventional nature of this
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project, I will take on many diverse, possibly ‘non-academic’, attitudes and 
writing styles. This is not to confuse the reader (although it may) but to 
constantly try  to undermine my position as the narrator and creator of this 
text. The paradox is, however, that in perpetually attempting to remove 
myself, at every turn I seem to re-entrench and rebuild ‘myself within the 
rhetoricity of borders.16
The impossibility of totally removing or articulating the subject from/within 
the text will become more evident as I attempt to unravel the discourses 
around the artists Rothko and Michaux. The problem of retrieving 
(reaching) the artist from the inherent complexities of the discursive 
systems within which they are ‘held’ will be a recurrent one. It is imagined, 
through various discursive posturings, that it will be possible to somehow 
gain privileged access to the artists in question, through the reading of 
primary texts, letters, opinions and official interpretations of the artist’s life 
and works. Such an appeal works on the premise that the artist in question is 
the primary origin. What I am appealing to through(out) this text, however, 
is a discursive spectrality or a hauntological ‘origin’ rather than an 
ontological one.
This logic of haunting [is] not merely larger and more powerful 
than an ontology or thinking of Being (of “to be,” assuming that it 
is a matter of Being in the “to be or not to be,” but nothing is less 
certain). It would harbor within itself, but like circumscribed 
places or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves.
It would comprehend them, but incomprehensively. How to 
comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse about 
the end? Can the extremity of the extreme ever be comprehended?
And the opposition between “to be” and “not to be”?17
Whilst acknowledging this hauntology, I will still be trying to comprehend 
the spectres of Rothko and Michaux. Even though these spectres, borne from 
discourse, can be deconstructed and thereby exposed as fallacious, the 
question I need to ask is, should I then go on to declare them inauthentic? Is
the ‘real’ corporeal body the authentic signifier for ‘being-in-the-world’,
11 There is a multiplicity of borders within the world, o f/on my own ‘self’ and within this 
dissertation.
17 Derrida, The Spectres o f  Marx, page 10.
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for existence!18 Can these artists still ‘exist’ after death, albeit as phantoms? 
Can I believe that the events which ended the corporeal existence of Rothko 
constitute a mere moment of suspension - and which, although fatal in one 
sense - did not end his being-in-the-world as a spectral ‘soul’ or ‘presence’? 
Spectrality, and its relation to the discourse on Rothko will be investigated 
further in chapter two. In chapter three I will also look at the work of 
Michaux, an artist radically different from Rothko, in order to demonstrate 
that the ‘soul’ or ‘presence’ endures as a spectre not only after death but also 
through the duration of the corporeal body. Within chapter three, 
subjectivity will not be posited as a fully conscious entity moving evenly  
through a constant space-time continuum, but as a spectre which cannot 
adequately cover the unceasing state of disintegration, both of the body and 
of consciousness, or regulate the inconsistency of experience. I will also 
argue, by using Michaux as an example, that spectrality can not be separated 
from corporeality, but is constructed by human beings in order to cover over 
their (our) varying degrees of decomposition.19
This conjoining of the spectral and the corporeal is however almost 
impossible to argue convincingly. If spectrality can’t be explained as a fu lly  
linguistic phenomenon - but one that is inextricably tied into or manifests 
(partly) from /in the noemic ‘unknowable’ aspect of the material world - how 
can I fully question the discursive strategies which proffer an ontological 
basis for subjectivity, expose their concepts as fallacious, establish a 
hauntology without falling into an infinite abyss of arbitrary signification 
or hitting a phenomenological dead end? It seems that there will always be 
an excess, something that will escape complete conceptual capture. Arguing 
through linguistic and visual structures means that I can only  ever refer to
or signify words and/or images within the same discursive framework(s).
18 Heidegger’s Being and Time would be an obvious starting point in tackling this 
question in that within this text he discusses (and champions) the notion of an 
‘authentic’ existence - as ‘being-towards-death’. However, as outlined in my 
introduction, I have decided against utilising Heidegger’s theories in any great depth 
(although they do get the occasional mention) as they would lead my argument down a 
different (philosophical) avenue.
19 In relation to consciousness there is an element of re-composition also involved, 
however this is (unfortunately) not the case with the corporeal body.
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What, it seems I have to offer is only:
... very little, almost nothing ... miss[ing] the hardest, the most 
resistant, the most irreducible, the othermost of the ‘thing itself... 
repeat, repeat and repeat again, with neither consciousness nor 
memory of its compulsive droning. 20
What I will do in this dissertation is amplify and investigate this ‘compulsive 
droning’. My argument will thereby constitute an apostrophe, as an exegesis 
of multiple and repetitive fictions. Haunting has no residence, no location 
(dis-location), as the spectre(s) move across and through discursive borders. 
I will look at what the patchwork of such fictions covers up: the contingent 
corporeality of existence. I will turn away from the ‘living’ and call to the 
absent or the dead, addressing the artists Rothko and Michaux as spectres: ‘in 
memory of...’. This is an interaction that does not occur in the present but is 
always lost in a fragmented and abyss-mal ‘past’. I will come back to this 
deconstruction of time later, but for now suffice it to say that when ‘I’ 
interact with ‘you’, or T  interact with ‘Rothko’, it will not be the meeting of 
identical, present subjectivities. My ‘I’ will manifest itself as a fragmentary, 
spectral ‘event’ within the wider spectrum of complex social and cultural 
discourses which are older and wiser than ‘us’. Although, in part, the 
concept of the ‘soul’ will be one of the casualties of this dissertation it will, 
nevertheless, be maintained as a figure, as something that can be presented 
alongside ‘death’. Death, it will be shown, is not a natural and teleological 
‘process’ which maintains the soul through and beyond the dying of the 
corporeal body, projecting it into a ‘safe’ metaphysical space, but is instead a 
fiction without origin. I will argue this originless fiction is covered by a 
virtual mask, a face: a ‘soul’ presented through the figure of prosopopeia. A 
trope with a hauntological rather than an ontological basis whose ‘location’ 
is within the very discursive processes and social rituals that produce it. This 
leads me to the fictive nature of subjectivity itself, in that it is a 
prosopopoetic figure that unifies death, life and soul through the 
construction of narratives, presenting ‘itself’ through linguistic,
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20 Derrida, The Politics o f  Friendship, page 81.
hermeneutic and visual devices as a comprehensive and cohesive identity. By 
uncovering the illusion and fallaciousness of the dichotomy between life and 
death 1 will be constantly decimating and reinventing the subject; dis- and 
rearticulating it within each paragraph. This project will thereby constitute 
many false starts, contradictions and repetitions. Yet for the sake of 
chronology, in order to give the illusion of progress, I will allow it to begin. 
However, in order to do this I will have to outline again the complex 
relationship between the subject (as the pronoun T, ‘You’, ‘Him’, ‘They’,
‘We’ within any  linguistic or indeed visual structure) which believes itself to 
be an autonomous and self-knowable entity within a community of the same; 
and the construction of the same subjectivity, through and by, social and 
cultural ‘narratives’.
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... we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a “self” 
is never in itself or identical to itself. [The] specular reflection 
never closes on itself; ... before or outside [the] structure of 
allegory and prosopopeia which constitutes in advance all “being 
in us”, “in me”, between us, or between ourselves. The selbst, the 
soi-meme, the self appears to itself only in ... bereaved allegory, in 
[the] hallucinatory prosopopeia . . .21
21 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 28.
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1.2 Face-ing  a r t
... representations of death are misrepresentations, or rather they 
are representations of an absence. The paradox at the heart of 
representation of death is perhaps best conveyed by the figure of 
prosopopeia, that is, the rhetorical trope by which an absent or 
imaginary person is presented as speaking or acting. 
Etymologically, prosopopeia means to make a face (prosopon + 
poein); in this sense we may think of a death mask or momento 
mori, a form which indicates the failure of presence, a face which 
withdraws behind the form which presents it. In a manner 
analogous to what Nietzsche writes about the function of Schein in 
The Birth o f Tragedy, such a prosopopeic image allows us both to 
glimpse the interminability of dying in the Apollonian mask of the 
tragic hero, and redeem us from a nauseating contact with the 
truth of tragedy, the abyss of the Dionysian . . .22
In relation to the figure of prosopopeia we can explore the notion of faciality 
which is a concept that will come up several times during the reading and 
writing of this thesis, especially in the concluding section. It must be 
stressed that this is not a representation of an actual ‘face’ but a spectral re­
presentation of Being, or Once-Being, which can ‘speak’, but only th rough 
the performativity of linguistic and/or visual structures. This ‘face’ covers, 
masks, the Activity of such structures as well as the tropes and figures that 
haunt them. As de Man argues:
... it is the figure of prosopopeia, the fiction of an apostrophe to an 
absent, deceased or voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of 
the latter’s reply, and confers upon it the power of speech. Voice 
assumes mouth, eye and finally face, a chain that is manifest in the 
etymology of the trope’s name, prospon, poiein to confer a mask or 
a face (prosopon). Prosopopeia is the trope of autobiography, by 
which one’s name ... is made intelligible and memorable as a face.
Our topic deals with the giving and taking away of faces, with the 
face and deface, figure, figuration and disfiguration.’ 23
Therefore the ‘voice’ beyond the grave comes in the form of an 
address, it is directed at the ‘self’ (where all ‘beings’ think that any 
address is for them (and therefore, as memory ‘in’ them) - it 
figuratively addresse[s] us, looks at us, describes and prescribes to 
us, dictates to us in advance, with the voice under [an] initialled 
signature ...24
This ‘deathly voice’, one that ensues from beyond the grave, seems to have a
22 Critchley, Very Little ... Alm ost Nothing, page 73.
23 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, page 76.
24 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 26.
resonance of its own; as an omnipresence. Although it is a fictive device it 
always - ‘already haunts any said or present voice.’25 Therefore, the ideal and 
specular movement of the self-identical subjectivity, turning towards itself 
in order to comprehend itself fully, turns into the spectral moment through 
and by the trope of prosopopeia. When ‘we turn towards him [the dead artist] 
we address ourselves to him, who addresses himself to us.’ 26 What comes to us, 
through this tropological movement, is not our own self reflection as a 
whole, present and knowable entity, but the figure of an animated spectre - 
one that covers the void both within subjectivity and within the discursive 
structures within which this subjectivity abides.
The memorial trace of the now departed ‘other’ is always allegorical in that it 
covers the actual absence of that other. Such traces, because of their (partial 
and complex) configuration can never be specular because of their 
speciosity, their inability to ‘follow through’. They are not consummate 
enough to reflect our own identical subjectivity back to us, although such 
affirmation is always promised through cultural and discursive mechanisms. 
We think that any recollections we may have of ‘others’ are ‘interiorised’, 
held within our own personal memories and histories as complete and 
autonomous events/experiences.27 They are, in fact, re-membered through 
cultural and social practices (i.e. via the intimate experiences of reading, 
looking and recalling). The memory of others is presented as constituting 
part o f our own sense o f  fboth as an individual and a communal,) self, yet 
such memories, and the people that ‘inhabit’ them, are discursive 
phantasmagoria presented through the trope of prosopopeia. The borders of 
subjectivity ‘are delimited in the way that they are only through this 
experience of the other, and the other as the other that can die, leaving in
me or in us the memory of the other.’ 28 The ‘other’ can only cross the border
25 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 28.
26 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 26.
What I am arguing here is that we assume that the memory is separate from the 
event/7experience and that we ‘hold’ it as an independent entity which is then available 
for recall. However, here I am arguing that we construct that event/experience only 
through its re-membering. Therefore we construct the ‘o ther’ through thinking about him  
or her (v ia linguistic and visual reparation]. They do not ‘exist’ otherwise.
28 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 33. My italics.
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of subjectivity as memorial traces, re-membered within the wider cultural 
and social sphere. The ‘memory’ of the other, and consequently of our sense 
of self, is a rhetorical (culturally derived) device, a promise of safely 
connecting with the other who can then testify to the continuous duration of 
our Being (beyond the physical). We culturally idealise the memory of the 
now deceased other as:
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an interiorising idealisation takes itself upon itself the body and 
voice of the other, the other’s visage and person, ideally and quasi- 
literally devouring them. This mimetic interiorisation is not 
fictive, i t  is the origin o f fiction, of apocryphal figuration. It takes 
place in a body. Or rather, it makes place for a body, a voice, and a 
soul which, although ‘ours’ did not exist and had before this 
possibility that one must always begin by remembering, and whose 
trace must be followed.31
It is with reference to the figure of prosopopeia that I aim to demonstrate 
how death (as indeed life) can only ever be singularly (if aporeticaily32) 
mine. Only through cultural posturing and repetition is it posited as shared 
and universal (constituted as the plurality of m ine which then becomes 
ours). By utilising the figure of prosopopeia I will show how the memories, 
interactions and recollections we have of and with other people, within a 
personal and cultural framework, are only the meeting of spectres which 
address each other through the figural structure of the epitaph. ‘Everything 
we inscribe in the living present of our relationship to others already 
carries, always, the signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the grave’.33 The 
specular (which then becomes spectral or sepulchral) duplication, of 
ourselves to ourselves, and to others, covers the aporetic structure of the
i9 When I think of ‘m e’, even within the immediacy of the ‘present’ , I am always using 
memory and recall. Any sense of ‘me’ is therefore always mediated through and by 
discursive strategies and temporal delay.
30 Again, this is an indirect reference to Heidegger’s theories in that Being (with a 
capital ‘B’) refers to a concept of subjectivity believed to be ‘transcendental’ and 
‘universal’.
31 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 34-5. My italics.
32 I am arguing here that any ‘death’ (actual or conceptual) has no location. Death in the
physical sense happens to everyone as cessation of be subjectivity but no one ever 
experiences it directly - unlike dying which is the process tha t leads to death (as a no­
place for subjectivity).
35 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 29.
isolated subject, constructing a limit o f truth within the borders of cultural 
narratives. Subjectivity is thereby enclosed and encircled by the 
reassurance of discursive strategy. This enables the subject to fix its gaze on 
the horizon, reassured that even though there is something unknown and 
deadly ahead it is somehow rendered knowable, universal and shared, made 
safe through the reassurance of meta-narratives.34 This ‘something’, figured 
as the prosopopoetic ‘face’, is actually beyond the limits of knowledge (as 
truth).35 Yet, because it is made visible, made in the likeness of a universal (if 
spectral) subjectivity, it becomes ‘known’ and therefore rendered harmless. 
This rendering then allows death to be mediated and named as a future event, 
thereby consolidating the experience of now as a shared present (presence).
... the human subject is simply the outer limit or threshold of a field 
within which it cannot itself figure any more than the eye can 
figure within the field of its own vision. What founds all of our 
representations is itself radically unrepresentable, no more a 
material part of the picture it produces than is a perspective.36
I will be arguing that at the very core or vortex of this spectral subjectivity 
is a lacuna, an unknown and unknowable space, which can never be seen, 
acknowledged or understood, only felt through the viscerality of the 
decomposing and aging body. Cultural and social narratives attempt to render 
subjectivity active and progressive rather than ‘passive and impotent. Dying 
is the sensible passivity of the senescence, the wrinkling of the skin - 
crispation: the helplessly aging face looking back at you in the m irror.’37 The 
illusion of preservation or mummification has to be preserved at all costs. 
Time becomes progressive, moving toward the ultimate goal of immortality 
instead of the degenerative chaos of corporeality. Temporality is thereby 
‘shared’ and experienced collectively. We can locate ourselves and others 
within a stable framework within which we can safely ‘interact’. However:
i4 i.e. I do not know what is to become of ‘me’ but I am supposed to trust those who do (the 
Church, the State, psychoanalysts, etc).
35 For further reading on this refer to Derrida’s Aporias, especially the first chapter.
36 Eagleton, ‘Self-Undoing Subjects’ in Rewriting the Self, page 263. My italics.
37 Critchley, Very Little ... Alm ost Nothing, page 75.
32
When and where would we be, ourselves, we, in order to say ... ‘we’ 
and ‘you’? Let us call these questions fictive questions, and recall 
an evidence of common sense: I can address them - these 
anguished, but abstract and fleshless questions - only to an 
addressee; I can only destine them with the precipitative 
supposition of a we by definition and destination, has not yet 
arrived to itself. Not before, at the earliest, the end and the arrival 
of this sentence whose very logic and grammar are improbable.
For the T that feigns to address these fictive questions finds itself 
comprised and determined in advance by the fact that it to the most 
suspended ‘we’ of ... supposed contemporaneity. It is this arrow of 
this teleiopoesis that we have been following and waiting for, 
preceding for a such a long time - the long time of a time that does 
not belong to time. A time out o f joint. 38
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It is this ‘time out of joint’, dis-location, the conflation and interruption of 
time, to which I will return over and over again within this dissertation: The 
dissembling of the teleological ‘I’ within a ‘time without certain jo in in g or 
determinable conjunction’,39 Instead of embarking on the straight and 
progressive path of the telos I will embark upon that of the peras:
The Greek word peras -term  (here, a synonym of the Greek word 
terma) end or limit, extremity - puts us also on the path of per an, 
which means “beyond,” on the other side, and even vis-a-vis. It 
also puts us on the path of perao: I penetrate ... I traverse by 
penetrating, I cross through, I cross over life’s term.40
38 Derrida, The Politics o f  Friendship, page 77.
39 Derrida, The Spectres o f  Marx, page 18.
40 Derrida, Aporias, page 7.
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1.3 N am ing the  p re s e n t  (p re se n c e )
In cross[ing] over life’s term I will transgress the boundary of the self’s (as 
spectre) jurisdiction. Not only the physical boundary that separates the ‘self’ 
from other self-contained entities but also that boundary that allows us 
individual rights, space, time and property. The power of the name and 
signature will therefore be questioned as the signifier that calls forth  the 
self as an identifiable and autonomous subjectivity. The name within this 
context is thereby posited as:
... a magical incantation, uttered without many illusions, but as if, 
having become one with his name in my memory, the departed ... 
would respond to just the call of his name, as if the impossibility of 
distinguishing Paul de Man from the name ‘Paul de Man’ conferred 
a power of resurrection on the naming itself, or better still, on the 
apostrophe of the call recalling ‘the naked name’ as if the uttered 
name resuscitated resurrection ...[this] is the power of the name, 
particularly the so-called proper name, awakens, calls for, attracts, 
or makes possible such magic: not only the desire but the 
experience of hallucination.41
This again brings into question the concept of time and presence as present. 
The name is used with semiotic force, engendering a ‘magical incarnation’ 
that can conflate historical ‘time’ and bring ‘back’ (or ‘forward’) into the 
present that which no longer (or not yet) exists. Derrida, following St. 
Augustine, posits three ‘presents’; the past-present, the present-present, and 
the future-present, all of which are rhetorically (re)presented so as to 
culminate in a static and shared perception of our experienced ‘now’. By 
being positioned within such a constructed ‘present’ we can validate our 
(social and cultural) place within it through shared memories of the past and 
fantasies for the future. Such memories and fantasies, however, are not just 
the juristiction of the self, they are collectively shared within a community 
of the same (ideals, beliefs etc), as the Zeitgeist, the Hegelian Spirit. The name 
is a major figure within this process of retrieval and projection, through the 
recollection and projection of our self and others through the concept of
41 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 47. My Italics.
historical time, the calling of the name can magically re-call the ‘presence’ 
as spectre of now departed souls and adorn them with various attributes. The 
name is also culturally and socially registered as the signature, which is 
always inscribed in the future tense as a mark of propriety and/or intention 
and which ‘projects’ our individual immortality into the future. The name 
and signature (as the future and past-presence of the name) can therefore 
be situated within any time frame and deemed present within the culturally 
contrived phenomenon of a collective (and individual) past or future 
‘memory’ or ‘memory-to-come’.
The name and signature will be recurrent themes within this thesis. I will 
argue that the subject(ivity), in approaching the art-object apprehends, 
through the a culturally contrived ‘interaction’ with the artist’s name (as 
the mark of the spectre), a moment yet to come; as the promise (by the artist) 
of overcoming the future event of death.
Art and philosophy, I will argue, buoy each other up as privileged realms of 
ideas and meaning. Within an never ending dialectics of resurrection they 
present us with a presence of (culturally) remembered and promised Being. 
Art presents a visualised horizon, one in which we can spectrally play out 
what we were, can and will become. Philosophy ‘acts’ as the conceptual way 
of comprehending that horizon. However, it limits that horizon (through 
concepts) whilst still giving the idea of a (metaphysical) space beyond. Even 
as a discourse that is essentially concerned with death, it continues to offer 
something beyond it, freedom from the corporeal, the mundane.
Traditionally interwoven with religion, philosophy offers a meaning which 
surpasses meaning, a heaven beyond the empirical, a sublime within the 
ridiculous. Philosophy, art and religion, metaphysics, aesthetics and the 
concept of immortality therefore intertwine in complex interdependency 
that engenders itself within its own rhetoricity. Death gives meaning  to all 
these institutional discourses in as much as they all offer an empty but 
seductive message of hope through the creation and ‘play’ of spectres as a
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battle posited as already won against the decomposition of both Being and the 
corporeal world ‘beyond’.
I will also argue throughout this dissertation that re-presentation, as 
constructed through and by a complex weave of rhetorical figuration, is an 
attempt to cover over the unstable chaotic and unfathomable world. Putting 
in its ‘place’ a stable ‘knowable’ moment of present(ation): one which has an 
ontological basis. However, as argued above, re-presentation is the constant 
repetition of an ideal present, a hauntology, as a constant repetition which:
re-presents a present that would exist elsewhere and prior to it, a 
present whose plenitude would be older than it, absent from it, and 
rightfully capable of doing without it: the being-present-to-itself 
of the absolute Logos, the living present o f God. 42
In order to take this argument further I need to look at the notion of the 
aporia . Derrida argues that ‘life’ only becomes possible through cultural and 
discursive displacement of the unknown otherness that both inhabits 
subjectivity itself and endures the non-being of the now dead and departed:
We can only live this experience in the form of an aporia: the 
aporia of mourning and prosopopeia, where the possible remains 
impossible .... where faithful interiorisation bears the other and 
constitutes him in me (in us), at once living and dead .43
The aporetic therefore ‘is’44 that which is beyond the boundaries of the 
subjectivity, of truth, of discourse, but paradoxically is necessarily homed 
within them. This is not a metaphysical space or place, but the difference, 
the dis-articulated within. What is at stake here, with(in) the acknowledging 
of the aporetic, is life  as represented through established and institutional 
discourses as whole, teleologically driven and known. Consequently, we 
cannot refer to our own or another’s name or history without erecting our 
own epitaph, as that which mourns the loss of the self-identical subjectivity,
42 Derrida, Writing and Difference, page 237.
43 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 35.
44 The problem with language is that I have to write that ‘the aporetic is ....’. This gives it 
an identity and ontology which it evidently resists.
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Beyond ... preliminary appearance, what is precisely at stake is a 
tropology of memory in autobiographical discourse as epitaph, as 
the signature of its own epitaph - if something of this sort was 
possible other than through a figure, trope or fiction. What figure? 
What fiction? What trope? Prosopopeia. 45
Because this dissertation is written through and by a named origin, the 
figure of prosopopeia inhabits its every assertion. The fiction of a present 
and knowable author is constantly returned and replenished through the 
creation and reiteration of the face. So, as stated earlier, throughout this text 
1 will be constantly attempting to de-face, but will then re-face (my own) 
subjectivity as one inevitably does when trying to make a statement through 
the medium of text or through the production of art. Indeed the continual 
(re)establishing of an identifiable subjectivity seems inescapable when 
travelling through and by the mechanisms of western discourse(s).
Prosopopeia as a figure ‘stands in’ for and covers the partiality of memory, of 
cultural musings on the life and production of a once living being. That 
which remains is illuminated through being placed within discursive 
stratification. Such illumination raises the phantom of presence, bringing 
the dead back from the past, into the present. Prosopopeia is, therefore:
... the figure of this bereaved memory [and] becomes a sort of 
(possible and impossible) metonomy, where the part stands for the 
whole and for more than the whole that it exceeds. An allegorical 
metonomy, too, which says something other than what it says and 
manifests the other (alios) in the open but nocturnal space of the 
agora - in its plus de lumiere: at once no more light, and greater 
light. 46
The metaphor of light will become important within this dissertation, 
especially when discussing Rothko in chapter two, as it is light which is 
commonly used as the symbol for the soul, as metaphysical presence deemed 
to be wholly (or holy) manifest through an illuminated source. (Day)light is 
also proffered within philosophical discourse, as the constant source of 
knowledge, of the rational, which has always to be pitted against the night;
45 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 25.
46 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 37. My italics.
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1 .4 . An e v e n  g r e a t e r  l ig h t
When I write the word ‘death’ it is not strictly to signify the ending of 
corporeality, or the many different contexts within which the concept can 
be ‘placed’; paradoxically it is both and neither. In the context of this 
dissertation, as I have already argued, the concept of death becomes multiple 
and partial; its presence is fe lt on many levels of existence but can never be 
articulated. Its shadow eludes to, effaces, yet enthrals its own definition; its 
trace can be glimpsed, but never fully captured within any system of 
connotation. This is the multifarious and irascible nature of death. It is 
impossible to write coherently or exhaustively about it, but I must try, even 
if it means discussing it in ways that will allow it to elude any exact 
definition. Primarily, it is a concept that (paradoxically) endeavours to be a 
condition of both being and non-being - in that it encompasses the 
termination of the corporeal but then holds the essential remainder of the 
now departed subject(ivty) ‘in abeyance’ (cryptically). The liturgy that 
surrounds death however demonstrates that this ‘essential remainder’ 
occupies a ‘space’ beyond the limit of truth and is thus presented as a 
dangerous ambiguity made safe through the cleansing rituals of funerary
rites and remembrance.
Death is not the noema of a noesis. It is not the object or 
meaningful fulfilment of an intentional act. Death or, rather, 
dvlng is by definition ungraspable; it is that which exceeds 
intentionality and the noetico-noematic correlative structures of 
nhPnomenology. There can thus be no phenomenology of dying, 
because it is a state of affairs about which one could neither have 
an adequate intention nor find intuitive fulfilment. The ultimate 
meaning of human finitude is that we cannot find meaningful 
fulfilment for the finite. In this sense, dying is meaningless and, 
consequently, the work of mourning is infinite.
Since direct contact with death would demand the death of the 
nerson who entered into contact, the only relation that the living 
can maintain with death is through a representation, an image, a 
n ttu^e  of death, whether visual or verbal. And yet, we immediately 
confront a paradox: namely that the representation of death is not 
the representation of a presence, an object of perception or 
intuition - we cannot draw a likeness of death, a portrait, a still life
or w hatever.47
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When one dies, according to some very powerful and longstanding 
institutional discourses, the soul lives on; there is some part of ‘me’ that 
remain; maybe it is within the memories of others, old letters, photographs; 
or maybe the ‘I’ that is no longer tied to the corporeal is somehow held in 
abeyance, placed within some metaphysical or heavenly place. Whatever 
happens, memory, ritual and re-presentation are all conventional methods of 
somehow holding on, of trying to deface the horror of the cessation of being- 
in-the-world. Death is always mediated and thereby resisted. What is 
physically ‘untouchable’ is somehow discursively ‘touched’ upon through 
the spectral appropriation and ‘safe’ visualisation of the deceased. Death, in 
this sense, is always mediated. Any direct relationship with it as experience 
o f  it would mean one’s own death and being caught up within a yet unknown 
and unknowable ambiguity. ‘I’ can only ever say ‘I am dead’ through the 
mediation of discursive strategy and always before the event, however 
immanent. One can never experience death in its unmediated sense. You 
would be dead. Indeed you would have ceased to ‘be’ and could therefore not 
recount your own experiences. The experience of death therefore is always 
given on-behalf-of. Discourse always holds us in a state of mourning  within 
its perpetual displacement of dying, mortality and corporeality and its 
constant (re)construction of the ‘experiences’ of the dead (and of death).
...mourning .... It consists always in attempting to ontologize 
remains, to make them present, in the first place by identifying 
the bodily remains and by localising the dead (all ontologization, 
all semanticization - philosophical, hemeneutical, or 
psychoanalytical - finds itself caught up in this work of mourning 
but, as such, it does not yet think it; we are posing here the 
question of the spectre, to the spectre ...48
Whatever the medium, whatever philosophical or theological framework it 
may be, it is my argument that the positioning of a dead person within such 
spectral, visual or theoretical contexts constructs a face upon/within which
to ‘place’, or provide a place for, their magnified trace. This facing of the
47 Critchley, Very Little ... A lm ost Nothing, page 73.
48 Derrida, The Spectres o f  Marx, page 9.
now departed other ‘masks’ and makes safe the void of non-being.
The movement of interiorisation keeps within us the life, thought, 
body, voice, look or soul of the other, but in forms of those 
hypomnemata, memoranda, signs or symbols, images or mnesic 
representations ... are lacunary fragments, detached and dispersed 
- only parts of the departed o ther.49
Such ‘lacunary fragments’ are, however, within the discourses of Western 
culture, re-figured and irradiated as the promise of an afterlife, one that can 
be glimpsed safely and at a distance within the contemporaneity of now. 
Whether it is through religion, art, or drugs, the pure state of ‘being’ is 
repeatedly posited as waiting to be experienced, to be illuminated through 
another vehicle; to transform Being through an altered state o f self without 
the encumberment of corporeality. This ‘altered state of Being’ can be 
figured within many different contexts, but in this dissertation it will be 
discussed in relation to the two artists already mentioned, Rothko and 
Michaux. With regard to Rothko I will argue that his artworks are positioned 
as the phantasmic presence of a now deceased ‘Rothko’ occurring through 
the dirgal repetition, and ‘transcending’ his suicide. His non-corporeality is 
thereby denied through the strategies of various discourses and his 
prosopopoetic spectre is then projected onto/into traces of his ‘creative 
moments’. This ‘altered state of being’ will shift throughout my discussion of 
Michaux insofar as I will argue that he himself tried to ‘die’, many times, 
through the use of drugs. Not die in the conventional sense, where drugs 
would deprive him of his life, but where he tries to remove himself from the 
static and ‘known’ culturally and socially inscribed world, to become even 
more tied into the ‘truth’ of his corporeality. In this sense Michaux’s ‘altered 
state of being’, I will argue, becomes the impossibility of dying.
The concept of death when used within these various contexts will taunt; it 
will shift, cover its own non-conceptuality by throwing out illusions, come 
into focus only to slip through the gaps within the text. The concept of death 
cannot be held within any  object, discourse, or experienced or described in-
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49 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 37.
itself, ‘ ... it trembles with an unstable multiplicity as long as there is no 
context ...\50 Death only becomes a concept when used within a particular 
context; its comprehensibility is an illusion, which, once removed from any 
context, falls back into its own aporetic and degenerative ‘space’. However, 
even though the concept of death is vacuous and illusory, I will be arguing 
that it acts as the foundation for meaning. The cultural ideal being: ‘... that 
historical moment when “life endures death and maintains itself in death’” 
in order to gain from death ‘the possibility and the truth o f speech.,S1
Through the duration of this dissertation it will become obvious that death 
haunts every word, even though it is ambiguous, multiplicitous, permeates 
every known and unknown border and cannot be ‘contained’ within any 
possible present-past, present-present or present-future.52 The present 
therefore, the now-ness of interaction,5" will not be ‘given’ within this thesis 
as the transparent and known ‘present’, rumbling towards a mutually 
satisfactory conclusion, but as the multiplicitous and fragmentary 
‘experience’ of a time out o f joint. This thesis will therefore be made up of a 
layering of asymmetrical ‘events’ leading to a multiplicity of possible 
endings (which in themselves will lead onto other, as yet unknown and 
unstable journeys).
The comparison of the works of Rothko and Michaux will thereby 
demonstrate the suspension of the mono-temporal subjectivity ‘placed’ 
between life as the cultural promise of a future transcendence of death, and 
life as riveted to the multiplicitous, multi-temporality of existence. This 
suspension will be presented within this dissertation as a fundamental 
paradox, yet it will enable me to establish how Rothko’s work aims to hold the
presence of ourselves and others in the present-present by projecting the
50 Derrida, Aporias, page 9.
51 Blanchot, La part du feu, page 324. Quoted in Critchley, Very Little ... A lm ost Nothing, 
page 52.
521 am referring here to St. Augustine’s observations on time as outlined on page 28.
S3I use the concept of ‘now-ness’ here as the bringing together of the seperate (temporal, 
historic and physical) interactions; the reading a n d /o r  writing or reading this thesis; 
into the ‘p resent’. This concept can also be applied to the multiplicitous interactions 
with (in) any artwork or text.
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possibility of experiencing loss into the fu ture-presen t. Making our ‘lived’ 
experience meaning-full. Death, or being-towards-death in this context, is 
always here  as a figure that allows the present to exist by acknowledging, yet 
projecting, the inevitability of death into a stable present-future. This 
acknowledgement of death is then presented the promise of its overcoming; 
allowing subjectivity to exist ‘now’ through the cultural repetition of a 
transcendental logic.54 This enables the subject to locate itself within a shared 
temporality; as beings-in-progress, as a beings-towards-a death which is 
always deferred; or as a being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a universal 
and institutionally endorsed) metaphysical or heavenly place.
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Also within this dissertation, especially in chapter three, I will demonstrate, 
through the investigation of the work of the French artist/w riter Michaux 
and the theories of his contemporaries, Blanchot, Deleuze and Guattari, that 
at various junctures throughout history, certain cultural moments have 
developed which began to articulate the subjectivity in crisis, as partial, 
incomplete and chaotic. Paris in the middle of the twentieth century was one 
such ‘moment’. As Dollimore explains in Death, Desire and Loss in Western 
Culture, such events have been commonplace throughout ‘history’:
... in Augustine’s Confessions (c. 397 - 401) ... we find one of the 
most influential precedents for the way in which ‘modern’ 
subjectivity is founded in the same sense of crisis which imparts 
the restless expansionist energy which is the making of 
civilisation itself. Augustine suggests how individualism was from 
the beginning energised by an inner dynamic of loss, conflict, 
doubt, absence and lack, and how this feeds into our culture’s 
obsession with control and expansion - the sense that the identity 
of everything from self to nation, is under centrifugal and 
potentially disintegrative pressures which have to be rigorously 
controlled. This is a kind of control that is always exceeding and 
breaking down the very order it restlessly quests for, and is 
forever re-establishing its own rationale even as it undermines it 
.... It is this that we have inherited; what we are living through 
now is not some (post-)modern collapse of Western subjectivity but 
another development of its enduring dynamic.”
There have always been moments, throughout history, of dis-articulation,
54 As a subject (socially and culturally contrived) you live then you die, but you do not 
cease to ‘be’, unlike subjectivity (as sense of self) which does.
55 Dollimore, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pages 92 - 93.
when established discourses and systems of beliefs could no longer hold 
subjectivity within their delineated borders.56 It is at such times, especially 
now within the ‘post-modern' era, that we cannot be consoled by the comfort 
of a deferred or transcended death. Instead, we are constantly forewarned of 
death’s immanence by deconstructive theories. It is immediate, we are told, it 
is everywhere at ail times, breaking down the borders of our own 
subjectivities. Death is thereby multiplicitous, dangerous, we do not know at 
which moment we will come across it or when it will undermine us.
Yes these warnings turn endlessly. Yes, like searchlights without 
a coast they [deconstructive theories] sweep across the dark sky, 
shut down or disappear at regular intervals and harbour the 
invisible in their very light. We no longer know against what 
dangers or abysses we are forewarned. We avoid one, only to be 
thrown into one of the others. 57
So in writing about death, by either writing about it as known, plotting its 
position within modernist and post-enlightment thinking, or as something 
that is abyss-mal, fatal, and dangerous as forewarned by Derrida and visually 
articulated by Michaux, I will, throughout this dissertation, be repeatedly 
questioning what death actually is, and why it figured, or dis-figured, so 
strongly in the abstract art of New York and Paris in the 1950s. This is not an 
easy subject to write about. Trying to concretise such a concept into the 
permanence of words 1 find that I become dizzy, constantly going round in 
circles; the artist - the art object - the viewing subject - discourse - the artist 
and ad infinitum, to infinite regress. Where do I begin and end? Can I really 
disregard an ontological (rather than a hauntological) origin as the source 
of meaning, of truth? Surely it has to be there somewhere. The way in which 
the complex weave of relationships between the artist-art-viewer is 
construed means that I have to constantly refer to opaque philosophical 
concepts in order to explicate myself, make myself understood, heard, to give 
myself a spectral (therefore a prosopopeiaic) voice. But, somehow, it’s not 
real enough. It seems that I am constantly speaking to, and about, my own
56 By ‘delineated borders’ I am referring to the param eters ‘dictated’ by institutions such
as the church or the state.
57 Derrida, P olitics o f  F riend ship , page 8 .
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(non)relationship with death: T say my name, and it is though I were 
chanting my own dirge.’ 58 ‘Negation is the very work of language and thus 
when I speak a nothing comes to speak in me.’ 59
So, in order to ‘enter’ the realm of others, to enter the ‘realm’ of shared 
experience, and to break my solitude, I call the artist’s name. Yet in 
summoning the presence of Rothko or Michaux I only interact with spectral 
figures exhumed from partial, material or textual traces of a life once lived, 
creative gestures once made, a voice once uttered. I can look at their work, 
texts, photographs, their own writings, but in doing so I only bring forth 
rhetorical figures, spectres, which as it were, stand in for the absence of the 
artist, as a knowable, understandable entity - which, in an ideal situation, 
would be presented to you, the reader of this text, for your intellectual and 
visual consumption. However, we are not caught in one homogenised closed 
or shared culture but many overlapping, estranged, and inhospitable ones: 
strands, networks, intersections and dispersions. All of which may sometimes 
coincide but only ever partially. As Derrida argues when discussing the laces 
on Van Gogh’s shoes:
Accept here, concerning the truth in painting or in effigy, that 
the interlacing causes a lace to disappear periodically: over under, 
inside outside, left right, etc. Effigy and fiction . 60
When I discuss the artists, or try and glimpse their presence within the art 
work, or when I approach the theorists through whose ‘wise’ words I attempt 
to encounter the way forward, I will constantly (and frustratedly) return to 
different voices, none of which speak the same language:
Multiple, expandable and protean as it may be, the corpus of a 
single individual .... could not be its sole witness, even less contain 
it. As is the case in any mutation, [the name] is never exempt from 
repetition .61
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58 Blanchot, La part du feu  .page 43. Quoted in Critchley, Very Little ... A lm ost Nothing, 
page 54.
59 Critchley, Very Little ... A lm ost Nothing, page 54.
60 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 31.
61 Derrida, The Politics o f  Friendship, page 80.
I cannot reach the voice of the artist. Instead, I hear the many voices of art 
historians, philosophers, modernist and post-modernist theorists, all 
subsumed under the name ‘culture’. Voices coming together to raise the 
spectral vision of Being (for/of us all). Disparate voices distanced by, 
amongst other things, history, discipline, geography and/or intent. Figured 
voices of Being. Being figured: there is not just one spectre raised, but many.
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So, by taking a deconstructive perspective (initially through Derrida and de 
Man), 1 will demonstrate that the subject in its knowable state is primarily 
constituted through tropological and figural devices. I shall show that this 
subject, within a suspended dialectic between brute existence and conceptual 
illusion, is constantly dis- and re-established, as it were, within a ‘living’ 
death:
... the absolute imminence, the imminence of death [occurs] at 
every instant. This imminence of a disappearance that is by 
essence premature seals the union of the possible and the 
impossible, of fear and desire, and of mortality and immortality, in 
being-to-death.62
I will also demonstrate how the projection of a figure into the abyss of non­
meaning constitutes:
... a substitute, a prosthesis that we put forth in order to represent, 
replace shelter, or dissimulate ourselves, or so as to hide 
something, unavowable - like a shield.63
By showing how subjectivity constantly looks within the realm of ‘tru th’ for 
some ontological6’ foundation, I will demonstrate how, in constantly looking 
for its own origins, producing a figurative ‘shield’ with which to deflect the 
threat of non-being, the subject both unravels and establishes itself within 
each and every m om ent. Life and death cohabit every instance. I will also
show that once the prosthesis is removed and the void is uncovered it is
62 Derrida, Aporias, page 4.
63 Derrida, Aporias, page 11.
64 In the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the etymology of ‘ontology’ is as follows 
‘Gr. on, ontos, pr.p. of einai, to be, logos, discourse’. This undermines the premise that 
an ‘ontological foundation’ constitutes a metaphysical and essential substructure for 
Being.
almost instantly (through cultural convention) covered by another. The 
problem remains: once the subject is staring at its own non-being, how can it 
still ‘exist’ as a self-conscious being?
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I will, throughout this dissertation, also investigate how the subject 
supplements the lack of knowledge about its own existence by giving itself 
and the world meaning through cultural re-visions. In lim iting  my own 
scope of investigation to the visual arts I will argue that the subject, in 
interacting with such formulaic, contrived and rhetorical entities, 
establishes the art-object as a privileged vehicle through which it affirms its 
own autonomous and infinitely abstractable nature.
I will also argue that, because the subject is inherently aphasic65as to its 
fallacious nature, it instinctively denies its ‘lack’ of autonomy and self 
knowledge by way of universal ‘tru th’ and thereby re-affirms its identity as 
being identical to that of others. This is, I contend, is the will to untruth. 
Nietzsche argues, within yet another ‘pre’ post-modernist moment:
... as soon as man finds out how the world is fabricated solely from 
psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the 
last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any 
metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world. 
Having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming 
as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind o f clandestine access 
to afterworlds and false divinities - but cannot endure this world 
though one does not want to deny it. 66
Art-objects are, I contend, created so that the artist/viewer can constantly 
reaffirm his or her subjectivity and posit him /herself as a socially positioned 
entity. In creating and re-creating possible worlds and realities, ‘placing’ 
them within visual (and linguistic) systems of connotation, the viewing and 
producing subject can bring forth the illusion of knowledge, of a priori, and 
indeed a posteriori, truths.
65 If you notice I am treating this ‘subject’ as a concept rather than applying it to my own 
‘being’; this, I think, is im portant as it shows the impossibility of acknowledging the 
‘fallacy’ of my own being through the very linguistic devices that constitute it.
66Nietzsche, The Will to Power, page 13. Quoted in Critchley, Very Little...A lm ost 
Nothing, page 9.
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By naming  (and thereby dis-arming) the discontiguity between truths and 
their rhetorical nature a tentative suture is attempted. The closure of this gap 
within the discursive structure of the art-object is made possible by 
supplementing its unstable material existence with philosophically mobilised 
notions of the aesthetic, the metaphysical and/or the ‘real’. The 
perishability, the materiality of the art-object is embalmed and thereby 
displaced within the rhetoricity of the original (artistic) presence. This 
allows the subject to conceptualise this gap and thereby satiate its own lack to 
deny its own rhetorical structure with ethereal illusions.
By concentrating on Hegel's master/slave dialectic as the primary figure 
which dominates post-Enlightenment (Western) thinking, I will argue that 
the art-object exists primarily as a device through which the (illusory) 
subject can reflect upon its own stable position within a transient world. The 
art-object is thereby endowed with a metaphysical and mystical presence 
through and by which the subject can abstract its own consciousness, thus 
positing itse lf as an independent and essentially dualistic entity. Like the 
object upon which the subject gazes, it is itself made up of a corporeal body 
yet it believes that it is somehow embalmed by an autonomous subjectivity; a 
presence or origin from which, and for which, it was created.
Although the rhetorical nature of discourse circulating and supplementing 
the art-object furnishes the subject with these ‘truths’, the contingent and 
rhetorical nature of such truths, the noemic existence of the re-presented 
object, and the perishable materiality of the object itself, means that the 
subject, like the original object or artist, and indeed the art object itself, is 
precariously positioned; they both balance between life as meaning, and 
death as non-meaning. The brute materiality of both the world and the body, 
their propensity for decay is disavowed in the feeble attempt to stabilise 
knowledge, to produce and procure ‘truths’ that are fixed and eternal. The 
acknowledgement of an extraneous other space, of decay, aporia, finitude and
death (as non-meaning) could potentially unravel the subjects own sense of 
identity. Kristeva argues that:
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There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of 
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the 
possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but 
it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates 
desire, which nevertheless does not let itself be seduced. 
Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened it rejects. A certainty 
protects it from the shameful - a certainty of which it is proud 
holds onto it. But simultaneously, just the same, that impetus, that 
spasm, that leap is drawn toward an elsewhere as tempting as it is 
condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a 
vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it 
literally beside himself. 67
Death being that to which we are not accustomed, we approach it 
either as the unaccustomed that astonishes or as the unfamiliar 
that horrifies. The thought of death does not help us think death, 
does not give us death as something to think. Death, thought, close 
to one another to the extent that thinking we die, if dying, we 
excuse ourselves from thinking: every thought would be mortal; 
each thought, the last thought.68
Following Kristeva, I will argue that it is this terrifying void of non-meaning 
and non-being that partly  drives human beings to create cultural systems. 
This allows them to repeatedly supplement and 'make safe’ this excess as that 
which is ‘literally beside himself, and capture life as a whole entity, a 
metonomic presence, for consumption. This presence is both older and 
greater than ‘us’, in that it is, the cultural refiguration of ‘lacunary 
fragments’, the object-in-itself, that which has no (longer a) voice of its 
own. As Derrida argues, the memories of departed others (and thereby 
ourselves), usually re-inscribed into cultural objects, are:
...in turn ... parts of us, included ‘in us’ in a memory which 
suddenly seems greater and older than us, ‘greater’ beyond any 
quantitative comparisons .... the figure of this bereaved memory 
becomes a sort of (possible and impossible) metonomy where the 
part stands for the whole and for more than the whole that it 
exceeds. An allegorical metonomy too, that says and manifests the 
other (alios) in the open but nocturnal space of the agora - in its 
plus de lumiere: at once no more light, and greater light. 6y
67 Kristeva, The Power o f  Horror, page 1.
68 Blanchot The Step not Beyond, page 1.
69 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 37. My italics.
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This ‘memory’, the illumination of the ‘greater light’, I have already argued, 
is culturally borne. No more light, as the end of ‘being’, is covered over by 
offering the continuation of biography after death. This can only be done, 
however, through the constant re-inscription, the creative re-invention of 
some ontological foundation, the ‘place’ where souls can congregate waiting 
to be called into existence; as Beings beyond the physical. The partial nature 
of the cultural artifacts that remain are thereby individuated, i.e. made whole 
through remembrance of the name; the epitaph or the effigy. Such spectres 
can only ‘exist’ within the realm of the theoretical and the figural. 
Narratives, transmitted onto and through cultural objects through the 
spectre of the artist, shines a knowledgeable light, a light greater than that 
which emits from being itself, into and onto the viewing subject and the 
material world that surrounds it.
Death as the lacunary space of non-meaning, that which is beyond the 
figural, takes us beyond Hegel's dialectic, beyond the borders of post­
enlightenment truths. By scrutinising the Derridian notions of force and 
presence I will circumvent the limits of Hegel’s main premise and argue 
against the idea that his dialectical movement captures both the negative and 
positive aspects of the movement between an autonomous self-knowing 
subject and a knowable object. I will uncover a tomb within discursivity 
inside which the materiality of the subject, and the object upon which it 
gazes perishes, decays and dies.
I will argue that the ‘original’ lost but re-presented object, that which is 
beyond the tropological systems within which both the subject and its world 
are inscribed, is at the very core of meaning as force and presence. In being 
deferred, denied, buried with-in (yet with-ouf) discursive mechanisms, the 
force of presence, the presence of an origin, is indeed an aporetic but 
forceful space. The force of meaning comes from a void, over which the 
spectre of presence, as origin, is projected. The real noemic object (or once-
subject) as the unwitting site of meaning, is paradoxically meaning-less in 
itself. In itself it is beyond signification; the sound, smell and sight of its 
decomposition covered over by cultural rites and rituals. The negative 
noemic aspect of the re-presented object cannot be subsumed in a slick, all 
encompassing dialectical movement, can not be effortlessly neutralised by 
the positive. The very process of the dialectic necessarily involves the death 
of the noemic object as a site of non-appropriatable meaning; yet its 
continuing non-meaningful existence is always embedded within the 
process. This residual object, inherent within all cultural systems, is 
therefore covered and denied by offering the viewer the effect of the 
aesthetic and the real. However, this deathly residue, the noemic object, the 
corpse, the aporetic, whatever you want to call it, within whatever 
theoretical framework you choose, can momentarily rupture the discursive 
manoeuvres which are set to keep it in place. The noise, smell, the abject 
break through, as:
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that which disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect 
borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite ...[the corpse as] utmost abjection ... it is death infecting 
life. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, 
from which one does not protect oneself from an object. Imaginary 
uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up 
engulfing us. The corpse is intolerable because it shifts the border 
between life and death into itself. 70
In a similar vein the Klang71 makes its atonal gesture as one that is without 
origin, reverberating through, and potentially threatening, all cultural 
systems, down to the core of ‘being’ itself. Although appropriated as the 
sound through which the signification of speech is articulated, it is in-itself 
without gesture, intention or residence.
70 Kristeva, The Power o f  Horror, pages 2 & 4.
71 Derrida writes about the ‘Klang’ as a ‘ringing, sonorous light reverberating on a stone 
bell’; it is that which is no longer mute, but not yet speaking (see page 3 Glas). I am 
using this concept as the noise, or the death rattle, which is made when the cadaver 
disintegrates - tha t which is covered up through religious ceremonies and social rituals.
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1.5 The ‘k la n g ’ and  the  silen c in g  of the  n o isy  cad av e r
The truth: that you’re dead, or that you don’t stop dying and that 
your image, like your name resounds to infinity ... in the “stones” 
that “say”, “familiarly” death upright, the bordel [le claque], the 
sound of bells [cloches], the apotheosis, the tomb as pedestal [socie], 
the mausoleum, the prelate’s neck [cou], the collapse 
[degringolage] of the Immaculate Conception, and so on, the letters 
and steps [marches] of “glory”. For the first and last time, and as an 
example, here you are as if forewarned by this text of what clacks 
here - and decomposes the cadaver of the word ...72
The scope of truth, according to established theological and philosophical 
discourses, has no boundaries, it is infinite. These discourses are built on the 
premise that any  journey into the ‘unknown’ has already been undertaken, 
the work of knowledge has already been carried out on our behalf. However, 
according to Derrida, any realm of truth (and there are many) does have its 
limits; it is finite, contingent and does not have the capacity to contain or 
represent everything.73Truths, according to this theory, are contained 
within borders which can be feasibly transgressed. However such borders 
offer vital protection in that they are ‘ ... created by a substitute, a prosthesis 
that we put forward in order to represent, replace, shelter, or dissimulate 
ourselves, or so as to hide something unavowable like a shield.’74 Spectres, as 
the manifestations of this substitution, shield the borders of truth in order to 
protect subjectivity from confronting something completely other to itself; 
the aporetic75. Spectres thereby supply us with concepts, through which we 
acquire knowledge of the metaphysical. The spectral offers the infinite to us, 
already and safely known. Although major concepts such as the ‘aesthetic’ 
and the ‘sublime’ (for example) are potentially transgressive, in that they 
encompass a ‘space’ beyond the border of the physical, they are safely
72 Derrida, Glas, page 3.
73 See Derrida, Aporias, chapter 1: ‘Finis’.
74 Derrida, Aporias, page 11.
75 The ‘place’ of aporia is where ‘ ... there is no longer any problem. Not that, alas or 
fortunately, the solutions have been given, but because one could no longer even find a 
problem that would constitute itself and tha t one would keep in front of itself, as a 
presentable object or project, as a protective representative or a prosthetic substitute, as 
some kind of border still to cross or behind which to protect oneself.’ Derrida, Aporias, 
page 12. My italics.
retained (as discursive strategies) within the perimeters o f truth. However it 
is my contention that such concepts only  ‘exist’ within  the juristiction of the 
spectral and upon the border itself. Death is another concept that 
‘represent[s] the crossing of a border, a voyage between here and the beyond 
... toward this or that place beyond the grave.’76 Death is thereby posited, 
through established discourses/7 as a crossing; not between spectrality of 
truth and the aporetic, but between the physical and the metaphysical.
With cultural platitudes and metaphysical musings we cover up the aporetic 
space of the unknowable, of the irreducible other, as that which ‘exists’ 
beyond the borders of truth. We discursively disavow this deathly place by 
composing figures, spectres, which will protect the borders between the 
known (as truth) and the unknown. These borders provide shelter, a loci 
within which the universal subject(ivity) can safely abide. The spectres 
found on the perimeters of truth are given faces and names which endow 
them with culturally validated attributes.78 The fictitious nature of these 
spectres is thereby covered over, which then allows them to act as (stable) 
substitutes for the decomposability of the noemic, material ‘world’.
So although I will write in this thesis of particular artists and historical 
‘moments’ it will not be a voyage bound for a destination where resolute 
answers are to be discovered, of truths that will lead to a redemptive and 
enlightening moment of ‘knowing’, but one of equivocal questions; an 
opening up, a circulation around the different levels of discursive strata that 
surrounds, embalms and entombs the art object; securing its meaning forc­
ing, as it were, the cadaver to breath. As Derrida states in the above quote 
‘you don’t stop dying’; all subjectivities, culturally induced and maintained 
occupy a liminal space, not differentiated between ‘life’ and ‘death’ in the 
strict sense.
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76 Derrida, Aporias, page 6.
77 Such a crossing is usually marked through and by religious and social rituals, where 
the now-departed is sent, through the power of incantation, to a safe (and known) ‘place’.
78 For example ‘honour’, ‘dignity’, ‘genius’, etc.
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Although I will be staying within the realm of the ‘tru th’ I will be making a 
vertical rather than horizontal journey, below rather than across, in order 
to uncover, dis-inter the rotting and noisy corporeality which lies at the 
foundation of truth. By doing this I will unearth the cadaver which has 
discursive structures enforced upon it in order for the Klang to be covered 
over with spoken words, imaged realities and written texts. I will argue 
within the main body of this thesis that this ‘Klang’ can never be covered 
completely and momentarily breaks through in the form of kinesthesia - the 
aural aspect of disintegrating materiality; both of the art object and the body 
of the now deceased artist.
Why use the metaphor of the noisy cadaver to discuss the art object? Well, the 
forced opposition between life and death, the living whole body and the 
rotting corpse, between subject and object, is one which I intend to dissolve, 
dis-inter-grate. The cadaver, which in the case of the art object, is covered 
by the figure of prosopopeia, offers an eternal ‘presence’, usually in the 
name of the artist, yet is, like the artist behind and the viewer in front, 
perishable, decaying - death thereby occurs, I will argue, within every 
moment of ‘living’.
The concept of death in-itself, as I have already argued, refers to, and is 
based on nothing; it cannot be fixed or placed within a metaphoric 
relationship of equivalence (as the opposite, but continuation of ‘life’). It is 
used to indicate the ‘end’ of life, a ‘passing on’ into the unknown, Heaven or 
H ell... to which we can never travel but can receive messages from through 
the medium  of art. What I will endeavour to demonstrate however is the 
impossibility of the possibility of such a passage by indicating the aporetic :
...the impossible passage, the refused or denied, or prohibited 
passage, indeed the non passage, which in fact be something else, 
the event of a coming or of a future event [evenement de venue ou 
d ’avenir], which no longer has the form of the movement that
consists in passing, transversing, or transiting.’79
Being, I will argue, is continually trapped within this non-possible passage. 
Although it is rhetorically promised, as a voyage beyond the empirical, 
where metaphysical truth will be sought and found. Being is thereby stuck 
in such a ‘moment’, struck as it were dumb, where life and death enmesh 
around a disintegrating subjectivity. This dumbness is covered by 
philosophical discourse, and like the art object before it, is spoken on ‘behalf 
o f by such discourses. The philosophical text, therefore, attempts to covers 
the fall into the abyss (yet at the same time cannot prevent it) by suturing 
together the multiplicity, the ‘patches’ which constitute the subject and 
presents/presences it as whole. However, this suture is never complete or 
stable because the concepts and figures stitched together in order to fix the 
subjectivity transgress the borders of other disciplines, histories and 
cultures and therefore remain aporetic in their difference (to themselves 
and to each other).
I will argue that meanings ‘appropriated’ by the subject from the art-object 
are supplemented by the illusory presence of the aesthetic, metaphysical or 
the real. Such terminology conceals the real world’s and the conceptual 
field’s recalcitrance to become a site of meaning. By ‘mimicking’ and 
reflecting the subject as an autonomous being, the art-object deflects the 
threat of death; this it does by the appropriation of, and introjection into, 
‘objects’ which otherwise would be beyond the subject's reach, or at least 
would decay and die in an abject-ional manner.
In referring back to the first quote of this section, I will argue that the 
‘stones’ that ‘say’, on ‘behalf of’, allow, through the figure of prosopopeia, 
that which does not have a voice to speak. Reconstituting the cadaver of the 
now dead artist into an autonomous Being, so that it can speak on its own 
accord, be present-in-the-present; become a Being-in-the-world-now. The 
truth is, however, that without ‘life’ being constantly inscribed and re­
79 Derrida, Aporias, page 8.
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inscribed within cultural systems, all subject(ivitie)s would be dead in the 
social and thereby ‘individuated’ sense - have no meaning for ourselves or 
indeed others.
I have argued that, by covering the fissure between noemic materiality and 
rhetoricity and by giving the subject the satisfaction of appropriation, 
cultural narratives re-cover the subject (the abject) and give back the 
fantasy o f wholeness. However, the materiality of the subject/object disturbs 
this fantasy, making it momentary, ensuring that the subject relentlessly 
strives for more. It is this that allows art to live, to come into being, in that its 
fundamental utility is the repetitive disavowal of death.
It has seemed appropriate, so far, for me to adopt an overtly metaphorical 
‘style’ throughout this dissertation so that my words can open up spaces; to 
make gaps which expose the rhetorical nature of the subject and the art 
object and their consequent discourses, and thereby offer, paradoxically, a 
theoretical ‘account’ of the unaccountable/aesthetic, even though the thing 
or being-in-itself cannot be incorporated into such a framework. The form 
and content of the remainder of this dissertation will have the same 
rhetorical (and non-essential) style of its subject-matter.
We all wear either proper or impropria persona when we write...if 
we are confronted with different audiences (multiple desires, 
forces) and if we have different things (forces) to express, doesn’t 
it follow that we need many different masks (folds)?80
Also, while theorising the multifarious concept of death, I will keep in mind 
that:
Tropes allow us to open up places, spaces, if not completely turn 
them inside out. Yes, it is not a matter to the outside, but being an 
outsider while inside.81
By occupying and opening poetic spaces, speaking to other spectres in order
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80 Vitanza , Negation, Subjectivity and the History o f Rhetoric, page 19.
81 Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity and the History o f  Rhetoric, page 19.
to indicate forces, presences, I will endeavour to celebrate the rhetorical 
nature of the subject without placing it in strict opposition to any notion of 
stability or essentialism. By exploring the rhetorical aspect of both the 
subject and the art-object I hope to show how aspects of both exceed, but are 
forever entwined with, their own materiality.
I will take up the position of an ironist,82 creating a theoretically open but 
over determined ‘tapestry’ which has no final conclusion, just taking 
another path on the Nietzschian road to a continual (re)beginning; to 
‘reach’, as it were, a place of ‘no final vocabulary.’ 83
57
82 Here I mean ironist in the Hegelian sense where art and language ‘presents itself as 
essentially over determined, and its manner of representation as a duplication and 
excess’. Hamacher ‘(The End of Art with the Mask)’ in Hegel A fter Derrida, page 107.
83 Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity and The History o f  Rhetoric, page 32.
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1.6 Hegel: The m yth  of th e  se lf- id e n tic a l su b jec t
As demonstrated above, a (pre)post-modern argument has run through 
philosophical discourse for a considerable time, weaving in and out, on the 
margins. Maverick philosophers have been struggling with the 
dissemination of the rhetorical subject long before the onslaught of 
deconstruction. One such philosopher, Frederick Nietzsche, argued that 
human subjectivity, that Descartian Cognito which we know  to be true, is 
based on a fundamental fallacy: the fallacy of subject-hood. Nietzsche states 
that the ‘self’ ‘ ... forgets that this is the case: his lying then is no longer 
conscious and is founded on age-old habit and it is by this non-awareness, by
this forgetting that he develops a sense o f truth.’84 The subject 'knows’ itself
to be true and regards the world accordingly. The twist in the plot, however, 
is that the subject, with the help of culture, ‘forgets’ that its existence is 
fallacious. This aphasia allows the subject to remove itself from its own 
interiority and look out into the world of objects and other subjects, 
wrestling from them truths which it can then abstract and utilise for its own 
purposes. What this subject refuses to acknowledge however is that such 
truths emanate from a void of nothingness, from de-composing matter (‘life’ 
becoming abstracted with ‘death’ negated and conceptualised as the opposite 
to life). This movement, between subject and object, attests to the absolute 
reign of the subject - with all objects being subsumed under its penetrating 
gaze.
We as subjects, according to Nietzsche, construct such truths about ourselves 
and world through a process of substitution. We can never appropriate such 
a world in-itself, even through the immediacy of the senses, therefore we use 
metaphorical language to ‘appropriate’ it on our behalf. Nietzsche asks:
‘What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymes, 
anthromorphisms....truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they
84 Quoted in de Man's Allegories o f  Reading, page 112.
are illusion.’85 Coming from such a deconstructive perspective, one that has 
not just been realised over the last forty or so years, I contend that we can 
never fully ‘know’ either ourselves or the world through figural devices, as 
they are deceptively opaque. We only ever know the devices themselves 
which are then, through a series of cunning moves, posited as being truths 
corresponding to the external world. The negative aspect of the world, the 
noemic sphere of being-in-themselves, is subsumed under this rhetorical 
scope of truth. However, in this uneasy relationship between a concept and 
its noemic object, the object is posited as the opposite to the truth it yields to 
the subject - its recalcitrance thereby ‘becomes’ error. The subject, by 
describing the world, thinks that it can know it in its entirety; error only 
being that which can be later corrected and revealed under the shining 
light of truth.
This notion of the erroroneous object is necessary in order to define notions 
of truth. Error, within this dialectic notion of truth, always succumbs to its 
more powerful opponent:
In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion (of the 
other-being), by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action 
consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out 
of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation 
with error and with finitude. Error or the other-being when 
superseded is still a necessary dynamic element of truth; for truth
can only be where it makes itself its own result.’86
This notion of truth has a philosophical imperative; as Kant states, without 
these unifying truths the ‘universe must sink into the abyss of
nothingness’.87
I contend however that these rhetorical devices, tropological systems which
posit notions of truth, do not have the ability to close themselves off; to
correct the ‘error’ they encounter. They cannot form a totality of meaning. 
“ Quoted in Derrida, Of Gram matology, preface xxiii.
"°Eagleton, Ideology o f the Aesthetic, page 138.
87Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 6, page 187. Quoted in 
Jameson, Postmodernism, page 248.
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There is always an excess which goes beyond the domain of such systems and 
forms a 'residue’. Such residual matter, according to de Man, inscribes the 
materiality of the linguistic device, and leaves a trace of non-meaning from 
which the subject cannot escape. However, I contend that this residue is 
‘forgotten’ by the viewing subject during the ‘aesthetic moment’; again 
here’s another space of error which is brought back under the formulaic 
notion of truth to the safety of reason. The subject ‘feels’ that it has escaped 
the confines of the language and burst out into the world full of enigmatic 
yet appropriatable truths.
The art-object being appropriated by (and within) such rhetorical devices 
connotes absolute freedom from the noemic world which is a world full of 
non-penetrable beings-in-themselves. The art-object re-presents a non- 
representable ‘reality’ by presenting a spectral 'substitute’ instead. The 
unknown world, the unrepresentable (which includes the corporeality of 
the subject itself), is therefore posited as error; it becomes necessary only in 
order to be abolished and re-presented to the subject in a embellished and 
‘tru th ’-full manner.
Truth is, therefore, necessarily positive. Any negative aspect has to be 
overcome and transformed into a positive one. This the subject does, 
according to Hegel88, through a dialectical movement as the fundamental 
relationship between the subject and its desired object.
Within Hegel’s master-slave dialectic the master negates any independent 
existence of the slave so he can project his own socially-contrived attributes 
into him; the master thereby ‘lives’ via the slave. This enables the master to 
abstract his own sense of being; eventually achieving absolute freedom:
Hegel’s subject suffers no permanent bout of bad faith or 
debilitating repression of what is real. Every deception 
immediately releases a broader conception o f truth by which it
88 However, I will be arguing against Hegel’s theory of the division between subject and 
object in chapter 3.
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might be transcended.89
Hegel posits a final closure upon the master/slave dialectic, which captures 
all knowledge:
The ‘dialectically overcome-entity [the object] is annulled in its 
contingent (stripped of sense, “senseless”) aspect of natural, given 
(“immediate”) entity, but it is preserved in its essential (and 
meaningful, significant) aspect; thus mediated by negation, it is 
sublimated or raised up to a more “comprehensive” and
comprehensible mode of being....90
According to Hegel, the subject (as master) first negates the 
phenomenological world by dialectically overcoming it via the ‘work’ of the 
slave and endows it with symbolic ‘life’. This the master does via introjection. 
In virtue of the work carried out by the slave on the real world, the master 
can endow real objects with attributes which will finally enable him to know 
himself completely. Such attributes constitute the register of substitution: 
the symbolic. This re-creates the world so that it is full of animated and 
symbolically re-presented objects. Such objects can then reflect the 
master’s/subject’s presence back to him or her. These objects become a 
‘living’ metonomy for death: a sacrifice made in the name of the subject. The 
real fragmented world is turned, via visual and linguistic representation, 
into a unified and stable space. The world of the unstable real goes through a 
process of mortification in order to fix its meaning. The problem with Hegel’s 
dialectic, however, is that once the world is overcome it becomes positive to 
exist totally within the symbolic order: real objects now become symbolically 
animated with no excess or residue. Within this dialectic, when a real object 
is re-presented, it ‘becomes’ positive. The object becomes abstracted and only 
exists for the aesthetic consumption of the master/subject. The negative 
aspect of the object has been ‘overcome’ for the sake of being introduced 
into the realm of the symbolic. As Hegel argues:
The thing in itself...expresses the object insofar as one abstracts
39 Butler, Subjects o f  Desire, page 22.
90 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel, page 15.
61
62
from it everything that is for consciousness, from all 
determination of feeling as well as all distinct thoughts of the 
object. It is easy to see what is left, the total abstraction, total 
emptiness.91
The life of the subject/master thereby entwines itself around many actual 
and potential deaths through and by the services of the slave. The illusion of 
the re-presented real means the natural world becomes animated with a 
presence which can be captured and controlled by the subject.
Within Hegel’s dialectic the slave works on the world, on behalf of his 
master, in order to produce abstracted fantasies of absolute truths. Kojeve 
states that as the slave prepares the world for consumption he:
transforms it [the thing in the world] by work [i.e., he prepares it 
for consumption, but does not consume it himself]. For the Master, 
on the other hand, the immediate relation [to the thing] comes into 
being, through the mediation [i.e. through the work of the Slave 
who transforms the natural thing, the ‘raw material’ with a view 
to its consumption (by the Master)], as pure negation of the object,
that is, as Enjoyment.92
Truths presented to the subject/master via objects for enjoyment are devoid 
of any real physical presence. The master has not had to work on the world 
himself and therefore can gorge on the fruits of the slave’s labour. Such 
fruits mean that the master can remove his concept of self from any physical 
bonds, as his relationship to these end-products does not involve direct 
negation of the original object. His own physical labour has not been 
expended. This means that the master’s/subject's negating relationship with 
the world is always mediated. As a consequence of this ‘... the life that is won
by the lord or master is a life beyond mere [physical] ‘life”. 93
The master/subject gains recognition, affirms his own existence and believes 
that he knows himself beyond the confines of his corporeal body; his 
identity is, he believes, separate from his earthly existence.
91 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, page 69.
92 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading o f  Hegel, pages 17-18.
93 Osborne, The Politics o f  Time, page 77.
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The fear of not recognising oneself as a subject beyond the realm of the 
physical engenders the fear of death in that:
Death both appears to consciousness as, and derives its existential 
reality from, the possibility of an absolute refusal of 
recognition....Death is the “possibility of the impossibility of
existence”.14
Consciousness can only know itself through being affirmed by another 
consciousness. As Hegel himself states:
Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the 
fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is 
only by being acknowledged or “recognised”.95
By projecting his attributes into the other-consciousness (into the 
‘consciousness’ of the art object figured as and by the artist) and recognising 
himself ‘reflected’ within it, the subject elevates his knowledge of himself 
onto a metaphysical level; his identity thereby becoming abstracted (like the 
already re-presented and abstracted artist). The slave ‘works’ on, destroys, 
the naturalness of the real objects, and makes them inorganic, spectral; 
transforms them into abstracted objects. The real objects are re-created by 
the desires of the master/subject and made to reflect the subject’s 
‘immortality’ (where the artist, either dead or alive in the conventional, 
physical, sense has already made himself immortal through the enforcing of 
philosophical rhetoric onto the materiality and the formal language of the 
art work itself). Such objects are re-made into static plastic forms which can 
yield meanings affirming the subject’s presence within a metaphysical 
reality, otherwise beyond its reach. In order to deny this possibility of death, 
the subject needs to ground itself in this notion of truth as an abstracted yet 
intellectual entity which can allow the subject to construct its own narrative.
Self-consciousness is to attain to a godlike authorship of the world,
____ “a universal formative activity” not “master over some things,
94 Osborne, The Politics o f  Time, page 79.
95 Hegel, The Phenomenology o f Spirit, page 230.
but......over the universal power and the whole of objective
being”.96
However, as argued earlier, the re-presented presence of the object, like the 
subject’s own concept of himself, is precarious; slippage is always 
threatened. The figurative devices used to ‘capture’ the unstable and noemic 
world always leave a residue which can never be symbolised. This residue is 
beyond culturally and philosophically induced ‘truths’, yet to break free 
from the circularity of the subject/object relationship would mean a voyage 
into the realm of the de-composing cadaver. The art object thereby:
...fill[sj the fracture between a no longer and a not yet, where what 
has been extracted from a purely material basis does not yet 
participate in the pure abstraction.97
64
96 Butler, Subjects o f Desire, page 57.
97 Maleuvre, Museum Memories, page 37.
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1.7 The c ir c le  (p a rerg o n ) as fram e
Within this section of my thesis I will examine the circularity of Hegelian 
discourse and the ways in which it places the art object within a dialectical 
relationship between ‘knower’ and ‘known’. Any object, according to Hegel, 
is only relational to the subject(ivity) beholding it. The subject is only 
interested in the object as a vehicle through which the subject gains 
knowledge of itself and the world. Knowledge, according to Hegel, is 
abstracted from the material world by the subject which:
... journeys through a series of its own shapes as though they were 
the stations set for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself 
for existence as Spirit and achieve, through a completed 
experience of itself, the awareness of what it is in itself.98
What constructs knowledge is the (collective) subject(ivity) as discourse; as it 
surveys and abstracts the world around it, it shapes its own image. Claims of 
validity, as either true or false, are thereby internal to consciousness itself. 
Consciousness does not relate directly to the object but only indirectly to 
itself. Therefore, the world does not somehow hide or reveal truths to the 
inquiring consciousness; its truths are understood and revealed through the 
process of thinking itself. The subject is always present through discursive 
strategies, as presence: as an original ‘I’. According to this theory the 
phenomenological world is a mere appearance which only ‘exists’ as the 
result of the subject(ivity) comporting towards it in a certain way.
In self-consciousness, in the concept of the Spirit, consciousness 
first has its turning point, from which it leaves behind its colorful 
appearance of the sensible immediacy [Diesseits] and the empty 
night of the supersensible beyond [Jenseits] and steps out into the 
spiritual daylight o f the present."
Accordingly, the subject(ivity) turns, within the dialectic, from the sensible
phenomenolofiical world to the pursuit of knowledge (of itself). Within the
98 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit [55:49].
99 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit [108-09; 110/01].
illuminated light of day (as spirit) this is the unity of the finite and the 
infinite at a central knowledgeable point: the subjectivity itself. The role of 
the artwork within this scenario is as reparation of an incomplete 
experience as the subject realises its potentiality and acts upon the object (in 
this case the artwork) in order to realise itself as fully actual. This is the 
circularity the discursive systems of thought and knowledge with the 
subjectivity being at both the beginning and the end of the processes 
involved. Such discursive systems form a circle which always begins and 
terminates within the concept of (subjective) presence/essence, performing 
a slick passage from subjectivity as presence, through representation as an 
identical presence and back again.
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However, Derrida argues that within this dialectic between representation 
and presence resides the spectre, the fictitiousness of the subject(ivity), 
borne only through and by discourse.
The phantom in the centre from which we fascinate .... Between 
the outside and the inside, between the external and the internal 
edge line, the framer and framed, the figure and the ground, form 
and content, signifier and signified. 100
The trait thus divides in this place where it takes place. The 
emblem for this topos seems undiscoverable; I shall borrow it from 
the nomenclature of framing: the passe-partout.
The passe-partout which here creates an event must not pass for 
the master key. You will not be able to pass it from hand to hand 
like a convenient instrument, a short treatise, a viaticum or even 
an organon or pocket canon, in short a transcendental pass ...101
In The Truth in Painting, Derrida points out the deconstruction performed by 
the circularity of Hegel’s epistemology as a journey which constantly, and 
frustratingly, folds back onto and into itself. Rather than starting or 
finishing with the subject(ivity), as the ontological base for meaning, what 
occurs is a tautology - a chain of signifiers which invade and haunt each 
other. Circles, it seems, encapsulate and contain the viewer, the art-object
100Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 12. In The Chambers Dictionary ‘Fascinate’ is ‘to 
bewitch, enchant or cast the evil eye upon’ .
101Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 12.
and the artist, all of which are circumscribed by the quest for knowledge, as 
an experience of truth. Philosophy, especially within its notion of the 
aesthetic, sets out to create a model, a circular structure within which to 
investigate and appropriate such an experience. From such an edifice the 
viewer’s eye’s are pointed skywards in order to glimpse at the infinite; to 
make their experience count. The image of the circle is essential when 
thinking about the relationship of nature to eternity in that it signifies the 
relation between the part and the whole, the subjectivity and the spiritual as 
well as the continual movement of time.102 Circles within circles, all 
returning as knowledge to the subject(ivity) from which it began.
No doubt art figures one of those productions of mind thanks to 
which the latter returns to itself, comes back to consciousness and 
cognizance and comes to its proper place by returning  to it, in a 
circle. What is called [s’appelle: lit. “calls itself”] mind is that 
which says to itself “come” only to hear itself already saying 
“come back” The mind is what it is, says what it means, only by 
returning. Retracing its steps in a circle. Retracing its steps in a 
circle. But art forms only one of those circles in the great circle of 
the Geist or the revenant (this visitor can be called Gast, or ghost, 
guest or Gespenst. 103
The universe is thereby conceptualised and visualised so that it can be 
appropriated by the desiring subject as it ‘becomes’ part of it. It gazes at the 
stars, or at the infinite depth ‘within’ an abstract painting, past the 
materiality of both, in order for discourse to encircle it and bring back a 
truth; the affirmation of its own pure self-consciousness as knowledge of 
itself. The artwork acts as a mediator, as a vortex at the very heart of this 
circular motion which transports the desiring subject out into the concept of 
infinity and then back to its own (known and stable) presence. Philosophy, 
with its rich network of concepts and figuration, builds on a structure 
through which this ‘journey’ can take place, which is then posited as 
metaphysical and universal, as Being-beyond the corporeal. It throws the 
subject over the abyss and constructs a safety-net known as the aesthetic, or 
the spiritual, into which the subject can fall. This allows the subject to
experience the full force of subjective freedom through philosophical and
102 See Rockmore, Hegel’s Circular Epistemology, especially chapter 1.
103 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 26. My emphasis.
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theological figuration. Derrida discusses the circularity of such discourse(s) 
through the concept of the parergon, or frame by demonstrating how the 
framing of the artwork, through and by discourse, attempts to disregard the 
materiality of the work or indeed the subjectivity viewing it.
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The parergon economise on the the abyss: not only save oneself 
from falling into the bottomless depths by weaving and folding 
back the cloth to infinity, textual art of the reprise, multiplication 
of patches within patches, but also establish the law of 
reappropriation, formalise the rules which constrain the logic of 
the abyss and which shuttle between the economic and the 
aneconomic, the raising [la releve] and the fall, the abyssal 
operation which can only work toward the releve and that in it 
which regularly reproduces collapse. 104
This dissertation will also question this circular epistemology, especially in 
relation to the self-identical subject. Within the circle comes repetition and a 
returning of the same. But what if this is not so? What if the corporeality, the 
materiality of the body and the world constantly interrupts the Hegelian 
process of acquiring knowledge, especially through the production and 
appreciation of art? What if the circle breaks and instead we have a line, or 
multiple lines, which spin off into infinity, taking the subject with them? 
What if the parergon fails to break the fall? What if the time it takes to travel 
around this circle becomes dis-jointed, finite, multiple? The subject 
disintegrates, grows old never fully knowing itself? Death becoming part of 
life instead of occurring at the end? What if, instead of being a dualistic 
consciousness with two parts being identical to one another, we are made of a 
variety of disparate and ill-matched components, and what if there is an 
artist that can somehow demonstrate this?
The law of the return supposing that “everything” would come 
again, seems to take time as completed: the circle out of circulation 
of all circles; but, in as much as it breaks the ring in the middle, it 
proposes a time not uncompleted, a time on the contrary, finite, 
except in the present point that alone we think we hold, and that, 
lacking introduces rupture into infinity, making us live in a state 
of perpetual death. 105
104 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 37.
105 Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, page 12.
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1.8 ‘F o rc e ’-ing open th e  p ro m ise  o f su b je c tiv ity
...instead of trying to define the other (“What is he?”), I turn to 
myself: “What do I want, wanting to know you?” What would 
happen if I decided to define you as a force and not as a person?
And if I were to situate myself as another force confronting 
yours?10*
If subjectivity does not complete the epistemological circle, what happens 
when it attempts to reflect its own reality back to itself? What if the spectral 
vision is not total enough? I will argue that if there is a force  of being it is 
not tied into the construction of a self-identical subjectivity but ‘exists’ both 
within and beyond it as the aporetic. I do this not to posit some kind of 
metaphysical force, but to allow the corporeality of the body and the semiotic 
force of language (both visual and linguistic) to emerge.
This ‘force’, as the very force-of-being, is both the ‘being’ connoted by the 
individual ‘name’, as personae within a social and cultural context. But it also 
manifests itself beyond the linguistic and the visual, the aporetic as klang: 
that which is without the concept of the self but continues to interrupt it as 
the droning of corporeality.
... withstanding] conception, it plays for the Hegelian logos the 
role of mute or mad sound, a kind of mechanical automaton that 
triggers and operates itself without meaning (to say) anything.107
Encased in a metaphoric tomb, ‘protected’ by spectres, this force is re­
presented as an ethereal and essential presence held within, and made 
meaningful by being abstracted from the material. I will argue, however, 
that such a force cannot be made slave to the Hegelian master as it is neither 
mad nor mute but klangs on regardless as the decomposition of the material, 
the very ‘object’ upon which the concept rests and extracts (abstracts) its 
meaning. The logos cannot reach or silence the klang, although it tries to
106 Roland Barthes, quoted in Vitanza , Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of 
Rhetoric, page 2.
107 Derrida, Glas, pages 8 & 10.
muffle its sound with the all the might of the metaphysical, as a deafening 
and universal truth. Interruption always occurs in trying to think about 
death. In this context, death is ‘the first experience of an alterity that cannot 
be reduced to the self occurs in the relation to death, in relation to the 
ungraspable facticity of death.’108 Death, as I argued above, is not used here in 
the sense that it signifies the cessation of the corporeal, but as an aporia, as 
the unknown space of differentiation which finds its ‘home’ within the 
borders of subjectivity itself.
Derrida discusses the transo-empirical dialectic - that which necessitates 
both figures of the ‘transcendental’ and the ‘empirical’109 - and how it is 
displaced, but not reduced, even within deconstructive methodology. He tells 
us about the ‘middle ground’ which inhabits the ‘space’ between the 
transcendental and the empirical where the subject(ivity) is constantly 
suspended and from where the spectre emerges. However, it is:
... neither presentable nor reducible to some other instance or 
history. Therefore exceed[ing] time and space, escaping any 
attempt to arrest it in a concept, an epoch, a place or an history. As 
the condition of the possibility of all marks as well as the condition 
of their essential contamination, this ‘middle ground’ can be 
neither instituted nor projected as a horizon or end of thinking or 
action. 110
The ‘promise’ of a continuing historical (teleological) subject resides in the 
inscription of, and the circular (tautological) relationship between, the 
transcendental and the empirical. The fictive subject must, however, disavow 
this cultural/rhetorical inscription, which also constitutes the disavowal of 
any kind of contamination. This also means that the subject has to disavow its 
multiple but static position between (and yet at the same time within) the 
fictivity of discursive narratives of/on the self, and the non-representable 
corporeality of the material body. Subjectivity believes instead that it 
progressively moves towards its own self-knowledge. The disavowal, by the
108 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, page 82.
109 The transo-empirical dialectic is one with which the corporeal, as degenerative and 
finite, is figuratively embalmed through its ‘relationship’ with the infinite.
110 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, page 19. My Italics.
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subjectivity of any kind of cultural inscription or of its own corporeality 
means, as argued above, that the subject is necessarily aphasic as to its own 
fictive nature. However, the paradox remains that it is the rhetorical 
‘creation’ of the fictive subject (as an essential entity) that constitutes it as 
‘real’ in the first place. Neither totally transcendental nor totally empirical, 
but an uneven and unstable combination of the two means, the aphasic 
subject relies on the constant repetition of the transcendental into the 
empirical - re-inscribed into/onto the empirical through cultural meaning. 
However, it is the contamination of the transcendental by the aporetic 
corporeality of the body which, although terrifying, opens up the middle 
ground and breaks the circle so that a new territory can be opened up for 
theoretical exploration. What then is this middle ground?
The middle ground is that which is contained within (yet ‘removed’ from 
through figurative substitution) the subject/object, master/slave, 
mind/body, fact/fiction, transcendental/empirical dichotomies; it is a 
neutral force which interrupts the smooth operation of the dialectic; the 
aporetic space of the klang:
insofar as it is neither an “apparent or illusory” antinomy, nor a 
dialectizable contradiction on the Hegelian or Marxist sense, nor 
even a “transcendental illusion in a dialectic of the Kantian type,” 
but instead an interminable experience.111
between the act of producing and the product, something becomes 
detached, thus giving us a vagabond, nomad subject a residuum ... a 
third party.’112
So, the approach I intend to take in this dissertation is one that does not work 
within a strict dialectic, nor indeed one that allows for the negative to be 
phenomenolized in terms of the Other, i.e. death only ever conceptualised in 
terms of that which is not. As Schlegel maintains, ‘It is equally deadly for a 
mind to have a system or to have none...Therefore, it will have to combine
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111 Derrida, Aporias, page 16.
112 Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity and The History of Rhetoric, page 16.
both.’113 It is my aim to utilise available theories, whilst also acknowledging 
their (necessary) rhetoricity, in order to, as argued above, find the middle 
ground within which to investigate the impossibility of articulating the 
noemic, the aporetic corporeality of being-in-the-world, without the 
creation of spectres which are culturally (and poetically) contrived in order 
to cover up this deadly void of non-meaning. Death therefore will be 
(momentarily) revealed as that which teases the subject, by pointing to a 
mutual state of non-being; a non-being that cannot be re-inscribed within 
the polarity of the positive and/or negative, but forever in between; within 
the multiplicity of the neutral.
The neutral will be the space occupied in the third chapter of this thesis 
which is concerned with Henri Michaux. I will first demonstrate why French 
art in the 1950s cannot be subsumed by the Modernist ideal of the self­
identical subject(ivity) of both the artist and the viewer. I will utilise the 
theories of Blanchot, Deleuze and Guattari, in order to ‘place’ Michaux within 
the theories of his contemporaries who were trying to question and 
dismantle established systems of belief. By again questioning the strict 
Hegelian dialectic between subjectivity as ‘positive’ and object as ‘negative’,
I will demonstrate how Michaux’s use of drugs and his appeal to existentialist 
theories allowed him to visualise, and imperfectly articulate, the ‘space’ of 
the naugal. The naugal114 is a nascent ‘state’115 which blurs the distinction 
between the transcendental and the empirical by magnifying the 
a/fec tiveness of the corporeal body within the sensual and capricious world. 
When it is within this naugality the remaining subjectivity has no ‘real’ 
physical, psychological or critical distance. As far as I’m concerned, this 
allows an investigation into Blanchot’s notion of the plenitude of the void, 
and by questioning the aforementioned metaphor of light, argue that 
Michaux’s drawings are those of an insomniac, where insomnia becomes the
113 Quoted in Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity and The History o f Rhetoric, page 35. My 
italics.
114 The notion of the naugal will be discussed in more depth in chapter three.
1,5 This nascent ‘state’ of the nagual is often reduced to/by the derisory notion of the 
hallucinogenic.
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figure through which to visualise the decomposition of the subject/object 
opposition. This decomposition, I will later argue, allows the diminished sense 
of ‘self to witness different temporal speeds and spatial dimensions, and to 
question the accepted time/space continuum posited through 
institutionalised philosophical and cultural discourses. By again questioning 
the Modernist assumptions upon and within which abstract art from the mid­
twentieth century was constructed and critically approached, accepted and 
validated, I will demonstrate how Michaux’s drawings can show us a new, 
multiplicitous and uneven perspective through which to view his art. This 
will also demonstrate how his art, and the theories which informed it, reveal 
a post-modern impetus at the same time as a certain kind of predominantly 
formal Modernist reading was supposed to have a monopoly on all types of 




Painting as Autobiography: 
Rothko, Death and Prosopopeia
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Art preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is 
preserved. It preserves and is preserved in itself (quid juris?), 
although actually it lasts no longer than its support and materials - 
stone, canvas, chemical color, and so on (quid facti? ).116
... do what is necessary; speak to the spectre ...u7
2.1 W here to Begin?
Where to start with Rothko? Criticism, biography, words? Or the paintings, 
the canvases, material objects? Can they be separated, or are they forever 
enmeshed in each other’s rhetoricity? What about the artist himself, his 
being-in-the-world, his impulse to create? In order to start dealing with 
these rather complex issues I’ll start at a beginning, the beginning, the 
essential foundation of life, of philosophy even - the first premise of 
existence: the transcendental subject, that which, according to dominant 
philosophical rhetoric, pre- and super-cedes the materiality of the body.
Given that this transcendental subject is so riddled with inconsistencies and 
that the philosophical texts I read give conflicting accounts of what 
subjectivity ‘is’, or ‘isn’t’, I will begin with a poem, given that it somehow 
seems congruous to slip into the poetic, the aporetic; a poem by Paul Celan:
Came if there 
came a man
came a man to the world, today, with
the patriarchs’
light beard: he could,
if he spoke of this
time, he
could
only babble and babble
ever-ever
more m ore.118
Why have I chosen this poem? Indeed why choose a poem at all? It seems
somehow superfluous to the requirements of writing about an artist
115 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 163.
117 Derrida, Spectres o f Marx, page 11.
118 Paul Celan in Jewish Identity in Modern Art History, page 69.
especially this one; why not start with hard facts, none of this ambiguous 
meshing together of cultural elements, why not keep it simple, clear and 
concise - rigorous? Well, because the reduction of Rothko to either his works 
or his life is not what this thesis is about; its about expansion, exploding the 
myth into many disparate and unconnected parts. Disinter-connecting. So 
why not humour me and let’s consider the poem, because it could have been 
written about Rothko, his position as an artist situated within the Modernist 
episteme, and the impossibility of his possibility as a posturing 
transcendental subject. Yet it could also tell us about the inability of his 
paintings to ‘speak’ about the transient material world around them, or even 
about the fleeting conditions of their creation - their becoming. The silence 
of Rothko and his paintings is the impossible articulation of their own 
decomposing materiality. The sound of heavy paint being applied to already 
loaded canvases by heavy hands, smudged, smeared, rubbed; different hues 
and smells, different times and locations, are forever lost within the 
inchoate, atemporal babble. Noise. Klang. 119 The infinite babble of time, the 
babble of dying and decaying; that which is covered by words; history and 
criticism. The disparate experiences of one Modernist patriarch, and the 
objects that are his legacy, are collected, revised and reduced to the visual; 
arranged to create order; mummified and codified within a body of mute 
canvases and a handful of carefully chosen, recyclable words. All babble 
becomes stratified, covered, named as the same within the tape-loop of 
discourse. In the case of Rothko, the overarching concept120 with which to 
silence the babble is death: repeatedly articulated and then dis-articulated, 
entombed within the philosophical spectre of magical ‘living presences’; 
Rothko’s transcendental presence situated within silenced painted canvases. 
Canvases working within Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, the Enlightenment 
concept of the Spirit, of consciousness, the immaterial entity that is carried 
over from material body to material body, from Rothko to his canvases - 
labouring on regardless. Visioned within the mark of the name - the
119 Derrida’s notion of ‘Klang’ is discussed at length in chapter 1.
120 Although ‘death’ in itself is not a concept it is ‘conceptualised’ in order to be 
understood, through its rituals, descriptions and depictions. This is in order to keep it 
safe - which is impossible as it is beyond such conceptualisation.
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brushstroke. These strokes, once applied by Rothko within the inchoate and 
multifarious flow of ‘time’ lose their place within the babble; they are lifted 
up, collapsed into the rhetoric of the name, then opened up into the field of 
discourse. This enables the encroachment of the verbal - onto the name, the 
name of Rothko-deceased - onto the visual; he who works on after death, in 
order to present us with the idea of the suffering subject that transcends the 
‘human condition’ - mortality.
Derrida argues that work, the painful act of producing, is:
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... that which makes for a work, for an oeuvre, indeed that which 
works - and works to open: opus and opening, oeuvre and overture: 
the work or labor of the oeuvre insofar as it engenders, produces, 
and brings to light, but also labor or travail as suffering, as the 
enduring of force, as the pain of the one who gives. Of the one who 
gives birth, who brings to the light of day and gives something to 
be seen, who enables or empowers, who gives the force to know 
and to be able to be see - and all these are powers of the image, the 
pain of what is given and of the one who takes the pains to help us 
see, read, th ink.121
Rothko’s oeuvre; the collection of pain-fully marked canvases constitutes the 
body of work which holds and somehow contains the traces of ‘Rothko’; it is 
‘given’ as individual suffering opened up, made visible. However, the 
canvases that work on his behalf can only do so as deaf and dumb objects 
hanging within a museum; with a parental authority, an artistic discourse, 
speaking on their behalf, repetitively reworked, reworded, rewound. ‘One’s 
own proper sublime glorious body is gathered into an organless vocable. And 
is signed in a monogram .... the gallery speaks, writes. On its legendary walls 
...’. 122 Each brushstroke ‘concentrates’ the message, spoken in Rothko’s 
name, which seems to be saying: “I’m dead; I have suffered and died; listen as 
my voice, my being, remains my words reverberate around the hallowed 
walls of this institution, emanating from the strokes that were borne from
121 Derrida, ‘By Force of Mourning’, page 171. My italics.
122 Derrida, Glas, page 8.
my will to conquer death.”123 The work/labour which marks the coming into 
being of Rothko’s canvases also constitutes the bringing into being of 
‘Rothko’; this is ‘given’ as the light of being, the shimmering translucent 
paint which presents a ‘trademark’ of authenticity, marks his presence as an 
animating force. This obscures his not-being-anymore within the 
illuminating rhetoric of transcendentality. Yet there is a fatal misalignment 
between the transcendental subject as a philosophical entity and the positing 
of such a presence within Rothko’s work, within the brushstroke; 
underneath the literal interpretation of his oeuvre is a lacuna - a void‘d 
beneath the rhetoric. The light, the illuminating ‘force’ of Rothko that can 
only ever cover up what is in excess of discourse, what escapes the word (and 
the world); the babble, the noise of death, of the incessant decaying of brute 
materiality. The philosophical rhetoric that enables Rothko’s canvases to 
‘speak’ of his death, his suffering, of his once productive life covers up the 
very inability to speak of such things; for we can not intuit the death of
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123 In the Rothko Room at Tate Modern we are informed that ‘The metaphor of the window 
... appropriate to Black on Maroon, a painting from the Seagram Mural series ... 
[constitutes] a nebulous, hovering rectangular ‘opening’ [which] seems to give onto either 
infinity or nothingness. Rothko sometimes described his paintings as facades also as 
‘dramas’, ambiguous words which leave open to question exactly what the works might
reveal or conceal__Rothko himself constantly understood his abstract forms to be
charged with symbolic meaning. It has been shown that the compositions of the more 
fragmented abstract forms of the late 1940s ...are based on Renaissance religious 
paintings, and Rothko never abandoned a complex sense of his paintings as 
anthropomorphic describing them as ‘organisms’ and associating their formal properties 
with human presence .... the sombre colours used by Rothko ... are deeply evocative of 
sadness and loss.’ (This is also reprinted in Tate Modern the Handbook, page 218, my 
italics.] It is the constant repetition of the name Rothko, and its incessant association of 
‘presence’, ‘anthropomorphism’, ‘sadness’ and ‘loss’ that allows the institutional display 
of Rothko’s works to take on these ‘attributes’ .
124 I say ‘void’, however this connotes a ‘lack’ or nothingness - however this void or space 
is that which escapes being stratified and conceptualised by language - and therefore is 
in excess, which (contradictorily) contains all material objects - plenitude.
Rothko, or break the muteness of decomposing canvases,125 or reverse his no 
longer being-in-the-world. We can possibly describe his life and his suicide, 
think, or say it as words: ‘Rothko’s dead - he chose to die by his own hand’; 
we can try and read his paintings through his depression and untimely 
demise; but ultimately it is an impossible non-passage between thought and 
experience, between discourse and babble. As Simon Critchley argues.
Death is not the noema of a noesis. It is not the object or 
meaningful fulfilment of the intentional act. Death, or, 
rather dying, is by definition ungraspable; it is that whic 
exceeds intentionality and the noetico-noematic correlative 
structures o f phenomenology. There can be thus be no 
phenomenology of dying, because it is a state of affairs about 
which one could neither have an adequate intention nor 
find intuitive fulfilment. The ultimate meaning of human 
finitude is that we cannot find meaningful fulfilment lor the 
finite. In this sense, dying is meaningless and consequently, 
the work of mourning is infinite.
Since direct contact with death would demand the death of the 
person who entered into contact, the only relation that the 
living can maintain with death is through a representation, an 
image, a picture of death, whether visual or verbal. And yet, we 
immediately confront a paradox: namely, that the 
representation of death is not the representation of presence, 
an object of perception or intuition - we cannot draw a likeness 
of death, a portrait, a still life, or whatever. Thus, 
representations of death are misrepresentations, or rather they 
are representations of an absence. The paradox at the heart o 
the representation of death is perhaps best conveyed by the 
figure of prosopopeia, that is, the rhetorical trope by which an 
absent or imaginary person is presented as speaking or acting. 
Etymologically, prosopopeia means to take a lace (prosopon + 
poein); in this sense we might think of a death mask or 
memento mori, a form which indicates the failure of presence, a 
face that withdraws behind the form which presents it.
So how can ‘Rothko’ be represented in-death or as ‘death’, if in doing so the
125 [n Mark Rothko , page 192,""Dana Cranmer states that: ‘In the 1 9 5 ° 's Rothkocontmued 
to experiment with the physical components of the pamt mixture. He: added unbound 
powdered pigments and whole eggs to his paint formula and often diluted the paint 
L h  solvent, so much that the effect of the binding element in the pamt — was 
compromised- the pigment particles were almost disassociated from the paint film, 
barely clinging to the surface. Rothko ignored the limits of physical coherence to achieve 
a translucency unique to his paintings. Light penetrated the attenuated paint film, 
striking the individual pigment particles and bouncing back to suffuse the surface an 
engulf the viewer in an aura of color. These films, brushed one on top of p oth er, have a 
opalescent quality. Light seems to emanate from within the paint film itself. Physically 
these surfaces are extremely delicate if not ephemeral. Similar to.worksjMmpMe 
pastel they are brittle and crack or powder easily. They are readily effected by lig 
and humidity, sometimes fading or otherwise altering in appearance.
126 Critchley, V e r y  Little...Almost Nothing, page 73. My italics.
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representation of ‘Rothko’ constitutes his/its ovvn and the viewers’ 
destruction? For, as Critchley asserts, direct contact with death would demand 
the death of the person who entered into contact, thereby the viewer can 
only access Rothko’s death via the figure of prosopopeia, the death mask 
covering and speaking above the babble - the safe ‘crossing over’ the abyss 
which separates knowing and not knowing, being and non-being; creating a 
re-vision of Rothko through the myth of the transcendental subjectivity 
which traverses the materiality of his own physical demise into the abode 
[dem ure127 J of the remains of his own creativity; his work. It is the placing 
of Rothko into this safe space, this abode, that place which can be accessed 
via discursive (linguistic) strategies but never physically ‘entered’ into, that 
allows the figure of prosopopeia to gather its spectral momentum; its force- 
of-being. And although this, or a similar, assertion could be made about many 
artists, Rothko as a victim of his own rhetoric constitutes, as it were, a special
case.
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127 Derrida, in Demure: Fiction and Testimony, page 16, asserts that ‘I will attempt to 
speak of this necessary but impossible abidance [demeurance] of the abode [demeureJ. 
How can one decide what remains abidingly [a demeure]? How is one to hear the term - 
the noun or the verb, the adverbial phrases “abode [la demeure],” “that which abides [ce 
qui demeure],” “that which holds abidingly [ce qui se dent a demeure], that by which 
one must abide [ce qui meten demeure]”? It is the impossibility of this abode, and the 
often implicit ways of speaking and writing about it in relation to Rothko and his work, 
that will become one of the main issues examined in this chapter.
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2.2 The face  o f Rothko
According to Critchley’s argument Rothko’s face (poein - that which re 
presents his once-being-in-the-world) as a truth, as a connotation of his 
once-being-in the world, is a mere mask, a death mask that conceals the 
‘spacings, blanks [and] discontinuities’,128 that in effect destroys re­
presentation. Looking at a photograph of Rothko (figure 1) we see a face, the 
face of Rothko, yet this is not the same as the ‘face’; the intermediate, 
reciprocating, inter-fa.ee that withdraws behind the forms within 
(without129) the canvas, and finds its abode there. The transcendental spectre 
of Rothko, philosophically contrived, is projected into the forms he once 
created, worked on; consciousness re-materialised within another body. 
However, consciousness cannot take on any form in-itself; it is de-structured, 
paradoxically within a (philosophical) structure, as an immanent and 
immaterial entity. The contradictory nature of the assertion that something 
is both within, yet cannot be contained by - is in excess of - a material entity, 
constitutes an aporia, the babble that escapes the structure of the visual, or 
indeed the linguistic. It is the aporetic that unravels the face, the faciality of 
the prosopopoetic figure. It is the ‘face’ of Rothko that inter-acts with the 
viewer, as the inter-face of philosophical rhetoric, as the (re)vision of the 
transcendental subject. This inter-action is never stable, it can both 
construct and destruct within the same moment. 1 he constant re-establishing 
of the name of Rothko has to be put in place in order to reassure the viewer 
of his or her own transcendental subjectivity through and by the positing of 
the prosopopoetic figure. This paradox is dealt with in many different ways, 
yet all are within the same tape-loop of discourse, trying to explain, aiming 
to convince, that which is ultimately beyond the structure of significance.
128 Kristeva also argues that death cannot be represented only imprinted ‘by spacings, 
blanks, discontinuities .... the destruction of representation.’ Julia Kristeva, Black Sun,
^ T s a y ‘without’ because the figure of Rothko cannot be contain within the materiality of
the canvas, only contrived to be within it. . .
130 In the Chambers Dictionary the etymology of ‘imminent’ is ‘imminens, -entis, trom in
upon, and minere to project’.
Through art history, criticism, biography, all who try and rationalise 
Rothko’s paintings in relation to his life and death will come to an impasse 
which is then super-imposed on the name that survives, continues to live. 
Death (babble) denied, then re-established as a concept, will always be 
something which will never be understood, only experienced.131
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Taking an initial and brief foray into the discourse on (in) Rothko, I will cite 
a quote by Charles Harrison who suggests that a painting by Rothko *... 
evokes the life-size figure of a portrait.’ As soon as he makes such an 
assertion he qualifies it writing that:
I do not mean to suggest that the abstract forms ... are derived from 
some originally readable likeness to a person .... On the contrary. It 
is not a remote suggestion of likeness that evokes the figure genre, 
nor even any evident reference to a pertinent style; what are 
evoked are rather specific types of effect unprecedented in earlier 
abstract painting, but familiar from the experience of certain life- 
sized figure paintings - portraits and self-portraits among them .... 
evok[ing] the life-size standing figure ... comparable in qualitative 
terms to the effects achieved by some painters in pictures of single 
or at least isolated figures. 132
The assertion that Rothko’s painting somehow constitutes an (almost) self- 
portrait, comparable it seems in qualitative terms to earlier modes of 
portraiture and self-portraiture, is one that one comes across repeatedly in 
the writings on Rothko and his work. Another example of when James 
Breslin in Mark Rothko’s biography compares one of Rothko’s early self- 
portraits (figure 2) with one of his later abstract works (figure 3). It seems 
that in calling upon the ‘quality’ of Rothko’s paintings Harrison amongst 
others, relies on the overwhelming premise that somehow Rothko’s oeuvre 
constitutes the manifestation of his transposable, transportable, 
transcendental consciousness.133 Portraiture as a genre has always supposed a 
‘likeness’ to the sitter, or in this case the artist. Abstract art does not differ
131 However, the paradox is that once death is ‘experienced’ individually, as a subject, the 
subject no longer exists.
132 Charles Harrison, ‘Disorder and Insensitivity: the Concept of Experience in Abstract 
Expressionist Painting’, pages 115-118.
133 Therefore a paradox emerges in that Rothko’s persona is individual and thereby 
‘unique’ but his consciousness is identical to everyone else’s in that it is universal and 
transcendental.
in this preconception; likeness is reduced to essence; synecdoche as the 
effect that connotes the whole, like Rothko’s breath leaving a mist on the 
windowpane. As Rothko himself states:
There is ... a profound reason for the persistence of 
the word ‘portrait’ because the real essence of the 
great portraiture of all time is the artist’s eternal 
interest in the human figure, characters and 
emotions - in short in the human drama .... Today the 
artist is no longer constrained by the limitations that 
all of man’s experience is expressed by his outward 
appearance. Freed from the need of describing a 
particular person, the possibilities are endless. The 
whole of man’s experience becomes his model ...134
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We are, it seems, forever imprisoned within obscure philosophical [poetic] 
terminology - ‘human drama’, ‘eternal’, ‘essence’. Nevertheless when 
portraiture is used in this context it enables us to explore Rothko’s medium as 
vehicle through which he can ‘presence’ his once ‘being-in-the-world’ 
through the rhetoricity of artistic discourse. Leo Bersani, in discussing 
Rothko’s late paintings asserts that:
His work’s specular repetitions and erasure of forms - what we 
have interpreted as its projected return to unreadable surfaces of 
sameness - are themselves the result o f a man’s work of particular, 
inescapably form-giving movements o f his body, and die lines and 
forms and differences we do after all see in these paintings remind 
us that it is impossible to eliminate every sign of those delineating 
traces that result from our gestures. Rothko’s work is all the 
greater for its willingness to let us see those traces, its willingness 
to nourish the critical discriminations that it will also seduce us 
into renouncing. For what it represents is not the end of 
difference - the unrepresentable, in any case - but rather the 
drama of individuation, the tracing and erasing of those 
boundaries without which there would be no phenomenal world, 
no individual life. 135
According to Bersani the boundaries, between the inner and outer worlds, 
are traced and erased both within the production and viewing of Rothko’s 
canvases. Rothko’s body moves and thereby gives form, gives life, to his
work; the form is individuated through the traces of Rothko’s corporeality.
134 Excerpt from notes taken at a lecture by Mark Rothko at the Pratt Institute. Published 
in an article by Dore Ashton in Cimaise December 1958. Reprinted in Mark Rothko, Tate 
Publishing, pg 87.
135 Bersani and Dutoit, Arts o f Impoverishment, page 144.
His canvases, according to this theory, constitutes a self-effacing self­
portraiture. Brian O’Doherty, in discussing Rothko’s oeuvre shortly after his 
suicide, also explores this idea that his canvases should be seen and 
understood as portraits by utilising the concept of the ‘glance’ and its 
established iconography within portraiture. He argues that:
Glances ... meet the spectators eye [which then] ... reestablish[es] 
the surface. A portrait that looks at us, despite an angled or rotated 
figure, immediately announces the plane, an intimacy, a surface, 
however incidentals may interrupt that surface ... Extended 
comparisons could be made here - between the atmospheric 
vagueness [of Rembrandt’s late self-portraits] and Rothko’s 
atmosphere, between the golden lights and indeterminately 
brushed surfaces. Need we go any further to find precedents for 
this frontality in Rothko’s art? ... Frontality is established 
absolutely when the surface holds absolutely. It conjures up the 
image of the static viewer, with no opportunity to go sideways.136
Here O’Doherty deftly traverses the incongruity of concepts in order, it 
seems, to forge a relationship between the ‘glance’ of the painting and that 
of the viewer, both holding each other within an monogenius exchange. A 
dialectic is thereby set up between the viewer and the figure of Rothko, the 
later constituting the ‘intimacy’ of the painting’s surface. O’Doherty also 
places Rothko within an established genealogy of portraiture137 which in 
turn gives his theory a certain institutional ‘truth’ value. The crux of this 
argument, the problem that I keep returning to, then, is: ‘How can Rothko be 
figured in this manner?’ I will argue that the primary motif is that of the 
face (prosopon + poein), specifically the eyes - the organs of vision. Not a 
represented face, its features and orifices neatly arranged in a physiological 
manner, but the ambiguous awareness of ‘self’ which locates itself behind 
the face; that which ‘senses’ both itself and the world without recourse to its 
own materiality. The eyes thereby are the signifieds of ‘being’ , the windows 
to the soul, through which we are able to view the world and move amongst 
it, meeting other ‘souls’; eye-to-eye, face-to-face, interacting with other 
beings-in-the-world. Interaction through the primary sense of sight, 
connection with other identical beings, that vehicle that is located within
136 O’Doherty, ‘Rothko’, page 38.




Look at the canvas, move towards it, exchange glances, does it stir your soul? 
The movement is not actually physical or even actually spatial, but sensual, 
imaginary, locking onto the sense of 'being7 which is connoted through the 
trace, the brushstroke, the eye, consciousness, leading the hand into action. 
A comparison of this idea can be made with one of Barnett Newman’s, who 
argues in relation to his own work that he:
... was concerned constantly in doing a painting that would move 
in its totality as you see it. You look at it and you see it. And if you 
don’t, there’s nothing to walk into. It’s not a window leading you 
into a situation where you walk through some either interior or 
exterior world from which you then come to a conclusion. The 
beginning and end are there at once. Otherwise, a painter is a kind 
of choreographer of space, and he creates a kind of dance of 
elements, and it becomes a narrative art instead of a visual art.
When you see a person for the first time, you have an immediate 
impact. You don’t have to really start looking at details. It’s a total 
reaction in which the entire personality of a person and your own 
personality make contact. To my mind that’s almost a metaphysical 
event. If you have to stand there examining the eyelashes and all 
that sort of thing, it becomes a cosmetic situation in which you 
remove yourself from the experience. 138
O’Doherty concurs with the same premise: ‘Rothko’s figure ... set at an exact 
human scale and suffering a distraction between the tragic and the 
transcendental, has a paradigm in the picture. Or more truly, a physiognomy, 
a face.’ A face which once experienced:
... leaves no real image of what was perceived. There is an 
intimation of a glance or a stare, and a feeling. Features are not 
remembered only the sense of a perfect regard .... This brings us 
easily to the language of the mystics, and to the durable conceit of 
the “face of God”, presumably the ultimate stare. After their 
transports, the mystics similarly cannot describe what they have 
seen. The intensity of the experience forestalls memory. They are 
left with a vague image and an intense conviction.’1"
Such arguments have a philosophical premise, represented in and by a
138 Barnett Newman in Emile De Antonio and Mitch Tuchman Painters Painting: A Candid 
History o f the Modern Art Scene 1940 -1970. Aberville Press: New York 1972, page 71. 
My italics.
139 O’Doherty, ‘Rothko’, page 38.
metaphor that I used a moment ago and which has the face or would have the 
face as the location where the soul can be ‘seen’. Sight is deemed the vehicle 
through which the soul can escape into the (idealised) world, where the 
boundary between inner and outer worlds collapse. Hegel mused: ‘If we ask 
ourselves now in which particular organ the soul appears as such in its 
entirety we shall at once point to the eye. For in the eye the soul 
concentrates itself ... which is the source of soul-life, and reveals spirit.’1,10
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140 Hegel, Aesthetics, quoted in Derrida ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, page 99.
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2.3 Outing the in sid e
Is my death possible? ... It is well known that there is one word that 
remains absolutely unassignable or unassigning with respect to its 
concept and to its thingness, it is the word “death” - it is possible to 
attribute to the noun “death”, and above all to the expression “my 
death”, a concept or reality that would constitute the object of an 
indisputably determining experience. Yet the syntagm '“My 
death” ... relates the possible to the impossible [and] can be figured 
flashing a sort of indicator-light (a light at a border) installed at 
the custom booth, between a l l ... borders ... between the areas of 
knowledge or the disciplines, and finally, between conceptual de­
terminations. A light flashes at every border, where it is awake 
and watches [<;a veille]. One can always see there is always a 
watchman [du veilleur] or a nightlight [de la veilleuse].’ 141
In March 1999 I went to Paris to visit Rothko. It was his long awaited 
retrospective. His work was on display and I was eager to interact with it. 
After queuing for over a hour at the Musee d’Art Moderne de la ville de Paris 
I managed to get in to the exhibition. Copious notes, bland commentary 
ensued. 1 looked for Rothko, but all I saw was old paint on even older 
canvases. I was determined not to ‘give’ myself over to the rhetoric. But as I 
moved from canvas to canvas one of them fixed me with its gaze and made me 
realise that my thesis might actually convince. It was Red, Orange, Orange on 
Red (Figure 4). Looking back at my notes I notice that my initial reaction was 
that it seemed as though Rothko is ‘looking out from inside - the framing 
device is put on last (rather than first as is usual) thereby the colour does not 
“float”. Almost an exact reversal of the painting beside it’.
Looking at Red, Orange, Orange on Red, I could almost imagine inhabiting 
Rothko’s abode. 1 was staring back at me staring at him. Oh dear, I was falling 
for it. It seemed as if I was viewing my own viewing position, ‘within’ the 
inter-action - the dialectic - between Rothko and myself, from the other-side. 
I was confused. The distance between my ‘inner’ world and that (once) 
inhabited by Rothko had somehow been bridged. How could this happen? For 
me to inhabit the space of a dead man would constitute me experiencing my
141 Derrida, Aporias, pp 21-24.
own death - the dissolution of my own being. At the same time it seemed 
necessary for me to experience the other-inner, in order to confirm my own 
interiority. Life has to always experience death, albeit in a spectral and 
thereby circumspect ‘form’; consciousness always has to vacillate between 
the two philosophically contrived states of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’: yet 
always hovers above the abyss - the aporetic.
Pure life would be death. The absolute exposition of an inside to the 
outside destroys it immediately. But it cannot be absolutely shut 
away safely either. Every inside exposes a face to danger, without 
which it would be already dead. During one of the first American 
expeditions to the moon, a careless astronaut pointed his camera at 
the sun, which immediately burned out its cells. The camera cannot 
tolerate the source of purity of which its only raison d’etre is to 
capture and relay. This [is the] lunar drama of reflected light, of a 
burning that leaves only ash, of the sun and death that cannot be 
looked at directly ,..'42
Derrida, in Memoires for Paul de Man, tries to understand the implication of 
experiencing an-other’s interiority from the outside by using the metaphor 
of the crypt. The dead Rothko can only exist in ‘me’ or between me and Red, 
Orange, Orange on Red . The ‘form’ contained within the surface of the 
canvas constitutes the ‘content’ of Rothko’s interiority. By engaging with 
this canvas I assimilate him (in) to myself and annul him as other or his 
experiences as foreign. Rothko, according to this theory, has died"*’ so that he 
can become part of me. He not only continues to introject and animate his 
canvases, but he is also incorporated into my sense of self, my me. 
‘Incorporation forms the crypt: hidden under the inside which it thus 
supports, outside without really being outside .... I am here, in the crypt.’144 It 
seems that by confirming my own sense of interiority, by inhabiting 
Rothko’s, I also bridge the dialectic between life and death. However, 
according to Derrida, this is impossible as the impossibility of the possible (or 
the possibility of the impossible). The bridging of life and death is possible 
only through acts of philosophical construction which ‘safely’ efface the
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142 Bennington, Derrida, pages 137-8.
143 What I mean by this is that the corporeal Rothko does not have to be alive in order for 
his persona to ‘live’ within his work, or indeed be incorporated into my own sense of 
self.
144 Bennington, Derrida, pp 147.
threat of the aporetic. The move from my viewing position to that of Rothko’s 
is only possible through and by metaphor and displacement. It is necessary 
for me to view Rothko’s work as a confirmation of my ‘life’ as opposed to his 
‘death’ but in effect this can only be done by lifting myself above and 
denying the materiality of the canvas - that which constitutes the border, 
the boundary, between his subjectivity and mine. But is this possible, can I 
separate the content of ‘Rothko’ from the ‘form’ contained within his work? 
As far as Derrida is concerned, this is the impossibility of the aporetic
because what is in the form is the content and what the content 'is' is the 
form. Neither exists without the other for they are both theoretical fictions 
which contaminate and subvert each other at the same time that they 
constitute the possibility of each other’s ‘existence’. For me to respect the 
aporetic structure 1 would not be able to write about his 'form' as separate 
from the 'content' of his paintings - or indeed discuss his work in relation to 
his life at all. By describing my experience of Rothko’s painting the rhetoric 
of artistic discourse demands the construction of certain philosophical 
oppositions; and in constructing them I misrepresent and deny the aporetic. 
Experience is contaminated by its own description and vice versa. My writing 
about Rothko and the traces left by him  on the surface of his canvases 
present, to each other and to you, our ‘presence’ as autonomous 
subjectivities. ‘Presence’ is inscribed within our articulations. However we 
are both ‘dead’ insofar as our traces and inscriptions need neither of us. 
Rothko and I haunt the forms through which we articulate our selves; as 
presences.145 According to the Freudian concept of the ‘primal horde’, the 
father is more powerful an effect after absence; the ‘other’ always haunts 
the dialectic as the spectre of the outside, the unknown, the non-conceptual, 
the aporetic. This is how I could occupy Rothko’s abode. It would be necessary 
for me to do so as the ‘other’ constitutes the putative 'present' sign: Both me 
as a viewer and Rothko as the artist constitute the conditions of each other’s 
possibility as well as the conditions of each other’s impossibility. The
dialectic between life and death can only be constructed by effacing certain
145 1 would like to thank Paul Bowman for discussing this section with me and offering a 
clarity which was not, up to that point, attained.
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impossibilities about what it 'represents' or 'includes'. To include and to 
excavate. Any exclusion would excavate something which would subvert or 
invalidate the logic of the dialectic. The excluded, the aporetic, haunts, 
threatens, but also promises, in a sense. Its expulsion is necessary for the 
constitution of the internal systematicity of a conceptual order, but that is a 
violence which is unethical in the first instance, and will always return; it 
is, in a sense, repressed. The aporia is another name for the kinds of impasses 
one encounters when trying to construct a philosophical system of 
coherence, and we can only understand ‘Rothko’ through such philosophical 
systems. Artistic discourse is built on such rhetorical devices. My experience 
of Rothko’s canvases is constituted and made possible by such discourses, 
which, it seems, contradict and antagonise each other. I rely on tried and 
trusted academic-philosophical rhetoric to understand what I am looking at 
and why. Then there is my ‘appreciation’ of his work - the way I intuit the 
effects of his canvases, which is also shrouded in notions of the ‘aesthetic’, 
‘presence’, ‘universality’, etc. Nevertheless, as argued previously, Rothko’s 
work cannot be contained by and within such concepts. It is ‘understood’ 
within, and yet still exists without, the tape-loop. I am, it seems, forever in 
the grip of institutionalised contingency. Rothko’s canvases constitute 
‘presences’ which, given the clout of philosophical conceptuality, are 
validated under the auspices of academic traditions and myths. But ‘nothing’ 
is there. The spectre is projected through discursive tropes and 
institutionalised traces. All that is left is canvas and paint. Can you hear the 
babble? Neither ‘Rothko’ or his work can be comprehended completely or 
apodictically; the experience of his canvases exceeds their rhetoricity - the 
babble breaks through.
My seeing and being seen by Red, Orange, Orange on Red (figure 4) put all 
the other canvases into perspective, in that it allowed me to deconstruct the 
space inhabited by Rothko. As far as I am aware it is the only canvas that 
reverses the viewing position in this manner; it is the one which ‘exposes’ 
Rothko as a sham. As I walked around the gallery the other canvases
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‘promised’ the same spectral moment, but then blocked my entry into this 
‘space’ - the virtual abode inhabited by a dead man. It’s not as if I had to see 
Red, Orange, Orange on Red before I understood the rest of his work, but what 
I realised then was that we think that controlled reflection on deconstructive 
method will protect us from the follies of our modernist forefathers, that we 
will never again fall into the rhetoric, the rhetoric of our own ‘being’. How 
was it that Rothko preempted me with this one painting? ‘Enabled’ me, as it 
were, to imagine myself within his position of immateriality (immortality)? 
Although I did not see Rothko, I sensed something which I imagined as him. 
The only way I could do this was through the structures of philosophical 
rhetoric - yet at the same time it seemed ‘real’, the spectre of Rothko 
convinces, contrives, and at the end of the day even the most cynical 




2 .4 . Seein g  th e  Light
LIGHTING: The light, whether natural or artificial, should not be
too strong: the pictures have their own inner light ...146
Another aspect of his work that intrigued me was the translucent quality of 
his paint, his use of white. White light. Although he did not always use white 
paint he would always use a lighter hue, or play with the surface to create a 
tension between matt and reflective surfaces; both of which give the ‘effect’ 
of light.147 (figures 7 and 8). The correlation of the idea of ‘light’ with that of 
‘existence’ is deeply entwined within the history of Western thought. 
Religious, Scientific and Philosophical discourses all utilise, in some form or 
another, the metaphor of light to connote reason, ‘being’ (the soul), the 
metaphysical, the spiritual and the transcendental. We also use the metaphor 
of light in our everyday usage, which is not unconnected with such 
discourses: ‘Seeing the light’, ‘shedding light on...’, Tight of the world’, ‘to 
bring to light’, ‘going towards the light’, Tight of my life’, etc. Although we 
use commonly use such terms it is important to note that fundamental to this 
tradition is an image of light(either visual or verbal) as an invisible medium 
that opens up to a knowable world. Light is a metaphor for seeing the 
invisible in the visible, or seeing things in an intelligible form that holds all 
that exists together but is itself devoid of sensible qualities; for example the 
body and soul. Such a claim has its roots in Ancient Greek philosophy, for it 
is by means of this metaphor of light that the philosopher Plato implies a 
natural relation between existence and truth, or a concept of reality based on 
an original self-presentation of ‘being’ which can be clarified through 
vision. ‘Seeing the light’ is reaching understanding of something. Seeing 
the light is theory, religion and philosophy.
146 Notes drafted by Rothko and sent by the Museum of Modern Art New York. Reprinted 
in Mark Rothko, Tate Publishing, pg 88.
147 In the Mark Rothko Catalogue by Anfam (pages 522&525J he states that on Mural 
Section 4 the inscription is ‘upper left “MARK ROTHKO/[deleted]: 1958 /1 9 5 9 ” lower left 
[inverted]: “1958”’. On Mural Section 7 he states that the inscription is ‘lower centre 
[inverted]: MARK ROTHKO/1959”’. Given more time and space I would like to have 
expanded on this ‘writing’ of the signature onto the canvas and then erasing it - as 
effacing and defacing ‘Rothko’.
Derrida argues that ‘light’ constitutes a metaphor for philosophical language 
itself. Philosophical reasoning is thereby dependent on metaphysics: 
‘Metaphor ... is included by metaphysics as that which must be carried off to 
a horizon or proper ground, and which must finish by rediscovering its 
truth.’ 148 For Derrida then, light is the concept-metaphor by means of which 
‘truth’ can be made to appear or become present to consciousness. The light 
is conceived in terms of the sun:
The sun ... provide[s] a [remarkable] example of sensory Being such 
that it can always disappear, keep out of sight, not to be present.
The very opposition of appearing and disappearing, the entire 
lexicon of the phainesthai, of aletheia, etc., of day and night, of the 
visible and the invisible, of the present and the absent - all this is 
possible only under the sun. Insofar as it structures the 
metaphorical space of philosophy, the sun represents what is 
natural in philosophical language. 14y
The structure of the metaphoric space inscribed by the light of the sun, 
according to Derrida, is a specular circle or heliotrope. The movement of the 
heliotrope is simultaneously a movement towards the sun; always expecting 
its arrival; and the turning movement of the sun.150 There is always a turning 
movement/moment, within which the sun turns itself. The viewer also turns 
towards the sun in order to obtain light/truth. The sun is believed to be an 
exemplary natural object, entirely sensible or perceivable. Paradoxically, 
however, the sunlight of heliocentricism is always artificial. The heliotrope 
is the paradigmatic metaphor, or model of the sensory sun. Being sensory 
however, the sun is something whose presence  cannot be mastered and is 
always improperly known. Equivocally then the sun is always metaphorical 
yet is representative of all that is most natural in philosophical language: 
‘what is most natural in nature bears within itself the means to emerge from 
itself; it accommodates itself to “artificial light”.’151 Derrida states that is 
through this metaphor we make things sensible; that is, both accessible to 
the senses, and sensible in an abstract sense. 15"
148 Derrida, Margins o f Philosophy, pg 268.
149 Derrida, Margins o f Philosophy, pg 251.
130 Derrida Margins o f Philosophy, pg 251.
131 Derrida Margins o f Philosophy, pg 251.
15i Derrida Margins o f Philosophy, pg 209.
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Yellow and Blue [Yellow, Blue and Orange] (figures 9 and 10) is an example of 
a Rothko painting where the white-light is barely perceptible yet still 
manages to escapes from under the weight of the blue (bottom middle); the 
transcendental, it seems, never fails to escape; turning towards the viewer in 
order to manifest itself. The light is always there, on/in every canvas, 
receding, emerging, projecting out of the forms; Rothko, it seems, is always 
already-present, albeit partially hidden, and awaiting your arrival. The 
mystery seems to be how, or when, will he turn and show himself to you, 
make himself ‘real’. Or will he always just allude to his presence? What a 
tease. This 'presence’ presumes an autonomous will. Whether the eyes are 
closed, half shut or wide open - the face is always there, immaterial yet 
animated. It seems as if it is a matter of choice. Rothko chooses whether he 
will turn and ‘present’ (presence) himself, a choice made with his controlled 
application of the paint; a choice made with reference to the philosophical 
ideal of his own consciousness. As argued previously, light has clear 
philosophical connotations in relation to sight and the soul. ‘S ight... 
possesses a purely ideal relation to objects by means of light, a material 
which is at the same time immaterial ...\153
Sight as a partially immaterial ‘entity’ seems to move away from the location 
of the eyes and face when it navigates the surfaces upon which it finally 
rests: silent one-to-one communication, between vision and the visible. The 
other senses are deemed secondary to sight. Covering distances, 
encompassing great vistas, sight allows transgression, movement from the 
material body to the vast surfaces of the appropriated object, or coincidence 
with other sites of sight, other consciousnesses. Seeing is also silent - do you 
know that 1 am looking at you within the geometry of gazes?
The privileging of sight leads to violence both to the viewing subject and the
viewed art object. Sight silences, makes mute the babble; noise is covered,
entombed. Indeed, within Hegel’s master/slave dialectic once the two
153 Hegel, Aesthetics, quoted in Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, page 99.
consciousnesses have acknowledged each other by sight, there ensues a 
struggle until death - a silencing of the other and getting him to work on my 
behalf. As Derrida explains: ‘Violence, then, would be the solitude of a mute 
glance, of a face without speech, the abstraction of seeing.’154
In relation to Rothko’s multiforms, the abstraction of seeing constitutes the 
abstracting of the already abstract. How can we make sense of this 
contradiction? The abstracted face of Rothko manifested as light/sight on the 
surface of the canvas is hidden behind that which is already abstracted in 
form: the inter-faced. The viewer eagerly acknowledges this face, as a 
‘being’ that can see, and thereby recognises, through the meeting of 
abstracted gazes, another being, albeit one impossibly ‘contained’ within the 
materiality of the canvas. The way that this impossibility becomes possible is 
that this face is also beyond the canvas, as the light of being, the 
philosophical mark of consciousness. As discussed previously, the heliotrope 
can keep out of sight; be not yet present, yet it will always return and show 
itself - that is the spectral motion of the sun. In engaging with this eventual 
meeting of gazes as the promise of (philosophical) truth, the viewer abstracts 
his or her own consciousness, makes it mutual within the very 
moment/movement of acknowledgement - made possible through the 
immateriality, but the reality, of sight. Discourse locks into that moment, 
articulates it, makes it ‘real’, ‘authentic’. It gives a name to Rothko’s face: the 
brushstroke, the form, and gives an ‘experience’ to the moment: the 
aesthetic; mute, contemplatative, collapsed space, connections made through 
immaterial matter - sight and soul. Light has always had such connotations, 
the light of God, Apollo, the Rational; religious, philosophical, the light 
illuminates that which will always speak and write the ‘Name’:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things 
were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that 
was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men.155
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154 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, page 99.
155 Holy Bible, St. John Chapter 1: 1 - 4. My italics.
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2.5 Stepping out with Rothko - onto  the tape loop
In an attempt to understand the violent discourses that circulate Rothko’s 
work, bring forth the light, it is necessary to get onto the tape-loop, 
acknowledge my muteness, mouth and write words which, though they are 
not mine, seem at times as if they’re of me.
<P la y >
He [Rothko] never abandoned the 
intoxication of muted radiances, and their 
atmospheric as well as hazy outlines 
remained a constant mark o f  his 
individuality. The air and its gaseous 
fumes delineated even his rectangles, and 
thus, somehow, he succeeded in alluring to 
the harnessed heat of purposive action. 
Glimpsing them from without, he lifted the 
veils which hover before the opened 
furnace door, and their coloured flames 
were hiding the Greek fires of the 
imagination. As a rule, he reproduced an 
arrangement of bipartite and balanced 
chromatic values - almost as if 
counter expo sing a celestial and a 
terrestrial world.116
I don’t stand a chance do I? A will-less 
will. Rhetoric gone mad. What on earth 
is being said? Confused, contradictory, 
the tape-loop makes words, gives 
accounts, but can’t really say 
anything transparent, meaningful.
...it is the paintings borders ... that 
evidence an insubstantiality - sometimes 
through their very narrowness, sometimes 
through the ghostly fragility o f  surface that 
was achieved by dry-brushing a thin layer 
of color over another white or light tone 157
These are motionless pictures; but despite 
the repetition of the horizontal - line or rectangle 
they arc not pictures o f  rest. The floating shapes 
convey no sense of relaxation. Nor is there a hint 
of how they came to be, nothing that suggests the 
action o f  the artist (pace Action Painting), 
either through gesture or direction or 
impasto, nothing that defines the imposition o f  
the will, either through an exact edge or a precise 
measurement. And yet in the unrelenting 
frontality o f  these pictures, their constant
156
157
Kennedy, ‘Mark Rothko’, page 47. My italics.
Sandler, The Triumph of American Painting, page 184. My italics.
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Only one person knows, and he’s busy 
shining out of his canvases, being 
transcendental - playing hide and 
seek, facing and de-facing.
symmetry, and simplicity, there is the immediate 
conviction o f  an enormous will. At close range 
this will is mitigated. The rectangles terminate 
softly and irregularly, their sizes and intervals 
obey no commensurate rhythm, their 
symmetrical placing is approximate, their 
uniform surfaces are not quite as smooth 
and even. And lacking all traces in the 
process of their making, they are divorced from  
the will that created them. They are thus at once 
enormously wilful and yet unrelated to a 
formulating will. Apparently unprovoked in the 
making, they seem removed and indifferent to 
examination, yet they entice us to discover what 
is intention, what is chance.158
It seems that Rothko’s paintings always 
‘represent the death o f, are always 
‘beyond’ or ‘reactionary’, ‘on the 
border o f , are always ‘bigger’ 
‘heavier’ than other paintings.
Faced with Rothko’s later paintings ... one feels 
oneself unbearably hemmed-in by forces  
buffeting one’s every nerve, imagines the gravity 
of one’s body to be multiplied as if some weight 
borne on one’s shoulders were grinding one into 
the ground; one feels oneself rising against 
these pressures, riding them, carried away 
into exhilaration and release; pain and serenity 
become indistinguishable. This complcx of 
feelings is familiar enough in the experience of 
tragic art, but tempered and complicated by other 
appeals to the senses and intellect and 
imagination - involvement in a specific type of 
human situation; the re-creation o f  familiar 
elements o f  reality in a way that makes them 
seem more real than life... 159
These paintings are beyond poetry as they are 
beyond picture-making.
...violence and serenity are reconciled 
and fused  - this is what makes Rothko’s a 
tragic art. ... a Rothko is awe-aspiring as a 
cathedral is, not as a mountain is: the 
effect of its scale is not to make us feel 
puny beside a sublime vastness. It has a 
scale transcendent enough to command, 
accessible enough to reassure.
...[Rothko’s work] pushes the medium to 
extreme limits where there is m
<Pau se>
Taking these words out of their context - philosophical, theoretical and
158 Goldwater, ‘Reflection on the Rothko Exhibition’ in Mark Rothko 1903 - 1970, pg 34. 
My italics.
159 Sylvester, ‘Rothko’, in Mark Rothko 1903 - 1970 , pg 36. My italics.
160 Sylvester, ‘Rothko’ in Mark Rothko 1903 - 1970, pg 37. My italics.
making them stand for themselves seems somehow cruel, violent even. 
Nevertheless there are clues of their own undoing within them, as accounts 
of Rothko’s work that really don’t have anything to say. In a desperate 
attempt to cover up the incoherent babble, make sense of what on earth is 
going on, words are regurgitated, ‘sublime vastness’, words that only 
articulate the inarticulatable - Death uncovered by theory, and thereby 
covered by structures of rhetoric is entombed therein.
It seems, as I am finding out to my cost, that in writing about Rothko’s 
painting there is a perverse difficulty; any attempt to write clearly, 
truthfully about his work, leads to a disillusionment in one’s own ability to 
comprehend and articulate. The poet John Ashbury remarks that he:
... had produced a text [on Rothko] containing the words “shades 
snapped down against the day”, “Rembrandt,” “Dominican,”
“poverty,” “Spinoza,” and “the all-importance of fine 
distinctions.” After having put this paper aside for a few days and 
come back to it I was infuriated by the inadequacy and silliness of 




An idea that is irreducible, to what? 
deletions, subtractions ... verbosity that 
seems to say a great deal but fails to 
signify. Aiming to make all equal 
within a calculation; size up; pare 
down, getting to the naked ‘idea’. 
Making equivalent, through the 
‘dialectic’, Rothko the philosophically 
induced being with the ‘work’
Rosenberg states that Rothko’s paintings were 
‘based on the idea of one idea. That was an 
aspiration toward an aesthetic essence, which ... 
[Rothko] sought to attain ... by rationally 
calculating what was irreducible in painting.' 
Therefore Rothko was, according to Rosenberg 
employed in a ‘Marathon of deletions ... acts of 
subtraction ... reductionist aesthetics ... the acts 
of purging and the lik e .162
Writing on a picture of of Casper David 
Friedrich’s, Eric Heller called it romantic, not 
for its theme “but because of the opposites
161 Ashbery, ‘Paris Notes,’ in Art International, [25 February 1963], page 73.
162 Rosenberg, ‘The Art World: Rothko’, in The New Yorker [28 March 1970], pages 90 - 
95. My italics.
carried out within/by ‘his'
that come together in it; the vital and the 
abstract, the appetite of the soul and
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brushstrokes.‘Rothko’ is both created a geometrical design, the submission to
rational order, an ecstasy and a deiinition”. 
by, and is the creator of the light here, How clearly this applies to Rothko! Romanticism
and avant-gardism persisted longer in the visual 
thereby providing the the ‘ontological arts than any other. And at its end, an artist could
occur who can paint the pictures Schelling and 
basis’ for his own being. However the Hegel could intimate but not visualise. Hegel
foresaw the obsolescence of the imagination and 
corporeal Rothko, now decomposed, art unless, as Heller points out, quoting Hegel,
“it miraculously rises above historical necessity 
collapses, falls back into the tomb and creates ‘out or its own pure self something
which he called ‘absolute art’ . Is Rothko the 
which then snaps down its lid like artist Hegel predicted?163
shade ‘down against the day’. The <Pause>
abyss, the tomb, is thereby enveloped by the tape-loop. According to
Rosenberg, Rothko ‘calculates what is irreducible’; yet as Derrida argues,
when there are two irreducible and unequal ‘entities’(ontological and
hauntological ‘origins’) within the dialectic, each:
... envelop(e)(s) or sheath(es), incalculably reverses, turns inside 
out, replaces, remarks, overlaps [recoupe] the other. The 
incalculable of what remained calculates itself, elaborates all the 
coups [strokes, blows, etc.], twists or scaffolds them in silence ... the 
infinite circulation of general equivalence ....,64 Being assures, 
guards, assimilates interiorizes, idealizes, relieves the fall [chute] 
into the monument. There the fall maintains, embalms, and 
mummifies itself, monumemorizes and names itself - falls (to the 
tomb (stone)) [tombe]. Therefore, but as a fall, it erects itself 
there.165
Rothko epitomises, to some, the unification of being and transcendence,
‘pure self and ‘absolute art’, mind and body, life and death. But the distance 
between such concepts cannot be breached, except through language, even 
then it will contain a moment of its own deconstruction, its failed ‘recovery’
[recoupvrement]. ‘Rothko’: as the name, mummifies itself in the brushstroke 
and becomes, at the same time, an empty but meaning-full gesture. The 
dialectic, as the interaction between two equal, calculable entities - being 
and origin - fails, falls; it collapses under the weight of its own rhetoric.
163 O’Doherty, ‘Rothko’, page 30.
164 Derrida, Glas, page 1.
165 Derrida, Glas, page 1.
There is no equivalence between the man Rothko who becomes lost within 
the babble of decay and disorder, and the figure ‘Rothko’ who inhabits his 
brushstrokes, as the ‘origin’ of artistic labour. The ‘moment’ of creation 
becomes superimposed onto (into) the brushstroke as the in(tro)jection of 
the transcendental subject; even though the movement between the two is 
not a passage between two stable entities. The moment within which the 
brushstroke is executed, belongs within the babble, a dead meaningless 
gesture where the transcendental subject constitutes a precise knowable 
moment (movement) within a teleological framework of calculatable 
(historical) time. As Derrida tells us: ‘With the telos can also be found the 
cliff [l ’a-pic]. Where one can get a foothold or fall (to the tomb).’ 166




Let me return to my own memories, let me share them with you. 
Remembering my first ever encounter with a ‘Rothko’ in 1990.
Stood nervously in front of this vast canvas, Light Red Over Black (figure 11), 
eager to say the right thing, I was asked by my then tutor167 “How does it 
make you feel?”. I concentrated on the image, moved toward it, tried to 
understand what it was ‘about’ and replied that ‘I want to put my fist through 
the black rectangle, have 1 said the right thing?’ Silence - ‘... I know you by 
hearsay’ .168 There is still silence when I approach Rothko’s canvases, mute 
and somehow conspiratorial. However, I now know a great deal more about 
‘Rothko’. But only by ‘hearsay’ voiced through texts about him and images of
166 Derrida, Glas, page 6.
167 My tutor at that moment was Charles Harrison who I am now citing and critiquing in 
this chapter.
168Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, page 65.
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him, filtered through cultural discourse, placed upon the tape-loop. Since 
that first time, Rothko’s work has intrigued yet baffled me to the point that I 
was initially resistant to discussing him in relation to my thesis. Such an 
obvious choice for a post-graduate writing a PhD on art and death, I’ve been 
repeatedly told; an absolute gift. In an attempt to analyse my reticence in 
explaining Rothko’s work I stop at an impasse. To write a survey of the 
literature about Rothko would only imprison my words within Rothko 
scholarship.169 Instead I want to place an unknown ‘uncontainable other’ on 
the tape loop, rupture the circulation of cliched words, already mouthed by 
bigger and better critics than myself. Instead of coming blankly back to the 
name Rothko, back to the themes of mortality, death, resurrection, 
transcendentality, I want to undermine these concepts, show them up for the 
charlatans they are, and how within the superficiality they weave, the 
delicate persona of the artist is born. However, it seems that even with this 
insight, whilst working through deconstructing the spectre of Rothko, he 
still stands there like a modernist monolith, haunting my critical thoughts. I 
find myself babbling, constantly taunting and teasing his material absence. 
‘Come on, Mark, if you think you’re hard enough’, I chant. ‘Let me at the 
painting, let me remove the black, the block, show yourself, you wimp - 
afraid to speak on your own behalf?’ Obsessively, I still need to know what 
these paintings mean, what they ultimately signify, and there is only one 
voice that can tell me. I can’t just let them ‘be’. So, at what point do I stop the 
tape-loop, cut through it, stop listening, look, and finally see, feel, imagine, 
then understand. I stand in front of his work again, where I am told that it is 
important to set aside the theory and work with the materiality of the work 
(another repetitive piece of advice); but the colour is immense, the brush
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169 As Adrian Rifkin deftly puts it on page 5 of Ingres Then and Now: ‘If this little 
genealogy is a matter of hazard rather than of Ingres scholarship, nonetheless it tells us 
something of the fabric of the archive, of its strangeness and dreamlike character. It 
alerts us to how, in Michel Foucault’s terms, the concept of an author is a notion, one 
that we need, but that we must also try and set aside. For if we allow this notion to be 
invaded by its other, by an uncontainable otherness, its specific form might then be 
newly figured’.
strokes subtle, the effect stultifying.170 The silence of the glance.
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The most effective element of Rothko’s canvases, we’ve been repeatedly told, 
is his use of colour. He is often referred to as a ‘Colour Field Painter’ or a 
‘Colourist’ as though that explains, codifies and encapsulates his work. 
Rothko himself, however, dismissed this reductive understanding of his 
paintings171 by stating that:
I’m interested only in expressing basic human emotions - tragedy, 
ecstasy, doom ... And if you, as you say, are moved only by [the 
painting’s] colour relationships, then you miss the point. 172
Colour has been seen as an important vehicle through which to access the 
ideas feelings and thoughts of ‘Rothko’. In often simplistic metaphors the 
dark colours are taken to come in place of depression, anxiety, earth, the 
body; the light colours come in place of hope, reanscendence, the 
immateriality of the soul. In a complicated interweaving of concepts, and 
often protracted leaps of the imagination, the persona of ‘Rothko’ takes his 
first breath in the name of colour. Greenberg, when discussing Rothko’s 
work, effused that ‘[colour] breath[es] from the canvas with an enveloping 
effect, which is intensified by the largeness of the picture.’ 173
The tape loop nooses regardless. A presenter on a recent radio programme 
enthused about:
<Play>
...Mark Rothko, after Matisse the greatest
170 Stultifying here is used here as the dulling of the senses, as they become almost bland 
in their uniformity. When this happen there is no differentiation between stillness and 
observation, where the later becomes a non-activity. This in turn leads to the inability 
to make meaning of the colour which envelopes you. Rather like a rabbit staring into the 
headlights.
171 When I am repeatedly told by friends and acquaintances that ‘I bought a Rothko print 
because it matches my living-room wall’ it signifies the absolute death of ‘Rothko and 
all his transcendental posturings. It also reduces his work to bland blocks of colour - 
the thing he feared the most.
172 Rodman, Conversations With Artists, pg 94.
173 Greenberg, “‘American-Type”Painting’, In Partisan Review (Spring 1955), page 193.
colourist of the 20th century. A painter 
whose work seems so simple at first 
glance, with their rectangular blocks of 
paint, stacked up one on top of another, 
but whose blurred edges make them them 
float and gently jostle before the eye and 
whose layered application of thin washes 
of orange, or blood red, or even a brooding 
maroon seem to light up the whole room 
and suggest a myriad of different ways of 
seeing and feeling....there was always a 
sense of anxiety about Rothko himself and 
his paintings which gradually shifted from 




Colour itself is problematic in that it can be named but never pinned down to 
an exact hue or ‘essence’. Rothko’s colour modulates and reflects, escaping 
being categorised, slipping into the babble. The first thing most people 
notice about Rothko’s pictures is their vast expanses of colour, the way the 
paint has been applied, the opacity of the washes. And it seems that Rothko’s 
titles also enable the viewer to give an exact reference to the colours he used 
on particular canvases: Light Red Over Black] Henna and Green/Green and 
Red on Tangerine; Red and Yellow [Yellow, Orange, Red on Orange]: A myriad 
of colour combinations, an occular feast. Yet what do such titles tell us? How 
can we fix such colours to less ambiguous meanings? Again the argument 
slips into another aporetic moment. Stephen Melville argues:
Colour ... seem[s] bottomlessly resistant to nomination, attaching 
itself absolutely to its own specificity and the surfaces on which it 
has or finds its visibility, even as it also appears subject to endless 
alteration arising through its juxtaposition with other colours. 
Subjective and objective, physically fixed and culturally 
constructed, absolutely proper and endlessly displaced, colour can 
appear as an unthinkable scandal. The story of colour and its 
theory within the history of art is a history of oscillations between 
its reduction to charm or ornament and its valorisation as the 
radical truth of painting. From these oscillations other vibrations 
are repeatedly set in motion that touch and disturb matters as 
purely art-historical as the complex inter-locking borders among 
and within the individual arts and as culturally far-reaching 
....This movement of colour in painting is a movement in or out of
174 Radio 3 programme ‘Rothko: Light Red Over Black’, aired 29.08.00 9:30p.m.

to, Rothko the man - but the two can never be identical or indeed equal. This 
is why there is an inability to pin a meaning onto his canvas; it is the way in 
which explanation always floats above and adjacent to the materiality of his 
work, never absorbed, always repelling - always making critique seem 
somehow superfluous to the ‘experience’ of his canvases. Many on the tape- 
loop have tried, writing wordy accounts of his paintings, yet it seems 
inevitable that they will never hit the spot - the point of no return; time to 
get off. Words always return, constantly circulating within a strangulating 
discourse; strategies of not saying anything but at the same time saying 
everything over and over again - repetition, words, covering the babble; 
that which has no(n) sense.
Standing in front of the work can’t help me in my quest to understand, so 
again I return to my accomplice Derrida - as though in acknowledging the 
abyss I can avoid falling into it. In The Truth in Painting Derrida describes 
discourse as existing on the frame, as ‘on the limit between the inside and the 
outside of the art object’.177The Parergon is the ‘frame’, the ‘limit’ , the 
‘border’, which constitutes discourse, and the ergon what’s ‘inside’; the 
materiality of that which cannot be articulated - babble. The space between 
the two is liminal, inarticulatable, imperceptible. Parergon entombs ergon, it 
supplements, envelopes, but can never penetrate; ergon remains as the 
block. Returning to view of the art object, in an attempt to acquire the 
‘appropriate’ stance of Kantian disinterestedness, I remember:
If we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do 
not refer to its representation of it to the Object by means of 
understanding with view to cognition, but by means of the 
imagination ... we refer the representation to the Subject and its 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure. I7S
Yet the block is in place; the materiality of the object cannot be reached in- 
itself. As Derrida states:
177 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 45.
17S Kant, Critique o f Judgement [First Moment], page 8.
116
the pleasure [of an art object] presupposes not the disappearance 
pure and simple, but the neutralisation, not simply the putting to 
death but the mise en crypte [entombment/encrypting] of all that 
exists in as much as it exists ... an inexistent or anexistent 
subjectivity arising on the crypt of the empirical subject and its 
whole world.179
The materiality of both Rothko and his canvases are thereby neutralised, en­
crypted - in order to become meaning-full.
Time to <P 1 ay >  again?
The paradox is that we speak beyond Jean Richepin wrote a short story about a writer
whose first work, a poem, was so overwhelming
Rothko’s work but not necessarily look his friends thought it should be at least a novel
or a play. For years he worked, revised, came 
beyond it. Rothko’s face is inscribed back to his circle for further advise and
reassurance until his life was consumed and the 
in his work once a word is Uttered; unfinished work had become mythical. Finally he
pared off thousands of words, refining and 
the privileging of the verbal over the refining, until on his death bed he had reduced his
life work, his magnum opus, to one word-but 
visual. Let US, as O’Doherty suggests, died before he could utter it to his friends bending
over him. Perhaps he was writing an essay about 
look for a word that will conjoin (by Rothko. If one had heard that one word, one
might perfectly understand Rothko’s art. At that 
conjuring 180 ) the disparities between point art becomes alchemy and criticisms give
way to perfect apprehension.
word and image, between concept and 
materiality; look for a word that will 
silence the babble once and for all.
We need to look for the word - death?
- but within the image - how? I will 
begin with the proper  name 'Rothko’; 
the name and the concept ‘death’ 
becoming synonymous with each other; 
the meaning which circulates around
the objects that he left behind, which Can we go beyond this and imagine a civilisation
in which only one word is spoken-that functions
he Still, it seems, inhabits as a name, as for everything? A civilisation in which language
has vanished except for this one word, capable of 
a figure, as that which exists within yet inflections, since it can mean anything. A
179 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, page 45.
180 In The Chambers Dictionary conjure means to ‘call or summon by a sacred name ... to 
compel (a spirit) by incarnations’.
117
118
civilisation where no one has a face  until this 
beyond - living but ultimately dead. word inscribes it? Rothko’ s art utters a single
word, insistently. 181
<Pause>
Let’s stop this wordy procrastination, and get to the point. I propose that 
Rothko’s paintings act as (auto)biography, not only in a literary sense but 
also in a visual sense: within a doubled, spectral moment/movement. The 
paintings are as silent as the man himself. Like monoliths they present in 
their obstinate materiality. They are audacious enough not to speak to us 
directly. Nevertheless, many voices speak on ‘behalf’ of their creator,
Rothko, who, alas, is now no-more, dead, departed, decomposing. They conjoin 
as one; the voice, it seems, conies ‘from’ the paintings and speaks in Rothko’s 
name; they have his inflections, ‘reveal’ his thoughts, his behaviour, and 
constitute his persona. This voice speaks as if it inhabited his life, shared the 
events which through a teleological progression of time, composed, 
destroyed, and in the end resurrected the figure which encapsulates 
[encrypts] his work. And yet with the ‘resurrection’ of ‘Rothko’ came a 
spectre that was, and still is, bigger than either the man or his oeuvre. The 
same but different. Let’s go back, circle back to the first chapter of this 
thesis, repeat the moment where reference was made to Derrida, whilst at the 
same time implicitly referring back to the Critchley quote in this section182 - 
another text, another ally - yet the same figure: prosopopeia:
... the figure of bereaved memory [which] becomes a sort of 
(possible and impossible) metonomy, where the part stands for the 
whole and for more than the whole that it exceeds. An allegorical 
metonomy, too, which says something other than what it says and 
manifests the other (alios) in the open but nocturnal space of the 
agora - in its plus de lumiere: at once no more light, and greater 
light. 183
That which is no more seems to return, circling back through the event of 
death, the death of Rothko, and comes towards us, as though through the
" ‘O’Doherty, ‘Rothko’, Art International, 114 (Oct 1970), pages 30-49.
182 Which shows that the tape-loop is not only a metaphor for the discourse on Rothko, 
but can ‘stand-in’ for any discursive structure in this case philosophical.
183 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 37. My italics.
brushstrokes, the canvas; through the light, the translucence of the paint, 
the reflective surface, brighter and more magnificent than before his 
earthly demise. ‘Rothko’ becomes philosophically (well) endowed, potent.
The light, however, is a ‘nocturnal light’. The material becomes becomes 
distant and thereby made immaterial by and through the discursive 
deployment of death; but like the moonbeam, promises the origin of a source.
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The primary source of the prosopopoetic figure is culturally and 
linguistically contrived through the genre of (auto)biography. However 1 
need to clarify that I am not going to argue that Rothko’s paintings act 
merely as a visual correspondence to the literary genre of (auto)biography, 
only that Rothko’s paintings and (auto)biography implicitly postulate the 
metaphor of light as their origin. Although they produce different material 
results (word/image) they both reference the same 
philosophical/theological context.
For the next section of this chapter I will closely follow the theories of de 
Man, whose questions about the (auto)biographical project will inform my 
own. De Man asks whether (auto)biography:
depend[s] on reference, as a photograph depends on its subject 
(realistic) picture on its model? We assume that life produces the 
autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but can we 
suggest with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may 
itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer 
does is in fact governed by the technical demands of self­
portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources 
of his medium? And since the mimesis here assumed to be operative 
is one mode of figuration among others, does the referent 
determine the figure, or is it the other way round: is the illusion of 
reference not a correlation of the structure of the figure, that is to 
say no longer clearly and simply a referent at all but something 
more akin to a fiction which then, however, in its own turn, 
acquires a degree of referential productivity?184
The determining reference of (auto)biography will then constitute the main 
problematic within the remainder of this chapter: whether the correlation 
between ‘Rothko’ and Rothko is a reference determined by the figuration of
1S4 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, page 69.
the artist within discourse and not the material referent (body); whether 
Rothko did or did not create his own persona; or whether the correspondence 
between life and art(ist) is rhetorically induced. Throughout this section 1 
will be arguing that Rothko’s work constitutes an ongoing autobiographical 
event which engages with the project of creating, recreating and 
preserving Rothko; with every re-imagined brush stroke, every musing 
over, or writing about his canvases, every curious glance or determined 
stare of the viewer within the gallery space. As Christie and Orton argue 
‘Each critic, each art historian constructs a different biography, a different 
Rothko’. 185 This argument could be expanded to include every spectator; 
anyone who been caught before the paintings, who has ever mused about the 
‘m ea n in gs’ hidden within his work. Every gesture of the paint brush that 
constitutes Rothko’s creative moment(s) repeats itself again and again with 
every viewing of his work or reading of his history. The discourses that 
intersect with and are dispersed by his work are caught within a spectral 
(cultural) re-vision of Rothko. Double spectre - body and mind, canvas and 
consciousness. The underlying assertion of this argument is that enmeshed 
within Rothko’s history is his own undoing; his persona - constituting a self- 
effacing, de-facing, de-materialising auto-biography - may seem a little, 
well, odd .... By working through the figure of prosopopeia and using de 
Man’s notion of autobiography (as a de-facement) I aim to demonstrate how 
‘Rothko’ is not a physical body once in the world constituting, as it were, a 
point of origin, a chain of discrete events from birth to death, but is a 
complex weave of figuration(s) which can be selected from many different 
cultural points; all having threads which both attract and repel each other, 
giving other sets of meanings, references, differences, yet which are forced 
back to the prosopopoetic figure of Rothko - a looming figure within a 
figure, a supra-figure, enhanced, illuminated', that which contains ‘life’ yet 
repels ‘death’, needs both shifting and empty signifieds in order, as it were, 
to ‘be’. Projected back into the canvases he once manipulated - ergon  - re­
figured yet silenced by their sheer material weightiness. Paragon stops at
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165 Christie and Orton, ‘Writing on a Text of Life’, reprinted in Avant Gardes and
Partisans Reviewed, page 305.
the frame, beyond lies babble. Life, as face/sight, needs to be superimposed 
onto these canvases. How? By giving them ‘back’ the life that once created 
them - so that they can interact with the viewer, affirm their being. Rothko, 
deceased, never stops the cultural posturing; bring on the transcendental 
signifier. I will argue that ‘life’ and ‘death’ are neither states of ‘being’- 
Rothko, nor points of painterly action. Rather, ‘life’ and ‘death’ constitute 
‘being’ or ‘non-being’ only in the cultural, linguistic sense, not in the actual 
material sense. The materiality of the corporeal is erratic and noisy, its 
movement always vacillating between being and non-being, disrupting the 
opposition by fracturing it into many unequal, unrelated and varied points 
which are lost forever within the realm of babble. Neither consciousness or 
brute materiality. Master or slave, Cognito or non-cognito; all 
philosophically induced binaries, constantly reminding you to ‘mind the
gap’.
The gap between the dialectic between being and non-being is covered by a 
superimposed (safe) passage, a name; someone who has passed on, over. The 
gap between is infinite, abyss-mal, deathly in the failure to connote. No 
transcendental origin to break the fall. The gap is beyond space, yet has no 
space of its own, we cannot think of it, comprehend, understand - it is death. 
It is liminal, a border frame upon which the dialectic plays its game whilst 
teetering on the edge of oblivion. This constant dialectic is never a straight, 
or equal passage, as we are led to believe, life/death, Rothko/’Rothko - polar 
opposites that constitute each other, two sides of the same man. Instead, they 
constantly attract and repel each other, from tape-loop to canvas, spiralling 
off into the cultural and social milieu; encircled and contained by the name 
‘Rothko’; sent back home to their supposed ‘origin’; the conjured moment of 
becoming. They then rupture again, repeat the process, come back, repeat ad 
infinitum - eternally return, the same but different. The name of ‘Rothko’ is 
as unstable as the very materials he used in order to articulate his own being 
on canvas. So even if the canvases did constitute their own meaning, and 
declare their own origin ‘Rothko’(which 1 am not for one moment arguing
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that they do), such ‘capture’ could only ever partial and momentary, before
the unruly jumble of references break free of the circle, fail to signify,
signify to excess; always the same name, never the same ‘body’. Same but
different - always taking a last gasp of life, on the verge of death before
resuscitation; back into the Rothko Room, Mark186 - you’re not dead yet. The
reader, the viewer the critic, the historian, me, you; we keep Rothko
breathing. By looking at his work, reading his life, even if once, twice, three
times removed from his paintings, ad infinitum, we call Rothko, ask him to
speak to us; yet we fail to notice that behind the materiality of the word,
canvas and brush stroke lie many voices and faces all of which are blind and
mute - mannequins. They say ‘original’ things in front of Rothko’s work, yet
are mouthing each other’s words. They create their own sense of ‘self’ on the
back of each other. One huge cultural speaking and writing machine which
grinds on regardless, creating, re-creating, obliterating, reviving. A
collaboration without conspiracy - to conspire would be to acknowledge the
blandness of each others words; words re-jumbled, re-worked, which have no
energy with which to fulfil the promise of resurrection, the promise of a
revealed origin. Are my words original, new? Absolutely not. 1 will fall into
the same trap as everybody else. Philosophy does not offer the release from
Plato’s cave. Within the post-modern episteme, seeing the phantoms for what
they are does not constitute the truth. Acknowledging the abyss doesn’t
break the fall. I am driven to continue, aim in a direction I know will never
be completed, Rothko will never take up the challenge, be shown. Only the
processes which constitute his manifestation will be glimpsed, momentarily.
So what’s the point? The point of no return, constantly circling within
circles, eternal return, to the same point, the same but always different, its
location, ‘Rothko’, always deferred. The ultimate violence is not being
allowed to die. ‘Rothko’ is thereby located somewhere within a cultural
colossus, everywhere yet nowhere - omnipresent within the presence of his
canvases. Living yet dead - oscillating between the two, a safe passage
promised but not delivered. But what is the point? Where is it, and at what
186 I’m here referring to the re-opening of the Rothko Room at Tate Modern, this was such 
a monumental event that it was a metaphor for the resurrection of the Tate as an 
international and universal ‘happening’.
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point do you manage to stop and get off the tape-loop and see the difference 
within the repetition? The substratum that ruptures the monotone. Will 
Rothko finally be allowed to die, his canvases perish, if we stop the tape? 
Tape off the Rothko Room.
In an attempt to give it one last shot, stop the dialectic until we drop (off), we 
approach Rothko’s work yet again, read the words once more, refigure, 




2.6 B i o g r a p h y
When it comes to Rothko, there is no avoiding James E B Breslin’s magisterial 
tome Mark Rothko. But even Breslin admits defeat:
And however ‘prematurely 
entombed’ he may be, his canvases 
are seen, felt, imagined and 
consequently understood as:
Much of Breslin’s biography is like 
this. In conflating Rothko’s life with 
his art, and trying to revive him in 
order to give his book ‘life’, Breslin 
remains on the tape-loop, not daring to 
get off, look down. Yet in fairness to 
Breslin, how can anyone do any 
differently? How can one write Rothko 
into a deconstructed mode of 
(non)being without removing him 
from the ontological plinth which
<P lay >
... any kind of writing about his work -by 
critics curators, or even by Rothko himself 
- fixes the artist in a “premature entombment’”187
Living presences, as powerful, warm, and life- 
sustaining and silent as the sun, Rothko’s new 
paintings were at once independent of, and yet 
closely identified with, their passionately self- 
assertive creator.188
‘When he arrived at his classic format around 
1950, Rothko, as if feeling an inner spirit not 
fully incarnated in his body, began to create 
paintings which no longer represented the body 
(or any other identifiable objects) because they 
were themselves organisms, idealised bodies 
which could - “ without embarrassment ” - 
incarnate his living spirit.' 189
Within his multiforms ‘Rothko wanted to be 
understood; he wanted to be recognised , to be 
seen, in the deepest sense. 190
Modernist discourse has made for him?
Breslin writes about the distant Space In the closing years of the 1940’ s, Rothko
187 B reslin , Mark R othko  ,page 276 .
188 B reslin , M ark Rothko, page 276 .
189 B reslin , Mark R othko  ,page 2 7 6 . My Italics.
190 B reslin , Mark R othko  ,page 247 .
entered a period o f  intense, painful, yet 
exhilarated search, no longer trying to concretise 
his symbols but trying to concretise his work by 
eliminating symbols and realising them through 
thinly painted areas o f color that seemed to pulse 
with an inner life o f their own. 191
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Rothko’ s reductions are about removing the 
“ obstacles” between painter and work, between 
work and viewer; they are about ending 
separation, removing the “ obstacles”  to a more 
immediate communication about being 
“ understood” . 193
“One begins by sparring with his insides 
with one leg in the normal world,”  he went 
on. ‘Then  you are caught up in a frenzy 
that brings you to the edge o f madness, as 
far as you can go without ever coming 
back. The return is a series o f dazed weeks 
during which you are only half a live”194
<Pause>
Rothko, it seems, goes to the edge and back, moves back and forth from death 
to life within the process of creating his forms, ma(r)king his canvases. He 
‘realises’ his own transcendental longings, the ability to transfer from pure 
consciousness to occupy his own creations. ‘“Art is of the Spirit,” Rothko had 
written in “The Scribble Book.” ... Max Weber, had also praised the power of 
art to make “dead or indifferent matter the very adobe195 o f spirit.’”
<P lay>  (again)
191 Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 233. My italics.
1.2 Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 238-9. My italics.
1.3 Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 246-7.
194 Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 233. My italics.
195 In the Chambers Dictionary ‘Adobe’ is defined as ‘a house made from [sun dried]
bricks’.
196Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 244.
in Rothko’s paintings as something 
like ‘solitude or death’. This is the 
space or abode within which Rothko’s 
‘spirif lurks, which is ‘beyond 
transcendental longings’ because it is 
still individuated, still part o f the 
dialectic between life and death’.19' In 
allowing Rothko to occupy this liminal 
space between life and death he 
collapses the opposition - straddles and 
occupies the two poles. Rothko himself 
describes this ‘movement’ when 
painting his canvases:
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... Rothko splits view ing into an intimate, 
loving quickening gaze that comes close to t using 
with its object and a cold, unconsciously hostile 
look that kills. He has now begun to think o f the 
shapes in his work as living “organisms,”  ....197
... multiple colored shapes with open spaces 
between them allow differing sides, independent 
parts o f  the self, to coexist in a “ life  unity.”  The 
self is a “ multiform.”  198
Rothko let his inner vision emerge on the canvas, 
materialising i t ... in expansive patches o f  color, 
as if paint itself could speak, could provide a 
language o f the deep psyche.199
<Pause>
In the chapter entitled ‘An Art That Lives and Breaths’ , Breslin describes 
Rothko’s Untitled (figure 3) as the painting which marks Rothko’s 
progression into multiforms. As already mentioned, in one passage he 
compares this painting with an earlier self-portrait (figure 2).
< P la y >
In Untitled ( 1948)... the two large red circular 
splotches above the centre resemble eyes, the 
horizontal red smear below them the mouth, the 
white above hair, the white below a nose, and the 
yellow  oval to the right an ear .... The untitled 
painting o f  1948, in fact, transforms - by 
transcendentalizing - Rothko’ s S e lf Portrait o f 
the mid 1930’ s .... In [ Untitled] imposing size is 
suggested, but the body looks weightless and 
buoyant - on the verge o f disembodiment. The 
pink areas within and around the body may be a 
kind o f luminous flesh or they may be ground 
color, in front o f which features such as the eyes 
and mouth hover. The body’ s boundaries are thus 
indeterminate, and its solidarity doubtful, tor it 
can be seen either as covered with a veil o f  pink 
flesh or an open .... containing empty spaces that 
invite us to look inside ...[at] a boneless “ figure” 
... composed o f soft, rounded, warm, sensuous 
shapes that occupy a mysterious, shifting space 
... Stable yet precarious, Untitled (1948) does not 
delineate a human figure or anything else 
substantial, but evokes a kind o f spiritualised 
human presence which looks as though it has
197Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 234.
1,8Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 238.
‘"Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 236. My italics.
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Mobilising the figure, making it breath 
again, but how? And whose figure?
The use of the third person pronoun
‘one’ explicitly places Rothko in the 
frame. Breathing, stretching arms, 
Rothko cites his own art as a metaphor 
for himself. However in making 
himself ‘human’ he also allows it to be 
a shared‘experience’ . Deep breath.
Life. Thank God. I thought I’d reached 
the end o f the tape. Don’t want to drop 
off into the abyss just yet. Cheers,
Mark.
either just come together or is about to come 
apart... Colors break through, glow  through, 
slip around the edges or, like the ghostly gray 
shapes within the rosy pink in the upper right 
comer, they persist as shadowy presences ... the 
paintings colorful surface [then] may be viewed 
as a construction, one which covers but does not 
entirely conceal something distant and 
impenetrable, something resistant to 
transcendental longings, something that just is - 
like solitude or death..200
For me the great achievements o f  the centuries 
in which the artist accepted the probable and 
familiar as his subjects were the pictures o f  the 
single human figure - alone in a moment o f  utter 
immobility.
But the solitary figure could not raise its limbs 
in a single gesture that might indicate its concern 
with the fact o f  mortality and an insatiable 
appetite for ubiquitous experience in face o f  this 
fact. Nor could the solitude be 
overcome..,.form[ing] a tableau vivant o f  human 
incommunicability.
I do not believe that there was ever a question 
o f being abstract or representational. It 
is really a matter o f ending this silence and 
solitude, o f breathing and stretching one’s arms 
again.' 201
<Pause>
In appropriating other voices I turn to Blanchot who, in The Step Not 
Beyond, refers obliquely to the perpetrators of modernist discourse, knowing 
that ‘... according to the law o f the return - that only the name, the event, the 
figure o f death, would give, at the moment o f disappearing in it, a right to 
presence: this is why they said they were immortal.’ 202
200 Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 237-9. My italics.
201 From Possibilities, No.l Winter 1947/8, printed in Mark Rothko page 84.
202 Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond,page 12.
‘Rothko’ resurrects ‘himself’ as the figure o f the universal being, his art 
pre- and post- supposes his death, and consequently his transcendentality; 
his forms carry, via the prosopopoetic, the promise of an immaterial 
consciousness through the philosophical metaphor of light. Rothko’s light, 
however bright, can not dazzle me into submission, believe in his 
transcendental subjectivity through which I can confirm my own. Girding 
my loins with deconstructive analysis I aim to show that the prosopopoetic 
figure can not illuminate the realm of knowledge; although it is visible as a 
metaphor, as a mask, form, it cannot deliver what it promises. When recently 
entering the Rothko Room at Tate Modern I remembered again what Derrida 
says about the prosopopoetic figure and how it constitutes ‘An allegorical 
metonomy ... which says something other than what it says and manifests the 
other {alios) in the open but nocturnal space of the agora - in its plus de 
lumiere: at once no more light, and greater light.’ 203 And Blanchot: ‘The room 
was dark, not that it was obscure: the light was almost too visible, it did not 
illuminate.’204
The light undoes its own rhetoricity, the prosopopoetic figure dazzles us, 
through the lens of discursive blatherings, but it cannot hold its own, cannot 
keep Rothko within his abode (adobe); presence becomes irretrievable 
absence, which in turn cannot be mourned or articulated, as it falls back into 
the babble. This is too hard to take. It is easy to be seduced and it seems that I 
can only survive my viewing o f his works if I take that leap of faith and 
believe somehow that Rothko can, and will, interact with my transcendental 
consciousness; as my own undoing is the possibility that I too am constituted 
by the same rhetorical structures as ‘Rothko’ . This impossibility o f my own 
unravelling means that I still have to call ‘Rothko’, knowing that the answer 
will not be his, or mine, but will be empty words and concepts, transcribed 
within the annals o f philosophical and cultural history.
“You will come again.” - “ I will come again.” - “You won’t come 
_____ again.” - “When vou speak like that, I understand what it means: 1
203 Derrida, Memories for Paul de Man, page 3 7. My italics.
204 Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, page 13.
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am here by the way o f return, thus I am not here: and I understand 
that this would be in the past, in a time so ancient that there has 
never been a present to correspond to it, that you have been here.”
- But I am here, you see that.” - “Yes, he said seriously, I am here 
on the condition that I forget that I’m here, remembering it one 
time, forgetting it another time, and just the same letting memory, 
forgetfulness, unfold themselves, close themselves back up, 
without anyone who remembers, who forgets.” 205
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I write, I read, I remember, I fall; I look for Rothko, I forget, and then I 
return.
205Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, page 17.
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2.7 W ork ing Th rough  the Prob lem s o f  (A u to )B io g ra p h y  w ith
Paul de Man: ‘C o n fe r r in g ] A n th rom orph ic  A ttr ibu tes  Upon 
a S ton e ’ .
In the throes of delusion, and within the confines o f this section, I will begin 
an intellectual debate with a dead man - a ghostly presence. I will try and 
silence his distant yet incessant voice constantly reminding me what his 
works are actually about, referring me back his canvases, the forms, the 
subjectivity inherent in his shapes, the colour. Read any account o f Rothko’s 
work and you’ll hear his ‘voice’, reverberating in the numerous quotations, 
speaking on his behalf. It seems that in order to discuss Rothko’s abstract 
paintings you have always to deal with the artist’s intentions - if you don’t, 
what do you have left? His works are deemed so intrinsically ‘personal’ , that 
i f  you remove ‘Rothko’ you remove the very ontological basis for his work. 
When discussing the importance given to the artists’ own words by art 
historians’ Kosuth warns us that:
Beneath the often condescending special status such texts are 
given (used, like art works are, as nature for the historians and 
critics to make culture from) there lies a kind o f philosophical 
unease, as though Dracula may awaken, daylight or not, a 
professional stake through his heart or not; and ravage their 
countryside.206
So, what are we art historians doing when we allow Rothko a voice, what 
exactly are we trying to ‘hide’? Let me repeat the statements by Mark Rothko
<P lay>
I paint large pictures because I want to create a 
state o f intimacy. A large picture is an 
immediate transaction; it takes you in.201
I would like to say something about large 
pictures, and perhaps touch on some o f the points 
made by the people who are looking for a
206 Kosuth, The Play o f  the Unsayable, page 68. My italics.
207 Taken from Lecture given by Mark Rothko (1958) printed in Mark Rothko, page 87.
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spiritual basis for communion.
I paint very large pictures....[because] I want to 
be very intimate and human...you paint a larger 
picture, you are in it. 208
I would sooner confer anthropomorphic attributes 
upon a stone, than dehumanise the slightest 
possibility o f consciousness. 209
<Pause>
OK Rothko: these ‘statements’ ; your intention was to figure consciousness in 
your work; to engage the viewer in some kind of consummate relationship 
between you and me/us, but you’re dead now. So what have you to say about 
that?
According to Anna Chave, 
fundamental binaries are brought 
together in and by Rothko’s work, 
‘giving’ the viewer a comprehensive 
and consummate interaction with 
another consciousness - a shared 
‘experience’ o f birth and death, the
<Play>
...abstract figures could do (at the least) a double 
symbolic duty, that is, even where the symbols 
involved were opposing ones, such as birth and 
death. Rothko’ s image-sign enabled him to elide 
or dismantle such conventional binaries and 
present them not as polar opposites but as 
interconnected two sides o f  the same process or 
phenomenon.’ 210
<Pause>
polarities which mark the beginning
and end o f life. A physical and psychical state o f consciousness, self 
knowledge and being, enveloped by two states of non-being. Rothko, you’re 
so clever, a genius even. However, in being so clever, in stating your 
intentions so clearly, you’ve left yourself wide open. You’ve encroached onto 
another discipline - philosophy. I understand that you were influenced by 
the writings o f Nietzsche. Good choice. Nevertheless, your philosophical 
machinations may be your undoing. Why? Because, as Kosuth pointed out:
The modernist project began as a process in which the self 
conceptualisation o f a practice shifted not to see not just its own
208 From Interiors (May 1951) printed in Mark Rothko, page 85.
209 Mark Rothko, ‘Personal Statement’ [1945] printed in Mark Rothko, page 82.
210 Chave, Rothko Subjects in Abstraction, pages 160-61.
limits, but institutionalise those limits as a form of self-knowledge.
It is here that the practice of art took on a philosophical aspect....211
In trying to undo Rothko with his own philosophical terminology I 
appropriate Derrida who in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ , gives me the theoretical 
ammunition I need - the pharmakon - a ‘drug’, whose effect like that of the 
artwork, gives a:
spellbinding virtue, this power o f fascination can be alternately or 
simultaneously - beneficent or maleficent. The pharmakon would 
be a substance - with all that a word can connote in terms of matter 
with occult virtues, cryptic depths refusing to submit their 
ambivalence to analysis already paving the way for alchemy....an 
anti substance....[operating] through seduction.212
So you see Rothko, that which can give life can also take it away; it just 
depends on how you administer the pharmakon. Although I can look at your 
abstract work as producing a dialectical ‘movement’ between the polarities of 
life and death, delivering a shared human experience, I can also look at it as 
a rhetorical device that attempts to seduce and bewitch the viewer into 
believing that the ontological basis for your paintings is your ‘voice’ ; a self- 
referentiality to the name Rothko. You were once a live, breathing being, 
but now you’re just the ghost o f a residual intelligence. Your ontological 
substance is anti-substance - in effect you dissolve yourself through the 
very act o f bewitching the viewer. Your existence depends on your non­
existence. Although your pharmakon-ic&l devices can, in effect, ‘substitute 
the breathless sign for the living voice’ , you are based on alchemy; just an 
illusion. As Derrida states ‘The pharmakon produces a play o f appearances 
which enable it to pass for truth.’213 Your voice gives the illusion o f speaking 
philosophical truths, imbuing your artistic form with life-giving powers. 
However, I know you’re just a sham.
Your paintings, it seems, always reiterate and repeat the same theme: myth; 
martyrdom; mortality; and death. As you state yourself, your work has ‘ [a]
2"Kosuth, The Play o f the Unsayable, page 68.
212Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, page 429.
213 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, page 437.
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clear preoccupation with death,’ and that '[a] 11 art deals with intimations of 
mortality’ .214 This philosophical preoccupation, coupled up with your own 
troubled personal history and your eventual suicide, leads to a ‘doubling’, an 
over-determination of the subject o f life and death in the 
viewing/interpretation o f your work. Your paintings are usually life-size, 
your ‘forms’ correspond to the dimensions of the human figure, visualising 
it’s demise and eventual resurrection. You give it large to the viewer Rothko. 
No chance of escape; message heard, loud and clear . Size, it seems, is 
everything.
Your life-giving ‘forms’ usually consist o f four rectangular shapes 
incorporating a long thin light strip (usually at the top o f the paintings). 
According to Chave this strip represents the resurrection of human 
consciousness after death. It’s a figurative device which allows you, ‘Rothko’, 
to be ‘placed’ within your own work; figured within the materiality of the 
painting, as the ‘trace’ o f your own ‘inner’ preoccupations. Rothko, you 
seem to have recreated yourself as an omnipresent ‘presence’: a Christ-like 
figure; a figure who magically redeems and restores your own ‘subjectivity’ 
for all to witness. By constantly repeating the form of the ‘risen martyr’ , in 
your work, and by having your ‘voice’ constantly reiterated in the 
discourses about, and around, such a theme, you, the figure of Rothko, have 
become over-determined. Your ‘persona’ gives the painting an authorial 
voice; which, because o f the circumstances surrounding your life and 
suicide, becomes a dismembered (and therefore strangely distant) voice; 
emitting from that unknown and feared other-space; the space of death. 
Looking at your work Rothko, I feel connected with your creative 
consciousness, your life and death, sharing one pure subjective moment. Or 
do I? Remember my initial response to your work: my fists are clenched.
We are supposed to feel very sad in front of this painting (figure 12), Rothko.
214 Taken from Lecture given by Mark Rothko (1958) printed in Mark Rothko, page 87.
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Does this mean that I, the viewing 
subject, necessarily engages with you, 
the spectre o f Rothko, as a presence or 
form-less form (a voice from within 
form) connecting to your existential 
despair - the claustrophobia o f being 
stuck within the babble? Does your 
suicide preempt any consideration of 
your work? It seems that you still 
‘exist’ as a dismembered voice, even 
after your physical demise. Your 
paintings are viewed as living 
(prophetic) testaments to your 
enduring existential angst. The forms 
within them seem to act as a physical 
surrogate for the troubled psyche that 
is now absent. Whenever I address you 
Rothko, I always imagine myself stood 
in front of one o f your paintings.
So, I ask how can I move beyond this 
eternal return to Rothko’s authorial 
voice, beyond this modernist idiom? 
What about Rothko’s ability to bring 
together, within his abstract forms,
<Play>
[One o f] a series o f  sombre paintings in tones o f 
black and grey. These airless, lightless, nearly 
colourless paintings - the familiar floating 
rectangles reduced to two, their light quenched,
their atmospheric ground removed.... have come
to be known as the black paintings”  probably as 
much because o f  the psychological responses 
they tend to evoke as the literal colour o f  the 
darkest parts o f the canvases. Because they were 
dark paintings and because they were the last 
paintings o f Rothko’ s career, there has been a 
tendency to connect them with the mood o f 
despair used to explain his suicide’ . 215
Rothko’ s ‘ earlier ‘ classic’ pictures suffused with 
expansive, translucent atmosphere ... are tragic, 
because they evoke the sensual world and its 
dissolution into spirit (and/or death) A s  Robert 
Rosenblum remarked they pit, ‘ Rothko the 
monk’ against ‘ Rothko, the voluptary’ . The 
choice is between two goods - the true essence o f  
tragic drama. ... [therefore] No longer did the 
awareness o f  death give rise to an urge for life ; 
now both were barely endurable. Rothko’ s 
growing anguish caused him to darken his 
palette. The atmosphere in most o f  his pictures 
turns oppressive, making it difficult figuratively 
to breath and stretch.' 216
<Pause>
the dialectic between life and death? Straddling the fierce gap between two 
polar opposites? What about Plato’s pharmakon, that anti-substance which 
seduces, drugs the viewer into believing that she or he is interacting with 
the eternal consciousness o f Rothko?
215 Antin, ‘Biography’, page 42.
216Sandler, ‘Mark Rothko’ in in Mark Rothko 1903 - 1970, pg 16.
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The notion of alchemy as the ability to interject ‘being’ into mute matter is 
also present in Breslin’s biography. The colours Rothko used, were created 
by him, by hand. The pigments were ground and mixed in order to get just 
the right hue for his multiforms. But, as argued above, Rothko didn’t want to 
be known merely as a colourist, or a colour-field painter. He came from a 
long line o f pharmacists, alchemists; the ability to create something magical, 
healing, or indeed lethal, was in his blood. This talent, along with his interest 
in philosophical (and theological21, ) texts, ‘allows’ Breslin to construct a 
correlation between the two. He argues that Rothko s ability with the pestle 
and mortar was, and still is, synonymous with that of breaking down or 
‘pulverising’ the distinction between concepts: between life and death.
<PIay>
Preoccupations with death, with the 
‘ability’ to make his own colours, make
T o  “pulverise [finite associations] is to “crush, 
them his, individuated within the grind, into a powder or dust” , an activity iamihar
to Rothko , who in the late forties was grinding
process o f alchemy, working within his own pigments with a pestle and mortar. ...
This way he could ... create his own colours; 
the Space Of the pharmacy, or indeed and he could engage in an activity familiar to
him from his boyhood in a turn-of-the-century
within the transcendental. As Clare Russian pharmacy where Jacob Rothkowitz
ground his prescriptions in a mortar and
Pajaczkowska argues: pesile.2
<Pause>
In the art, early science or magic of alchemy, the image is 
employed as an explanatory tool or diagram instructing us how to 
follow the alchemists’ search for immutable truth, by turning base 
matter into the pure gold of the sublime. The mass of the 
Philosopher’s Stone was thought to have the power o f ^
transmutation and that o f prolonging human life indefinitely.
So can we smash the Philosopher’s Stone (the epitaph)? Can we deconstruct
Rothko’s abstract work, with a short swift blow to the ‘subjectivity’ that
217According to Breslin, in Mark Rothko, Page 18, Rothko as a Russian Orthodox Jew 
‘ ...[and as] the “chosen son” [was] subject to a strict, tedious regime, possibly starting as 
early as the age o f three, o f reading instruction, prayer, translation o f Hebrew texts and 
rote memorisation o f Talmudic law.’
218Breslin, Mark Rothko, page 247. My Italics.
219Pajaczkowska, ‘Art as a Symptom o f Not Dying’, pages 75-6.
created it? Does the constant loop o f the tape mean that we can never remove 
his ‘voice’ , and what does that tell us about our own subjectivity when 
viewing such a work? What about the seductive, entrancing qualities o f his 
work, will they thwart our deconstructive advances - stop us in our stride? Is 
the pharmakon too strong to resist?
Can I go beyond the dialectic of life and death and somehow access the 
unsignifiable/unsayable aspect o f Rothko’s artistic form? Can I access the 
babble? If I do, what will I find? Will I be able to articulate it? Is it necessary 
for it to be reinscribed in artistic discourse for it to be translated and 
understood? Return to the tape-loop? If I find the spectre of absence 
emerging and interjecting itself into the materiality of the form; will it 
again become presence or ‘being’ existing beyond the materiality of the art­
work yet also inhabiting it? Will Rothko’s spectre ever be removed? And if I 
do remove this figure o f introjection, this figure o f another subjectivity, will 
I then move over to the space o f death, of non-subjectivity? Over to Kosuth 
again:
As we name art we name the world, and make visible the self. The 
language of information - even in its most philosophical form - is 
incapable o f such descriptions: the self and the world, within the 
realm o f such language, shares no empirical moment.220
According to Kosuth, any interpretation is forced upon the art-object; a 
philosophical ‘perception’ which is not about the art-work in-itself, but 
about the perception of the world and the self, not of the artist, but o f the 
viewer. Any message the art-work ‘offers’ is not about the lost moment of 
artistic creation or intention but about the need of the viewer to understand 
him or herself in relation to the world which it surveys. The viewer that 
beholds Rothko’s paintings is unwittingly engaging with the cultural and 
linguistic structures that hold his or her subjectivity ‘together’ .
What is it about us, as art historians and theoreticians, that seeks ‘meaning’
" “Kosuth, The Play o f  the Unsayable, page 67.
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within the domain of the dead, a domain which will offer, but never deliver, 
signification? We seek meanings from the spectre o f the artist, we try and 
interact with the inaccessible. We ‘begin’ the journey ‘into’ the painting, 
but we are thwarted: by the inanimate materiality o f the art-object (as the 
materiality o f Rothko - now dead) and because we can never ‘experience’ the 
death o f another. We try to prolong Rothko’s life by giving a transcendental 
origin to his ‘voice’. But in effect by deferring his death we are, in effect, 
deferring our own. Heidegger states that:
The dying o f Others is not something which we experience in a 
genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside’.... When 
someone has died, his Being-no-longer-in-the world ...is still a 
Being...in the sense o f the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no- 
more o f a corporeal Thing which we encounter.... The end of the 
entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua 
something present-at-end/21
We ask Rothko’s work to ‘talk’ about life and death without acknowledging 
that it is our own desiring voice that we hear. We give this disembodied voice 
a canvas, a mouth, one that has been created by the hand that now exists 
‘elsewhere’. Rothko has made the passage between life and death; a passage 
which up to this moment has been experientially denied to us. However the 
‘voice’ can never deliver that ‘experience’ , it can only reiterate and repeat 
the same philosophical rhetoric. Like a stuck record it can never go beyond 
the phonic sound, the surface o f the paint; it can never allow us to visit a 
space which will obliterate our very being.
As discussed in chapter 1, de Man calls this ‘voice’ prosopopeia - a figure 
which ‘acts’ as the subject(ivity) o f (auto)biography, through which, the 
name o f the dead artist takes on a personality, gives the paintings’ their 
characteristic form, speaks on after, and about, death. This structure 
remains, like the subject, tropological, but is presented (through 
philosophical discourse) as being transcendental.
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221 Quoted in Osborne, The Politics o f Time, page 69.
It is this ‘transcendental’ remainder o f ‘Rothko’ , his Being-just-present-at- 
hand-and-no-more, that I will now explore.
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Rothko’s voice is heard once more, lifted from the tape-loop:
OK Rothko, so your paintings are meant <Piay>
to ‘live’ for all their preoccupations For me the great achievements o f  the centuries
in which the artist accepted the probable and 
with death - being within non-being - familiar as his subjects were the pictures o f the
single human figure - alone in a moment o f utter 
formlessness within form - animating immobility.
the mute figure who, U p  to the moment But the solitary figure could not raise its limbs
in a single gesture that might indicate its concern
of your introjection can only ever see. with the fact o f mortality and an insatiable
appetite for ubiquitous experience in face o f  this
You give it a voice: your voice. What a fact. Nor could the solitude be overcome
....fo rm in g ] a tableau vivant o f  human
sociable chap you are. It’s good to talk - incommunicability.
talk about yourself in relation to your 1 do not believe that there was ever a question o f
being abstract or representational. It is really a 
work. Olney states that, within matter o f ending this silence and solitude, of
breathing and stretching one’s arms again.22
autobiography, the impulse is to move
<Pause>
from mute material to animated
consciousness, and back again, within the dialectic. It is to know oneself as 
both individuated and universal, as face: ‘...man explores the universe 
continually for laws and forms not of his own making, but what, in the end, 
he always finds in his own face: a sort o f ubiquitous, inescapable man-in- 
the-moon which, if he will, he can recognise as his own mirror-image.’223 
Olney also states that:
The Self expresses itself by the metaphors it creates and projects, 
and we know it by those metaphors; but it did not exist as it now 
does and as it now is before creating its metaphors. We do not see or 
touch the self, but we do see and touch its metaphors: and thus we 
“know” the self, activity or agent, represented in the metaphor 
and the metaphorising. 224
222 From Possibilities No.l Winter 1947/8 printed in Mark Rothko, page 84.
223 Olney, Metaphors o f Self: The Meaning o f  Autobiography, pg 4.
224 Olney, Metaphors o f Self: The Meaning o f  Autobiography, pp 30-31.
We do not ever ‘see’ the self. We only realise the metaphor and believe it to 
be ours alone; individualisation through a universalising metaphor. What is 
it then that constitutes the artist ‘Rothko’ or indeed the ‘viewer’ - ‘me’, ‘us’?
De Man argues that the metaphor of ‘being’ will always slip between the 
material and the transcendental rather than cross between the two in a slick 
dialectic. In Derridian terms there is no crossing between ergon and 
paragon. You can not transgress the frame, only teeter on the edge. Don’t 
look down. Any voice can only ‘exist’ in a safe space, a space that is not in 
excess o f the dialectic. The voice’s ‘origin’ can only be found within a 
tropological abyss, within the babble, never reaching being or non-being - 
existence or non-existence - only covering the gap.
Because we ‘project’ our inner ‘voice’ out through tropological figuration we 
place ourselves into language. We need to disguise our lack o f ‘being’ beyond 
any linguistic system by convincing ourselves that we can attain complete 
self-knowledge and self-reflexivity - deny the gap. But we need other 
‘beings’ in order to attain this. Writing, creating, putting objects into the 
world enables us to do this, ‘reach’ out not only out to other people, but back 
into ourselves.
This semiotically induced ‘Rothko’ comes to us with the ‘ability’ to reach into 
us, the viewing subject, and confirm our interiority, our sense o f self. This 
force within the image, according to Derrida, ‘sees, as if  it were seeing as
much as seen.’225 The subject ‘knows’ that it has been acknowledged; our own
image o f ourselves confirmed through the ‘eyes’ o f another autonomous 
being. As Derrida states: ‘the force of the image has to do less with the fact 
that one sees something in it than with the fact that one is seen there in it.
The image sees more than it is seen. The images looks at us.’226 The corporeal
Rothko does not have to exist in order to have a ‘voice’; what is important to
225 Derrida, By Force o f Mourning, page 177.
226 Derrida, By Force o f Mourning, page 188.
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the subject viewing his work is the subjective mirroring o f its own self­
perception through the artist’s eyes, the confirmation o f its own interiority 
by ‘recognising’ the face o f Rothko. Rothko’s abstract painting, and the 
discourse that wraps itself around the image, acts as a substitute for another- 
consciousness, one that can be interrogated and ‘known’ . The signification 
o f the image does not come from Rothko as the foundational or original 
object, but from its imaginal transfiguration within the subject as 
text/metaphor. This means that the ontological foundation of any image 
(including Rothko’s) is phantasmatic. The power, the force o f the art-object 
comes from the exchange between the artist Rothko, who is absent, and the 
semiotic alterity that takes his place. According to de Man this semiotic 
alterity:
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belong[s] to a simple mode o f referentiality, o f representation and 
of diegesis. It may contain lots of phantasms and dreams, but their 
deviations from reality remain rooted in a single subject whose 
identity is defined by the uncontested readability o f his proper 
name. 227
The artistic figure o f Rothko, his re-presented inner-life is presented 
through and by his artistic and philosophical endeavour, enveloped by his 
proper name. The ‘figuration’ of his life, displayed within the idiom of his 
painting, becomes theoretically impossible to disengage from the figure of 
his artistic persona. This dialectic between Rothko as a figure and a once- 
corporeal body collapses, covering up the gap beneath, allowing ‘Rothko’ to 
remain as the ontological foundation o f his work. Here, as Derrida states, the 
dialectics is the passage between:
(l)antidotes (alexipharmaka) which can be either human or 
divine and .... (2) problems (problemata): what stands before one - 
obstacles, shelters, armours, shields, defences. Leaving antidotes 
aside, The Stranger pursues the division o f the problemata, which 
can function either as armaments or fences. The fences 
(phragmata) are screens or protections (alexeteria) against storm 
or heat; these protections can be housings or coverings; coverings 
can be spread below (like rugs) or wrapped around etc. The 
process o f division goes on through the different techniques of 
manufacturing these wraps until it reaches the woven garment
227 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ page 80.
and the art o f weaving; the problematic space of protection.228
The materiality of Rothko’s work houses and protects his dialectical 
machinations. His paintings are deemed highly ‘personal’ yet only manifest 
their ‘being’ when articulated within a discursive environment, blurring 
and obliterating the definition between outer/inner, enabling the protective 
dialectic to weave its spell. The notion of inner/outer experience has been 
manipulated in order to produce the metaphor, substituting the external 
painting for the inner ‘Rothko’. Time and personal history have been 
conflated into one single artistic expression/name, which then inscribes 
itself as a universal ‘expression’ o f heightened consciousness, an essential 
being which becomes what Derrida calls a Cryptogram: that which takes 
shelter in a crypt.
According to de Man, however, it is impossible for autobiographical 
statements to reveal reliable self-knowledge. Instead, they demonstrate the 
‘impossibility o f closure and totalisation’ ( the impossibility o f coming into 
being). As far as de Man is concerned this is due to the fact all textual systems
- into which we create illusions o f self-knowledge - are based purely on a 
complex series o f tropological substitutions which are asymmetrical, 
numerous and excessive to any protective dialectic. This frightening and 
exposed excess, that which exists beyond the dialectic of life and death, 
between viewer and dead artist, thereby generates a ‘force’, a phantasmic 
noise which does not form any coherent words - babble. As Derrida argues, 
‘the effect o f the image would stem from the fantastic force of the spectre, 
and from the supplement of force' and the increase becomes fantastic at the
very heart of lack.’229 Rothko’s ‘voice’ increases in volume not from his
ontological presence but because it ‘exists’ in a space beyond that of the 
dialectic, beyond the symmetrical positioning o f life and death. His spectre 
rises from the very heart o f excess as lack.
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228 ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, page 442.
229 Derrida, By Force o f  Mourning, page 182.
The private thoughts and intentions spoken through the ‘voice’ of Rothko, 
taken as essentially ‘human’ , are always articulated through tropological 
substitution as infinitely knowable - thereby moving from trope to trope in 
an never-ending loop o f reference. As viewing subjects, however, we cannot 
allow ourselves to believe that this referentiality can move us beyond the 
dialectic o f life and death. In doing so we move ourselves into the same 
unstable deathly space. As Derrida argues:
This substitution, which thus functions as a pure play of traces or 
supplements or, again, operates within the order of the pure 
signifier which no reality, no absolutely external reference, no 
transcendental signified, can come to limit, bound or control: this 
substitution, which could be judged as “mad” since it can go on 
infinitely in the element o f the linguistic permutation o f 
substitutes, o f substitutes for substitutes: this unleashed chain is 
nevertheless not lacking in violence. 130
Violence, that is, to subjectivity.
De Man demonstrates that the meanings effected via autobiographical 
statements are not based on a personal situation, or event, located in history 
but are an aspect of the moment o f viewing. In approaching Rothko’s work 
we are relying, not on Rothko’s own experience, but on its linguistic/artistic 
substitution, circulating within an endless tropological structure; the tape- 
loop. This unending tropological movement constitutes all understanding; it 
does not end with the authorial ‘voice’ but moves beyond into infinite 
regress. Therefore, de Man reveals the specular moment between artist and 
viewer as one within which both ‘parties’ confirm and undermine each 
other’s ficticity.
By emphasising autobiography’s insistence on the subject, proper name, 
memory; birth, eros and death - and on the doubleness of the specular 
moment - de Man shows how the fiction o f autobiography openly declares its 
cognitive and tropological constitution, yet also shows how it almost seems to 
escape from the coercions of that system. Rothko, like any other perpetrator
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230 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, page 434.
of (auto)biography, is obsessed with the need to ‘move from cognition to 
resolution and then to action’. ‘Rothko’, as a ‘proper name’ and a ‘signature’ 
of authenticity within a tropological system, posits its philosophical and 
artistic actions as interchangeable. It operates (impossibly) within the 
tropological system of the name, and moves from ontological identity to 
contractual promise, delivering ‘Rothko’ to the viewing subject. This 
constitutes a transcendental authority - the artist ‘Rothko’ having the 
authorial clout to deliver his own philosophically couched ‘life ’ as a 
knowable entity.
The ‘form’ o f the painting has projected onto (into) it, the figure o f this 
authoritative ‘being’ . The artistic ‘signature’ , the proper name of Rothko, 
delivers the ‘life ’ o f that artist to the viewer. This authoritative ‘being’ 
thereby displaces the tropological nature o f the artistic text, and takes on the 
illusion o f transcendentality.
The autobiographical components in Rothko’s work stand ‘in memorium’ as a 
testament to his being a ‘being-in-the-world’. His abstract work becomes, in 
effect, an epitaph, and, what’s more, an epitaph written by Rothko himself; 
the discourse that circulates around his work is ‘sustained beyond and in 
spite o f deprivation’ . Any interpretations of his work will maintain the 
transcendental authority o f Rothko’s signature. The myths and concepts he 
used (o f death and mortality, o f portraiture) become tropological figures 
which manifest as Rothko’s own ‘poetic self’ ; a self that will forever be 
poetic.
This self, because of its rhetorical/tropological nature, can sustain the death 
o f the corporeal Rothko - restoring and repeating itself time and time again 
through its proper name, and through the ‘voice’ o f artistic discourse. The 
distance between Rothko who is contained within a corporeal body and 
‘Rothko’ which constitutes transcendental authority is converted and closed 
via a series o f tropological transformations that ‘leave the negativity o f the
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initial relationship (or lack o f relationship) intact’ - this allows for the 
‘movement’ between death or life to life and death.
For de Man the large overarching metaphor for this entire tropological 
system is the sun in motion. According to Breslin, Rothko alighted on the 
same metaphor for the affect/effect o f his painting:
Rothko, it seems, wanted his own <P lay>
presence, his own being, to radiate ...he wanted a presence, so that when you
turned your back to the painting, you would feel 
from his canvases. Within this system that presence the way you feel the sun on your
back.231
of metaphors, the sun becomes more
<Pause>
than a mere natural object - relayed
by the trope o f light, the sun becomes a figure o f knowledge, the emblem of 
‘the mind with absolute sovereignty upon itself’ . 232
Knowledge and mind imply language and account for the relationship set up 
between the sun and the text o f the epitaph. Epitaphs, like canvases, work at 
being ‘open to the day’ with the sun looking ‘down upon the stone’ . The sun 
(as the knowledgeable eye) becomes the organ that reads the text o f the 
epitaph. However, the epitaph can consist only of ‘the naked name’ (or 
proper name). As the epitaph is read by the sun the stone becomes a 
speaking stone in that it acquires a voice. And thus: ‘the speaking stone 
counterbalance[es] the seeing sun. The tropological system passes, sun to eye 
to language as name and voice’ .233
The name ‘Rothko’ calls up his spectre, which in itself is a empty 
prosopopoetic figure. ‘Rothko’ thereby constitutes a ‘ ... fiction of an 
apostrophe to an absent, [a] deceased or voiceless entity which posits the 
possibility o f the latter’s reply and confers upon it the power of speech’. 234
Prosopopeia ‘gives’ Rothko’s paintings a face - which in turn sees and
231 Quoted in Breslin 'Out o f the body: Mark Rothko’s paintings’, page 47.
232 Wordsworth ‘3rd Essay’ quoted in de Man ‘Autobiography as de-facement’, page 75.
233 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, page 75.
234 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, page 70.
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speaks. This is the trope o f autobiography, by which, Rothko’s ‘being’ is 
made as intelligible and memorable as a name carved upon the stone of the 
epitaph, or a mural on a gallery wall. De Man argues however, that although 
prosopopeia gives the artistic medium a face, in the same tropological 
movement it also defaces. It is a metaphor which both figures and disfigures. 
It supplants life as visage, but does so onto a foundation-less origin, a 
hauntological ‘origin ’ .
De Man argues that in terms o f style and narrative prosopopeia is also the 
figure o f delicate translation. The gradual transformations that occur in 
‘reading’ the text/image happen in such a way that ‘feelings [that] seem 
opposite to each other have another and finer connection that that of 
contrast’ .235 The fear o f non-being, the infinite signification that opens up 
the gap between life and death, is matched and ‘silenced’ by the tropological 
affirmation of life - a movement that proceeds in a dialectical motion, 
through a series of (seemingly) seamless and gliding displacements. As 
Derrida has pointed out: ‘the magic o f writing and painting is like a cosmetic 
concealing the dead under the appearance o f the living ... it makes the
corpse presentable.’236
Rothko’s canvases can again be posited as a ‘bewitching’ entity which 
conceal the un-represen table void: that which does not contain life. I his 
happens through the figurative framework o f substitution and replacement, 
the excess o f which leaves a material trace which does not conform to 
Rothko’s life/death dialectic. Through the figure of prosopopeia, however, 
this excess is denied and forgotten, it remains unspoken. It is as if this 
excessive art-object can hypnotise the viewing subject into a kind o f aphasic 
trance. We have been bewitched by the pharmakon.
De Man argues that: ‘the latent threat that inhabits prosopopeia, namely that
by making the death speak the symmetrical structure o f the trope implies by
235 de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, page 76.
236 Derrida, Disseminations, page 142.
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the same token that the living are struck dumb, frozen in their own death. 
The surmise of the “pause Traveller!” [or in our case “Stop in front o f this 
painting!”] thus acquires a sinister connotation that is not only the 
prefiguration o f one’s own mortality but our actual entry into the frozen 
world of the dead’. 237 This is the space beyond the dialectic which undermines 
and underlies all tropological systems. The inscription o f prosopopeia into 
the cognitive, solar system of self-knowledge however removes this threat o f 
the ficticity o f the self, veils its deadly and rhetorical nature and ‘replaces’ it 
with the voice o f a once-living being; one who has transcendental authority 
to speak on its own behalf. The loss o f this being would be too much to bear 
for the viewing subject who has an incessant need to reaffirm itself in the 
eyes of this authority. By covering this lack, the figure of prosopopeia lures 
the subject into the image, via the fiction of address. However, once it 
interpellates the viewer, it cannot fully deliver a ‘force’ of being. Instead, 
the silence is broken only by the constant and unearthly repetition of the 
authorial (in this case Rothko’s) voice. A repetition whose foundation lies in 
the domain of philosophical and artistic rhetoric.
The language o f restoration, o f resurrection, works ‘unremittingly and 
noiselessly to the extent that, according to de Man, when we use language to 
deliver meaning ‘ ...we all are deaf and mute - not silent, which implies the 
possible manifestation o f sound at our own will, but silent as a picture, that is 
to say eternally deprived of voice and condemned to muteness’ . 2,8 We can 
never speak for our inner-selves, we have to use tropes to speak on our 
behalf. Rothko’s voice therefore never speaks to us, or o f himself, his 
paintings only reiterate socially contrived, philosophical, idioms. Death 
therefore ‘is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament, and the 
restoration o f mortality by autobiography (prosopopeia of the name and the 
voice) deprives and disfigures to the precise extent that it restores.’ 2 We 
listen to Rothko’s voice whilst looking at his images, in order to restore a
237 de Man, ‘Autobiography as de-facement’, page 78.
236 de Man, ‘Autobiography as de-facement’, page 80.
239 de Man, ‘Autobiography as de-facement’, page 72.
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‘knowledge’ of the inner-self. But what we get instead are stock answers to 
an indominatable problem. So, what’s this problem? Well, it’s this: If we 
deconstruct and dismantle, and thereby ‘remove’ , Rothko’s voice we will be 
struck dumb when we approach his paintings. The dialogue stops and we end 
up undifferentiated. And if we don’t , then we are forever stuck within a 
tropological system which will offer us the route to transcendence but only 
deliver us metaphysical cliches. What would be left if Rothko’s voice was 
removed? Would the unlettered epitaph leave the sun suspended in 
nothingness? Would our own passage into language and self knowledge 
(however facile) also be suspended?
Jonathan Dollimore argues that:
It is ironic that, far from being the critical act of demystification 
which it [post-modernism] often aspires to be, the explanatory 
model at work here - from unity, fullness and freedom to disunity, 
crisis and fragmentation - echoes, often unawares and in secular 
form, one o f the founding myths o f Western-European culture, and 
o f Western subjectivity, namely the Fall. We repeat this Fall 
narrative imagining it as the narrative of the ending o f 
something, whereas in fact it is the narrative of its continuation. /M'1
A continuation! Is that good or bad? I’m confused, I need the pharmakon, 
Jacques. It seems that Rothko’s voice will eternally return, theoretically 
unravelled but never fully silenced, whilst ever I stand in front o f his 
paintings and mutter the name Rothko under my breath. The spectre of 
Rothko ‘reemerging’ with any attempt to interpret his work. Or do 1 just 
resign myself and join him in the abyss o f post-modernism, having now to 
observe ourselves, as ghosts - operating on a level of nothingness. Or, by 
falling apart, do I inadvertently reconstruct myself?
Here’s Derrida again:
Anamesic dialectics, as the repetition o f the eidos [the interjected 
idol/mask] cannot be distinguished from self-knowledge and self-
240 Dollimore, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, page 91.
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mastery. Those are the best forms of exorcism that can be applied 
against the terrors o f the child faced with death and the quackery 
of the bogeymen. Philosophy consists of offering reassurance to 
children. That is, if one prefers to take them out of childhood, or of 
forgetting about the child, or, inversely, by the same token, o f 
speaking first and foremost for the little boy within us, o f teaching 
him to speak - to dialogue - by displacing his fear or his desire.241
You see, Rothko, when I address you, Pm actually facing (and de-facing) my 
own non-being: that which blocks my understanding o f your work.
Sum m ary
In this chapter I have further explored the concept o f origin through the 
theories of de Man and Derrida. Given that I argue that the subject is 
constituted through and by rhetorical structures and is therefore only ever 
partial and protean, the problematic which will be woven throughout the 
remainder o f my thesis is this: Where does subjectivity, life and death, exist 
begin and end - i.e. what constitutes origin? In trying to understand this 
dilemma I have engaged primarily with the work of, and discourses 
circulating around, Mark Rothko. 'Beginning' with the biographical 
statements on Rothko, where the moment of his death (the end) is present 
from the start o f the text, I have explored how the themes of mortality, and 
overcoming (death), constitute the interpretative framework for Rothko’s 
paintings. Such themes, I have argued, that are constantly repeated through 
interpretations o f his work and life, validate the illusion that his paintings 
come and speak to us from a ‘deathly’ yet individuated place. It has been the 
purpose o f this chapter to reveal how interpretations o f Rothko's life and 
work constantly return to Rothko’s deathly preoccupations in order to 
perpetually resurrect the figure o f Rothko, and thereby cover the lack of an 
ontological or essential origin. I have argued that in articulating death as a 
universal and surmountable entity, the paintings o f Rothko are offered to us 
as epitaphic receptacles for his transcendental subjectivity. By utilising de 
Man’s notion o f prosopopeia and Derrida's theory of the pharmakon I have
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‘Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, page 442.
unpacked the philosophical precepts used by Rothko and his critics, to show 
how the spectre o f the artistic figure does not rely on the corporeal existence 
or preoccupations o f Rothko but on his tropological (and partial) 
substitution. A substitution which has no beginning or end, but is constantly 
renewed, reframed and reconfigured within discursive structures. What 
‘interacts’ with the viewing subject, I have argued, is not an identical 
autonomous subjectivity, but a rhetorically induced and vacillating 
substitute; with the artistic signature in this case the name ‘Rothko’ , acting 
as the underpinning o f his still-being-in-the-world (as origin). What are 
articulated by Rothko's paintings are the preoccupations of the modernist 
idiom within which he operated: the obsessions o f a society which could not 
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3. 1 U ncoord inated  leaps through M odern ist d iscourse
If thought searches, it is less in the manner o f someone who 
possesses a method than that of a dog that seems to be making 
uncoordinated leaps.241
Michaux’s (First) Mescaline Painting (Figure 13) is a small oil painting, 
approximately 18 x 14 cm in size. Applied to unprepared wood, the oil paint 
seeps into the grain making the colours and forms ambiguous and ill- 
defined. It is difficult to ascertain what it is a painting of; neither figurative 
or abstract it seems to evoke rather than describe or represent. On first 
viewing it seems akin to a murky, gaseous universe or an imaginary 
planetscape. Faces come forward only to fade into the background. This 
image is not static, it will not cohere either as subject matter or as surface 
matter. The colours Michaux applied seem unearthly even though he used 
mainly earthy browns and yellows.
... the colors used by Michaux are, in general, seldom conclusively 
asserted. Prissy pinks, brownish and olive-greenish tints, celadons, 
pale turquoises, saffron yellows, glints rather than sources of 
light, and in truth not very straightforward, rather cowardly, 
almost sickly - these all do their part to send the gaze into a state of 
indecision, a perceptible wavering between well-being and 
uneasiness, always irresponsible.242
Does this image resemble an endopsychic243 or external ‘vision’? How do you 
begin to write about an image like this? This particular image was found in a 
rather flimsy catalogue,244 nothing is written about it which will guide us to 
its meaning, what it is about, how it fits into the artistic discourse of its day. 
Ail I can find out about it, gleaned from the most basic of information, is that 
it is the very first oil painting executed by Michaux after he had taken the 
drug mescaline in 1954. Full stop.
241 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 55.
242 Rodari, ‘L’Homme de Plume’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 180.
243 An endopsychic image would be o f an internal ‘experience’ which is then taken as 
‘psychic’ or ‘psychedelic’.
244 Catalogue o f the Henri Michaux exhibition held at the Whitechapel Gallery, 1999.
Though there are several things written about Michaux’s literary 
importance, and are many things written about his use of drugs, it is very 
difficult to apply them to his drawings and paintings without sounding 
rather unorthodox, quirky even. I have read as much about Michaux and as 
much of his literary output as possible, including his poetry and writings 
about him: there is a short section in about Michaux’s use of mescaline in 
Malcolm Bowie’s biography Michaux24' the occasional, i f  sustained, mention 
in Sadie Plant’s Writing on Drugs,246 Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus/47 and David Boothroyd’s article ‘Deconstruction and Drugs: A 
Philosophical/Literary Cocktail.’248 Occasionally his drawings get 
mentioned in the popular press, for example in Adrian Searle’s 1999 
( Guardian) article ‘Who needs drugs, when you can paint like this?’ .249 
However, the most comprehensive guide to his drawings came out only 
months before the completion of this thesis, a catalogue250 written to coincide 
with an exhibition o f his work held at the Drawing Centre in New York, from 
October to December 2000. It would seem that an increased interest in 
Michaux’s drawings and paintings is beginning. However, because there is 
as yet no substantial published discourse about his drawings it is difficult to 
know where to place them within already established frameworks of 
understanding the artistic production from this period.
Also any mention o f Michaux’s use o f drugs and their effect(s) on his work is 
usually brief and fractured, embarrassed even. Often used to give the prose a 
certain philosophical playfulness, wrestling concepts from their ‘safe’ 
ground in an attempt, it seems, to evoke some kind of obscure and 
transgressive ‘reality’ . A reality, it is believed, that Michaux experienced 
himself but we that can only begin to imagine by confronting his images. To
fully engage with these images would, it seems, be admitting to taking drugs
245 Bowie, Henri Michaux: A Study o f his Literary Works, pages 151 - 170.
246 Plant, Writing on Drugs, pages 138, 145-8, 157-8, 189, 193, 202.
241 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 283, 285, 286.
24SSearle, ‘Deconstruction and Drugs: A Philosophical/Literary Cocktail’ in The 
Guardian, February 23rd, 1999.
249 Boothroyd, ‘Deconstruction and Drugs: A Philosophical/Literary Cocktail’ in 
Deconstruction: A Users Guide , pages 49 - 62.
250Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, edited by Catherine de Zegher.
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yourself, even if  you never did inhale. Michaux and drugs, according to 
divergent speculations, are constantly entangled in a kind of frenzied and 
chiasmatic coupling which somehow, it is argued, exceeds safe 
(philosophical) territory, projecting and visualising the act ‘into’ some 
dangerous other-space, a ‘space’ which ‘exists’ (paradoxically) within and 
without the intimate brute viscerality o f their encounter. Yet such an 
encounter can only be approached from a distance by a sober public, never 
experienced full-force in the same way that Michaux experienced it.
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Michaux’s words were devices and techniques for extending and 
exploring the worlds opened by his drugs. ‘Perhaps Michaux has 
never tried to express anything’ wrote Octavia Paz. ‘All his efforts 
have been directed at reaching that zone, by definition 
indescribable and incommunicable, in which meanings disappear.
A centre at once completely empty and completely full, a total 
vacuum and a total plenitude.’251
Michaux himself is not free o f blame in positing this ambiguous ‘space’ . He 
wrote various books on the subject, including The Space Within, The Distant 
Interior, Infinite Turbulence and Life Among the Folds.252These texts 
poetically evoke and trace the effects of mescaline in an attempt to 
demonstrate how it radically altered his sense o f ‘self’ and ‘reality’ ; (dis)233 
articulating how it transmuted his relationship with ‘normal’ time, space and 
speed; and placed him(self) within some ‘other’ ‘meaning-less’ zone.254
251 Plant, Writing on Drugs, page 146.
252 Selections from all these works can be found in Darkness Moves: An Henri Michaux 
Anthology 1927 - 1984, selected, translated and presented by David Ball.
253 I say ‘ (dis)articulating' because once the ‘self’ is dislocated through the use o f drugs 
it loses the ability to articulate itself. It could be argued, however, as I do many times in 
this thesis, that there is never such a thing as a fully articulate ‘self’ ; the ‘self’ only 
leaves traces within a multitude o f often contradictory signifiers.
254 Another way that this can be theoretically thought through is by utilising de Man’s 
notion o f ‘ irony’ (see Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric o f Temporality, pages
208 - 228]; it is within Michaux’s search for an ‘authentic’ self that he ‘trips’ and falls 
into an indeterminate ‘space’. De Man argues that there is an ironic twofold self which ‘
... comes into being only at the expense o f his empirical self ... [yet] ... Nature can at all 
times treat him as though he were a thing and remind him o f his factitiousness, whereas 
he is quite powerless to convert even in the smallest particle o f nature into something 
human.’ This happens when the self in question trips and falls, closing the distance 
between himself and ‘nature’. Later he argues that ‘The whole process (o f the fall] 
happens at an unsettling speed.’ This, I would argue, is the point at which Michaux 
becomes dis-located into a non-space through his use o f drugs, the point at which he 
becomes ‘non-human’.
But for the duration of this chapter I want to concentrate on the drawings, 
even though his writing will encroach into my understanding o f them.
Throughout the 1950s Michaux produced a series of drawings which attempt 
to visually map his use of mescaline. Entitled Dessin Mescalinien, and in the 
late 60s Dessin de reagregation, these are images through which he traced, 
and re-traced, memories o f his drug-induced experiences. Michaux had 
broken the ‘law’ ,255 put his life at risk, all for his ‘art’ , and he didn’t, it seems, 
give a damn. By representing his experiences he believed that he was in 
pursuit o f something real, if dangerous and precarious - experiencing and 
re-experiencing the ‘authentic’ space which lays beyond the conventional 
use of the symbolic.256 But how can such experiencing and re-experiencing 
be re-presented: as something will surely escape one’s ability to represent 
and, indeed, one’s understanding? How can we begin to talk about such 
individual, ambiguous, excessive and intimate moments?
We can begin by thinking about drugs, as substances which radically alter 
the taker’s state(s) o f consciousness. Constantly coalescing with the already 
exhausted exploration o f ‘death’ as a cultural taboo, taking or experimenting 
with drugs seems to be one o f the last social and cultural unmentionables 
that’s always getting mentioned either in relation to its transgressive nature 
or its ability to facilitate excesses in behaviour and experience. One way or 
another, we are told, follow the line of drugs and it 11 lead you to death , 
either as the physical cessation o f the functional body and/or as the aporetic 
‘other’ space o f the indescribable. And once ‘there’ there is no way back;
even by trying to re-trace the erratic marks left on paper by the artist on
255 When I say ‘ law’ here I am not only referring to the law as proclaimed through 
institutions such as the judicial system, but also Aristotle s three laws o f thought.
The Law o f Identity: A is A: Everything is itself.
The Law o f Noncontradiction: Nothing can be both A and not-A.
The Law o f Excluded Middle: Everything is either A or not-A .
(An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis by J. Hospers, page 108.)
This law denies any notion o f deviance, o f difference or o f leakage (say o f concepts) 
where something can be both A and -A.
256 This idea o f articulating something beyond that inscribed within the cultural 
framework o f articulation is paradoxical in that Michaux uses the conventional medium 
o f drawing to articulate this ‘authentic space’ - which, as I have already argued, is both 
within yet without its articulation(s), (see previous footnote).
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drugs: Michaux. So, what’s the point o f going any further if all you get is 
gaps and fissures; a confusing flux of useless information leading to the void 
which escapes being known or experienced? Can we obtain anything else 
from Michaux’s drawings apart from the oblique and unrealisable traces he 
left behind? To reiterate Deleuze’s now famous question: ‘How do you get out 
o f a black hole?’257 Why look at the work o f a strung-out Belgian/French 
artist who, until recently, only played the part o f a stagehand at the 
pantomime known as Modernist art history?258 Is understanding or discussing 
his work that important when there are other, more ‘worthy’ and straight 
forward, artists to write about, ones whose work is already placed within 
established frameworks o f interpretation? I was once told of the general 
apathy amongst art historians when it comes to writing about artists such as 
Michaux. It seems that ‘the French do not write about that period and the 
Americans do not care.’ :259 ‘ [Michaux’s] place in world literature and art [is] 
secure, but difficult to define. Michaux [stands] alone.’2*’ Even if we try to 
position Michaux’s art in relation to that o f his contemporaries it is difficult. 
The task seems enormous given the lack of theoretical texts, or indeed art 
historical accounts, on this artist and his work. When he is mentioned it is 
always in order to ‘define’ his work in relation to what it is not, in effect 
keeping it always-undefined.
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257 Deleuze asks ‘How do you get out from a black hole? quoted in Angelaki, volume 5 
number 2 August 2000, page 32.
256 Greenberg never mentions Michaux, although he does mention his contemporaries 
Dubuffet and Fautrier on several occasions. When discussing mid-twentieth-century 
French art he splits the artists into two ‘camps’: those who followed Picasso and those 
who followed Klee. Both Dubuffet and Fautrier are associated with the latter. An example 
o f the derisory way Greenberg mentions such artists is:
‘ ... the two main tendencies of the European version o f painterly abstraction, which ... 
emerged during the war. In Europe, too, painterly abstraction presses towards the three 
dimensional; but if one tendency leans, like our “homeless representation,” towards the 
three-dimensionality o f illusion, the other leans towards the literal three- 
dimensionality o f piled-on paint, and for its part could be called "furtive bas-relief .... 
For the rest, painterly abstraction in Europe has likewise degenerated into an affair 
largely of mannerisms, whether those o f “ furtive bas-relief or those o f homeless 
representation”. And there, too, a vast quantity o f abstract art that is bad because 
mannered is relieved, within the orbit o f the mannerisms, only by felicitous minor art.’
(Greenberg,The Collected Essays and Criticism.Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 
1957 -1969. Page 125.)
259 Personal communication with Serge Guilbaut 28/11/98.
260 Ball, Introduction to Darkness Moves (by Henri Michaux), page ix.
As Michaux’s [art] practice remains unclassifiable, it seems to
escape a connection to the Abstract Expressionists as much as to the
Surrealist Movement.251
I want to write about Michaux’s mescaline drawings without falling into the 
fatigued phraseology o f modernist hyperbole, without reducing his drawings 
to notions o f expression, ‘originality’ or as attempts to convey some kind of 
metaphysical idea or meaning. This, however, is a difficult task, especially 
given that Michaux executed these drawings when modernism, as the 
framework for understanding modern art, was at its zenith (1954 - 57) and 
because, as a value system, it seems to consume all work of ‘worth’ produced 
during that particular period. Nevertheless, even though it would seem folly, 
indeed indigent, to incorporate Michaux’s work into this homogenised 
framework o f explanation, it is difficult not to slip back into the modernist, 
primarily Kantian, understanding of form as related to, yet divisible from 
matter, as well as reduce perception to re-presentation, as the impossibility 
o f reaching, through representation the noemic, the ‘in-itselfness’ o f the 
thing itself, painting or object.262 According to Kant the objective 
appreciation art objects leads to its abstraction, idealisation and reduction, to 
its formal ‘qualities’ , thereby leaving the existence o f the object-itself 
obsolete and largely unnecessary. Once the object has caused an aesthetic 
sensation in the viewer it can be discarded, because the important elements 
have been extracted and placed within frameworks o f appreciation and 
interpretation.
This Kantian legacy will be discussed in a later section of this thesis, 
although it would be impossible to dispel in a few short sentences the 
modernist legacy, given the plethora o f considerable intellects already 
engaged in such a project. Michaux’s drawings, however, compel one to
261 de Zegher, ‘Adventure o f Ink’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 169.
262 1 am referring here to Husserl’s notion o f the noema as the object intended by 
consciousness as solely ‘being’ for  consciousness. However such an object ‘ is’ only for- 
itself in all its phenomenological and essential attributes. Consciousness can only ever 
possess its conceptual, linguistic and/or visual ‘equivalent’.
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attempt to construct a deviation, another way of approaching the work 
even if it means going beyond the confines o f ‘safe philosophical analysis. 
This I will do by examining the theories of certain mid-twentieth century 
French philosophers, primarily Blanchot and Deleuze and Guattari. This will 
allow an investigation into what seem to have been the effects of drugs on 
Michaux’s consciousness, and consequently examine any repercussions 
on/of his work. In turn I will posit perception and re-presentation as 
indivisible from matter, form and image and not as secondary articulations of 
them. Accordingly it will be argued that perception, matter, image and form 
all constitute the same zone of indeterminancy, where concepts relentlessly 
blur into and contaminate each other and the distance between subject and 
object, artist, work and viewer, collapses into a mass of infinite and 
incomplete connections. This will not close o ff a reading o f Michaux s work 
but open it up to numerable possibilities.
* * * * *
Maybe the reason why many art historians/theoreticians have ignored
Michaux, or refuse to form a systematic approach to his work, is because he
has, until recently, been seen primarily as a writer and not an artist, or
maybe its because his work is so difficult to define and categorise. Even
though I have already indicated the absence of a modernist explanation of
his work, it seems essential, given the theoretical basis of this thesis, to
deconstruct Michaux and his approach to, and interpretation of, his work,
but there seems to be no initial basis from which to begin. When
approaching a modernist work for example, one can begin by looking at the
body o f criticism, the discourse that informed the production and reception
of that work. With Michaux there are only his drawings, and his writing;
there is no substantial discourse from which to start. I would argue,
nevertheless that Michaux’s work constitutes another pre-post modern
moment- as outlined in chanter 1. Through Michaux’s writing it is possible to
263 Although I am concentrating on the artist Michaux in this chapter I could have 
discussed the work o f many other artists in this way, including those subsumed under 
‘modernist’ practices/theory.
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trace how he attempted to unravel, question and fragment himself; the 
impulse to deconstruct is evident in numerous passages. For example, in one 
poem, written after taking drugs, he describes himself as a:
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Faceless Force
Matrix of forms and rampart against forms 
In a space a faceless eye is watching 
with an unchanging eye 
without budging, without eyelid 
without tiring
Call to order 
Call to return 
Call to abolish264
Michaux, in this poem demonstrates the problem of maintaining a vital sense 
o f ‘se lf while at the same time trying to unravel and disseminate it(self). In 
chapter 1 1 suggested that I would find a middle path between ‘All’ or 
‘Nothing’,265 (either absolute presence, as the metaphysical and ontological 
point of origin, or absolute absence as the void beyond representation). In 
this chapter I will argue that Michaux’s drawings can aid me in negotiating, 
albeit theoretically, such an approach.
Deconstruction, like taking drugs ‘... has often been made an object 
of abuse for its alleged irresponsibility, its ‘nihilism’ . It has, 
nonetheless, always recognised the importance, even the 
necessity, o f ‘abuse’ in another sense: as a tactic in its strategic 
underminings, loosenings, erosions, subversions and (one might 
add and add ...) its ‘et ceteras’. All o f which are abusive in the 
conventional sense, from the perspective of those orthodoxies, 
authorities, institutions, etc., which underwrite the ‘truth’ about 
everything.’2™
Instead of analysing Michaux’s work in order to articulate ‘loss’ or a ‘void 
maybe we can outline how his drawings constitute an abusive reaction or 
retaliation against the rigidity of ‘truth’ one that does not totally disseminate
264 Michaux, in Darkness Moves, (ed. David Ball), page 238.
265 This is, according to Blanchot, a pseudo-dialectic ‘ ... that knows not an infinite 
number o f mediated and graduated positions, but only two: All or Nothing ... to abolish 
the world absolutely in order to put in place an absolute absence o f the world and 
thereby to substitute for real, functional objects a series o f imaginary, absent objects.’ 
(Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, page 107).
266 Boothroyd ‘Deconstruction and Drugs: A Philosophical/Literary Cocktail’ in 
Deconstruction: A Users Guide, pg 45.
the subject(ivity) ‘behind’ Michaux’s work. As Maurice Blanchot, a friend of 
Michaux, explains:
If Henri Michaux’s inventions strike us as so close to us and speak 
directly to our fate, even though they do not seem to implicate us at 
all, it is first of all because they symbolise this general condition of 
our destiny, namely, that it can only discover a meaning in its 
attempts to escape from this meaning and indeed from all possible 
meaning altogether - so that the sheer gratuitousness o f his ^  
fictions and sometimes of his language is what matters to us most.
Maybe Michaux was trying to compile or discover his own truth by pushing 
it beyond the boundaries of what was, and still is, ‘acceptable’. But he should 
not be punished for that. The pursuit o f truth, albeit futile, is not the problem 
here. It is when it is re-presented through art, as the final redemptive act, in 
the way o f Michaux’s American contemporaries, that the ‘truth’ becomes 
encased in its own rhetoricity, its own philosophical crypt. Then 
interpretation becomes self "referential and cannot break out o f the confines 
o f its own language.
It seems that Michaux’s mescaline drawings repel explanation within any 
kind of ‘authorised’ exegesis, and that his ‘irresponsible’ abuse of drugs, and 
the irreverence of his drawings has scuppered several avenues of 
investigation. Maybe it’s time to concentrate not so much on mourning the 
loss o f Michaux but on letting his drawings infiltrate and rupture any 
formulaic268 interpretation o f his work, so that I can deconstruct his drawings 
just enough to trace a moment of sensual overload - a moment of excess 
without memory or origin. Conventional269 interpretation and art histories 
could construct a memory for Michaux’s work but to do so would exclude a 
crucial element in/of his drawings. Any reading of Michaux s drawings will 
not be easy, as without the coherence of sequential thought or the 
recollections o f an original (re-membering) artist, events and conceptual
development becomes multiple, excessive and difficult to follow. Michaux
267 Blanchot, Henri Michaux ou le refus de l ’enfermement, pages 61-62. Reprinted in 
Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 169. My italics.
268 ‘Formulaic’ here is referring to either a strict modernist approach to Michaux’s work, 
or an approach which would deconstruct it into oblivion.
269 By ‘conventional’ I mean a biographical and/or genealogical approach.
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himself tried to articulate the ways in which excess manifests itself when 
trying to work through such confusion:
I begin to write almost without realising it, without thinking, busy 
transmitting these words I don’t recognise, although they are 
highly significant: ‘Too much! Too much! You’re giving me too 
much.’270
Because the deconstructive impetus undermines any coherent ‘history’ or 
(auto)biography we cannot, indeed would not want to, reconstruct a 
modernist reading o f Michaux’s work. However, as I have already mentioned, 
there are various and disparate voices clamouring to be heard on the subject 
o f Michaux’s writing and/or use o f drugs, all giving vague and confusing 
snippets of information, floating aimlessly around in that abstract space 
known as the ‘discursive realm’, endlessly connecting, dis-connecting and 
failing to cohere. These interpretations, although growing in number and 
constituting a possibly important contribution to Michaux’s work, are not yet 
sufficiently plentiful to be theoretically framed as a discreet discourse on 
‘Michaux’. As soon as anyone attempts to explain Michaux’s drawings there is 
the need to use the words of others in order, it seems, to attempt to fix their 
meaning. Although it could be claimed that this is the ‘nature’ of 
interpretation itself, it becomes more evident as a problem when reading any 
interpretations o f Michaux’s work. In using the words o f others, writers on 
Michaux place their interpretation(s) ‘elsewhere’ rather than within a 
‘proper’ discursive space (on/of Michaux). There is an added dimension to 
the problem o f understanding Michaux’s work in that philosophical 
discourses themselves do not provide any stable conceptual framework 
within which to ‘place’ Michaux’s work. Even though I can appeal to certain 
‘concepts’ the structures within which they evolve and are maintained are 
themselves made up o f a multiple weave o f disparate voices. These 
drawings, I will argue, function affectively rather conceptually;in that they 
do not connote or represent any ‘truth’. This raises a problem in that. ... 
there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to a ffect.... the
270 Michaux, Darkness Moves , page 203.
271 Deleuze, Negotiations, page 109.
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form/content o f conventional discourse ...[constitutes] a separate stratum 
running counter to the full registering o f affect...\272 The words I will use to 
describe Michaux’s drawings are themselves transgressive, excessive, 
affective, always pushing against the limits o f their own disciplines and 
leaking into others, always needing explanation from other sources, other 
discourses - ad infinitum. Never for-themselves, no full stop, no closure. I 
will therefore use fragments o f texts from several philosophies, or 
philosophical cultures - some ‘orthodox’, some not - in order to weave a new 
theoretical pattern, a fold, through which we can view or ‘inter-view 
Michaux’s art. This fold manifests itself in many ways, historically, 
temporally and literally. Buckling over, repeating and multiplying 
Michaux’s life, time and graphic line(s).
* * * * *
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To begin, a partial correspondence can be made with Blanchot’s commentary 
on Kafka:
When we see the disorder in which [Kafka’s] work reaches us - 
what is made known to us, what is hidden, the fragmentary light 
thrown on this or that piece, the scattering of texts themselves, 
unfinished to begin with and split up even more and reduced to 
dust as if they were relics whose power is indivisible - when we 
see his silent works invaded by the chatter o f commentaries ... this 
timeless creation changed into a footnote of history, we begin to 
ask ourselves if Kafka himself had foreseen such a disaster m such
a triumph.274
This quote notes several things; how texts are scattered, how they fail to 
relate totally with one another, and how they fail to compose themselves into 
a mono-linear or sequential discourse. It also points to the chatter of 
commentaries, and how these interrupt any unambiguous reading o f Kafka’s 
work. Because of this constant chattering and failure to cohere as an
272 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy o f Affect’, pp 221-2. My italics.
273 Derrida states that ‘ ... a jalousie (a blind) o f traits cutting up the horizon, traits 
through which, between which, you can observe without being seen, you can see between 
the lines, i f  you see what I mean: the law o f the inter-view’. Quoted in Angelaki, volume 
5, number 2, August 2000, page 17.
274 Blanchot, WorA' o f  Fire, page 1.
discourse, Kafka and his writing become, like Michaux and his drawings, a 
footnote of history. As far as I’m concerned, the most interesting part of the 
quote is the last last couple of lines, where Blanchot shifts a triumph into a 
‘disaster’, seemingly turning the positive into a negative by way o f a 
dialectical sleight o f hand. In fact, he interrupts any dialectical distance 
between the two ‘events’ , by introducing ‘fragmentary ligh t, dust, relics 
and the ‘indivisible’ all which force them into an neutral (indeterminate) 
space, a space which, I aim to argue, Michaux and his work also inhabit. 
Blanchot’s notion of ‘disaster’ , as an event (or multiple events), is an: 
‘ ....alterity without name, transcending all transcendence ... [it] ... is another 
name for the infinite contestation or anonymity ... formulate[d] as the 
neutre; at any event, as an inassimilable force of the infinite withdrawal, 
separation, and displacement ...’275
I need to tread on ‘safe’ territory here: I need to set the ‘scene’, and explicate 
what it is that I, in part, reacted against when I first attempted to analyse 
Michaux’s drawings.276
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275 Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary, pages 207- 208. . .
276 It is important, however, to note that Hegel’s theories on the Phenomenology o f Spirit 
and Aesthetics constitute the spring board from which many disparate and important 
philosophies have sprung. I am not about to dispute its importance in this respect.
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3. 2 F illin g  the v o id .
Mescaline multiplies, sharpens, accelerates, intensifies the inner 
moments of becoming conscious. You watch their extraordinary 
flood, mesmerised, uncomprehending. With your eyes shut, you 
are in the presence of an immense world. Nothing has prepared 
you for this. You don’t recognise it. Tremendously present, active, 
coloured, swarming in tiny islands very close together with no 
empty space teeming, vibrating but stationary, festering with 
ornaments, saturating the space which still remains 
immeasurable, which keeps coming to life in seething, twisting, 
interwinings, in unpreventable accumulations/
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, Hegel, in Aesthetics, 
demonstrates how the subject(ivity) creating or viewing a work o f art finds 
freedom from its own materiality by having its absolute consciousness 
‘reflected’ back to itself, within an inter-subjective moment. Art, according 
to this theory, constitutes the medium through which radical oppositions are 
overcome: subject overcomes object, positive overcomes negative, reason 
overcomes chaos, day overcomes night, mind overcomes matter. The 
artwork, as a manifestation of the Hegelian Spirit, has worked to overcome 
the world and its objects by negating their negative ‘qualities’ . The 
(viewing) subject(ivity) in turn overcomes the absolute otherness of the 
artwork by negating its materiality, thereby transforming it in to an 
aperture through which it can possibly attain absolute freedom. Hegel states 
that the artwork is ‘born o f the Spirit’ which itself is ‘born again when 
confronted with, and converted by, the viewing subject. Death, as absolute 
negation itself, is finally negated through the destruction of all that is a 
threat to the desired freedom of consciousness. It is important to note that 
any act of consciousness is always negation, either by the creating/ viewing 
subject(ivity) or by the reflected consciousness o f the artwork that works on 
the subject’s behalf. It is, as Hegel argues, always a fight until death (o f the 
other) which enables the Spirit to manifest itself as consciousness, thereby
277 Michaux, Henri Michaux (Whitechapel: Exhibition Catalogue 1999). No page number 
a v a j J
278 Accordingly, Hegel argues that once the Spirit attains absolute knowledge (o f itself) 
art is (will be) no longer possible or needed.
279 Hegel, Aesthetics, page 2.
becoming ‘life ’ in its fullest, triumphant, and most positive sense. 
Consciousness, according to this theory, actively works towards the bright 
light o f day by crossing over the line, the distance between life and death, 
then back again, replenished. It is important also to note that it is 
subjectivity itself280 that has conceptualised (and drawn) this line (as border).
Nevertheless, as even Hegel admits, contingency281 (as the negative, 
unknown, some-thing) is always proximate to, and divides, consciousness; it 
is thereby always threatening to disrupt a sense o f unity. According to Hegel, 
this threat is always kept at a safe distance even though consciousness is 
constantly having to re-cross the line between life and death to maintain its 
own sense o f unity, consciousness manufactures a distance between itself 
and anything which may undermine it, postponing the moment within 
which it may have to face its own contingent other(ness). Consciousness 
constantly keeps its vision on the metaphysical horizon and struggle toward 
the attainment of absolute knowledge (o f itself as subjectivity) by 
systematically eradicating the negative, sick and transient world of matter 
situated ‘below’. This ‘other’ corporeal state of being in the world, although 
nauseatingly close to consciousness, can, according to Hegel, eventually be
280 Although it is important to note that this subjectivity is part o f a larger, communal 
‘Spirit’ - as consciousness o f a particular epoch. Therefore the subject in question draws 
this line within wider social, cultural and historical context(s).
281 Hegel discusses contingency in various texts, specifically in relation to self- 
consciousness. In the Phenomenology o f Spirit, pages 124 - 126, he argues that ... 
consciousness, instead o f being self-identical, is in fact nothing but a purely casual, 
confused medley, the dizziness o f a perpetually self-engendered disorder. It is aware o f 
this; for itself maintains and creates this restless confusion ...But equally while it takes 
itself in this way to be a single and separate, contingent, and, in fact, animal life, and a 
lost self-consciousness it also, on the contrary conveys itself again into a consciousness 
that is universal and self-identical ... It [consciousness] ...has itself the doubly 
contradictory consciousness o f unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency 
and non-identity with itself. But it keeps the poles o f this its self-contradiction apart 
.... This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially contradictory 
nature is for a single consciousness, must for ever have present in the one consciousness 
the other also; and thus it is driven out o f each in turn in the very moment it imagines it 
has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other. Its true return into itself, 
or its reconciliation with itself will, however, display the Notion o f Spirit that has 
become a living Spirit, and has achieved an actual existence, because it already 
possesses a single undivided consciousness, a dual nature .
2,2 Here I am referring to both Kierkergaard and Sartre’s notions o f ‘sickness’ and 
‘nausea’ as the realisation that the subject(ivity) is not seperate from the material world 
o f objects. Both ‘sickness’ and ‘nausea’ will be fully explored in a separate research 
project which will focus on the artist Wols.
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eradicated as the two elements of self consciousness, the fixed and the 
changeable are fundamentally different and incompatible to each other, 
they are ‘ ... alien to one another; and because it [self-consciousness] is itself 
the consciousness o f this contradiction, it identifies itself with the 
Changeable consciousness, and takes it to be the unessential Being.’ 
Consciousness cannot accept difference as part of its very nature and 
incessantly attempts to negate the threat o f difference by keeping it in a 
‘safe’ (negated) place. As far as I ’m concerned Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit provides a useful resource with which to understand Michaux s art and 
writing but, as we will see, although it is useful, it is theoretically 
insufficient.284 1 will argue that consciousness, in constantly crossing the 
line between the two poles of the dialectic, between subject and object, life 
and death, the fixed and the changeable, always contains elements of both 
poles at any given time, and so always deconstructs itself in its own attempt to 
be subject/life/fixed. The very best that can be hoped is for a subjectivity to 
be partially and inconsistently ‘formed’ .
It is the incessant (subjective) movement across this rhetorical line, between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ , life and death, unity and difference, that interests me 
most in relation to Michaux’s work and the fold which is o f it and which I 
will have to temporarily ‘inhabit’ in the attempt to understand his drawings. 
Again, as argued above, this fold incorporates everything that we usually, 
albeit theoretically, separate out for the sake of brevity: identities, histories, 
spatial and temporal coordinates, and so on. This fold will not be an easy or 
‘safe’ space to explore. Deleuze proffers a word o f warning:
It’s difficult to talk about. It’s a line that’s not abstract, though it 
has no particular shape. It’s no more in thought than in things, 
but it is everywhere thought confronts somethings like madness,
285 Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, page 137.
284 As Judith Butler argued in her lecture ‘ Is Kinship Always Heterosexual? (held at 
CentreCATH, University o f Leeds, 14th May 2001), the combination o f two entities [in 
this case the fixed and the changeable] does not constitute a deconstructive moment, as 
the two [separate] realms o f signification/meaning still exist within a new combination. 
Also it is important to remember that within Hegel’s dialectic the fixed can only exist in 
relation to its opposite, the changeable, therefore the negative is only utilised in order 
to define the positive [the fixed]. [+ + - = +]•
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and life some thing like death ... For Michaux it is the line of drugs
“headlong acceleration,” the “whiplash o f a frenzied coachman” ’.
Such lines ‘ ... go beyond knowledge ... [they are] violent and fast,
carrying us into breathless regions.’285
Attempting to view Michaux, ‘frenziedly’ crossing over this line in his 
drawings, will not eradicate the negative or give me the necessary distance 
to allow me to safely ‘obtain’ the truth; it will situate me and the drawings 
alongside alongside each other in a temporary and ambiguous space, within 
which the only traces to be found will be tenebrous moment of speeds, 
intensities and uneven, contradictory, multiplicitous flows of/and concepts. 
Examining Michaux’s drawings will not enable me to re-trace or re-compile 
his consciousness or experiences of drugs, as both are in excess of any kind 
of stable coherent meaning and, as previously argued, are always unevenly 
reconstructed by (cultural) memory. Such an excess unhinges dialectical 
oppositions, rendering them in a constant state of dis-location (as the 
location o f both mine and Michaux’s subjectivity). Rather than viewing this 
as a disabling position, I will instead consider such a dis-location as one 
which allow me to indicate resonances, vibrations whilst not having to refer 
constantly back to a unified memory or originary ‘P .286
Blanchot argues that the attempt to overcome (the negative) constitutes a 
paradox, in that the subject becomes dis-located from (in) itself (as unified) 
by incorporating, then rejecting, the negative in(to) itself. This struggle for 
freedom, from itself, means that consciousness is always having to 
renegotiate its own limit in order to relocate itself, constantly having to re­
formulate a strict division between subject and object, inside and outside, 
positive and negative. This also means that subjectivity never moves from 
the limit(s) o f its own being and never fully goes inside or outside ‘itself’ . It 
oscillates in a neutral, indetermined zone - neither, but both, subject and/or 
object - always, frustratingly, suspended between the two, being everywhere 
but nowhere at the same time. This is the Deleuzian ‘line’ or lim it. a zone of
285 Deleuze, Negotiations, page 111.
286 I must, at this juncture, admit that I have no real experience o f drugs, and therefore 
found it interesting that Michaux’s drawings may convey some kind o f quality or 
intensity beyond (yet reminiscent of) my own experiences.
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indeterminancy, which both doubles consciousness into a (self-reflecting) 
subjectivity and at the same moment infinitely folds it into an endless 
labyrinth. The space or ‘zone’ occupied by this subjectivity, although 
believing that it belongs to the ‘day’ - as consciousness desires, - ‘ ... is only 
but the loss of a dwelling place. It is intimacy with the outside, which has no 
location and affords no rest.’287 This labyrinthal zone renders us all (Michaux, 
me and you) homeless. Consciousness is constituted in and by this labyrinthal 
zone, within which it searches for the location o f its own positive and stable 
reflection, but in doing so it only locates transient ‘moments’ which then 
fold over and out o f themselves and become re-incorporated back into the 
zone of indeterminancy. The relation between subjectivity and its world is 
not one of relations, but of non-relation. Here Deleuze concurs with 
Blanchot:
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‘ ... the theme of the Outside: the relation, and indeed 
“nonrelation” , to an Outside is further from us than any external 
world, and thereby closer to us than any internal world’ he goes 
on ‘ ... the interplay o f near and far along the line Outside, as a 
life-and-death experiment, leads to specifically Foucauldian acts of 
thought, to folding and unfolding .... [to become] the process of 
subjectification.288
In line with the differentiation inherent within Hegel’s dialectical model 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that subjectivity is made up of two main 
elements.289 They posit an uneven, unequal and interrupted flow between 
such elements, which means that they can never be separated from or,
indeed, at any one time be distinguished from, each other, l his leads to a
287 Blanchot, The Space o f Literature, page 31.
288 Deleuze, Negotiations, page 97.
289 This theory is also borne out in the section ‘Micropolitics and segmentarity’ in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 208 - 231: Ihere it is argued that 
there are three zones to every assemblage (in this case ‘subjectivity ]. The first is the 
zone o f power which is constituted through the segmentation o f a solid rigid line; this is 
usually over-coded within a system o f binaries [hence Hegel’s dialectical model of 
matter/mind]. The second is the zone o f indiscernability which relates to the diffusion 
of the first zone through a microphysical fabric, this ‘ is’ the many relations, events and 
experiences which ‘constitute’ the subject. The third is the zone o f impotence which 
relates to the flows and quanta which are beyond the control o f the first or indeed the 
second zone. It is this last zone which allows seepage, mutation and constantly 
undermines and challenges the other two zones by constantly taking several, yet 
unknown ‘ lines o f flight’ . 1 would say that the ‘tonal’ is roughly correspondent to the 
first two zones, and the ‘nagual’ the third, although this is being reductive for the sake 
o f clarity.
disastrous and potentially deadly contamination, a constant vibration which 
leaves the subject constantly on the brink o f an indeterminate ‘space’. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit o f theoretical investigation, Deleuze and Guattari, 
basing their theories on ones found in texts by Carlos Castaneda, split the two 
elements and name them the tonal and the nagual. These ‘elements’ are 
useful in approaching Michaux’s art. The tonal is that which allows me to 
investigate certain events/actions that cannot be placed within the specific 
sequence of Michaux’s life, as one-dimensional historical ‘moments’. 
Castaneda defined the tonal as that which incorporates ‘everything we know 
... its function is to judge, assess and witness.’290 The tonal would be utilised 
through tried and trusted modes of description and interpretation, for 
example, ‘drug taking’ , ‘art making’ , ‘France in the mid-twentieth century’ , 
etc. Without the tonal ‘there would be only weird sounds and grimaces and 
you wouldn’t understand a word ... \291 The tonal is that which attempts to 
regulate, systematise and name chaos. The nagual on the other hand is ‘the 
part o f us we do not deal with at all - it has no description, no names, no 
feelings, no knowledge.’292 However, a study of the nagual in Michaux’s 
drawings could facilitate a dis-articulation o f that which may escape such a 
systemised approach; that is the drawings paradoxical ‘nature’ . 293
In this respect it is the nagual that interests me the most, in that the excesses 
of Michaux’s drawings are somehow, imperfectly, placed within a quasi- 
philosophical system of becoming ‘something’ other than significant in 
terms o f an already constructed, and restrictive system of meaning, i.e., the 
tonal. Here it is important to stress again that the tonal and the nagual are 
only separated for the sake of theoretical investigation; they are part o f the 
same process:
290 Castaneda, Tales o f Power, pages 123 and 125.
2,1 Castaneda, Tales o f Power, page 122.
292 Castaneda, Tales o f  Power, page 126.
29s According to Brian Massumi ‘ ... paradoxes should not be taken as mere frivolities. 
They are serious attempts to pack meaning into the smallest possible space without 
betraying it with simplification .... A paradox is not a contradiction. A paradox 
abolishes contradiction. It does not negate, it compounds A User’s Guide to Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, page 21.
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They are moments or aspects of a process. They are mutually 
determining, in reciprocal presupposition. But they can be 
unravelled ... they may be thought of as levels, or “plateaus.” We 
can operate on whatever level seems adequate to the problem we 
are dealing with, and can choose to emphasise that level’s 
connection to or separation from the others (the relation or the 
non). We must remember, however, that the ground is ultimately 
unstable, and should be prepared to jump at any moment.294
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The tonal is all that is constructed through and by cultural, social and 
philosophical systems of thought. It is the subject(ivity) as described, 
organised and known. It is:
... the organism, and also all that is organised and organising; but 
it is also significance, all that is signified, all that is memorisable 
.... finally, it is the Self (Moi), the subject, the historical, social or 
individual person, and the corresponding feelings.
The nagual is also all of the above, but it includes all that can interrupt 
and destabilise the tonal. It is therefore:
... also everything .... [it is] Flows o f intensity, their fluids, their 
fibres, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, 
fine segmentation, microperceptions, [which] have replaced the 
world o f the subject.... There is no longer a Self [Moi] that feels, 
acts and recalls; there is “a glowing fog, a dark yellow mist” that 
has affects and experiences movements, speeds.
However, Deleuze and Guattari offer a warning in that the use o f drugs can 
potentially and irrevocably annihilate the tonal .29S The important thing to 
remember is never to let go completely as the nagual renders speechless, 
engenders inertia, impotence and the inability to rest in certainty. It is 
essential:
... not to dismantle the tonal by destroying it all of a sudden. You 
have to diminish it, shrink it, clean it, and that only at certain
294 Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, page 21.
295 Deleuze and Guattari state that the continual use o f drugs: ‘Instead o f making a body 
without organs sufficiently rich or full for the passage o f intensities, drug addicts erect 
a vitrified or emptied body, or a cancerous one: the causal line, creative line, or line of 
flight immediately turns into a line o f death and abolition .... Black holes and lines of 
death.’ [A Thousand Plateaus, page 285]. What 1 take this to mean is that the drug-user 
can eventually destroy the tonal in the pursuit o f the ‘pure’ nagual, which can lead to 
actual physical death or at the very least permanent aphasia where the subject(ivity) 
cannot remember itself as positioned within the tonal, i.e. as historical and/or temporal.
moments. You have to keep it in order to survive, to ward o ff the 
assault o f the nagual. For the nagual that erupts, that destroys the 
tonal, a body without organs that shatters all strata, turns 
immediately into a body o f nothingness, pure self destruction 
whose only outcome is death: “The tonal must be protected at any 
”2%
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Michaux eventually gave up drugs, after nearly a decade of experimenting 
with them.297 His continual return to the nagual was getting too dangerous. To 
diminish the tonal too much would allow the nagual to take over, confusing 
time, space and vision.298 The line folds over too quickly, multiplying all 
sensory perception to the point o f getting lost. There is a time to give up. 
Michaux got to the point:
...where “ to get high or not to get high” is no longer the 
question, but whether drugs have sufficiently changed the 
general condition o f space and time perception so that nonusers 
succeed in passing through the holes in the world and follow 
the lines o f flight at the very place where means other than 
drugs become necessary.299
2,6 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 162.
297 Michaux explained just before his death in 1984 that: ‘ I’m more o f a water drinking 
type. Never alcohol. No stimulants, and for years no coffee, no tobacco, no tea. From time 
to time wine, and very little o f that. All my life, very little o f everything people take. 
Take and abstain. Abstain above all. Fatigue is my drug, as a matter o f fact. I was 
forgetting: twenty-five years ago or more, I must have tried ether seven or eight times at 
the most, laudanum once and twice alcohol (frightful). Darkness Moves, page 207.
298 Huxley in his book The Doors o f  Perception describes how his use o f drugs altered his 
perception o f colours and shapes as well as temporarily suspending his sense o f time 
and space.
299 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Page 286.
175
3.3 F ly in g , but g e ttin g  n ow h ere , w ith  M ichaux
Like me, the line is seeking without knowing what it is seeking .... 
Preventing itself from ‘arriving,’ line o f blind investigation. 
Without leading to anything, without attempting to be beautiful or 
interesting, criss-crossing itself without turning a hair, without 
turning away, without turning into knots or knotting itself to 
something, without perceiving object, landscape, figure.
Colliding with nothing, somnambulant line.
Curved in places, yet not enlacing 
Encircling nothing and never encircled
A line that has not yet made its choice, not ready to be finalised. 
Without preference, without accentuation, without completely
300giving into appearances.
Vibrant certainty
its touch so fine, making a sign
peak, abyss on the same line.301
So can Michaux’s use of drugs and the scribbled articulation of his 
experiences help us, the viewers as ‘non-users’ , to follow his lines of 
‘ fligh t ’?302 Without the circularity o f discourse, where meaning and object 
collide and coincide, where can such lines lead us?
It is my contention that Michaux, by taking drugs, ‘diminished’ (but never 
eradicated) the tonal (the ‘self’ ) in order to concentrate on/in the nagual 
( affectively the impotent yet plenitudinous swarm of the void). To follow the 
traces of his line(s) o f flight is to watch the partial undoing of Michaux. Seen 
and understood like this, Michaux’s images constitute an attempt to trace 
flows and lines; to hold onto the vibrations o f his own consciousness
sufficiently long enough to re-member or replicate them on paper
300 Michaux, Emergences- 'Resurgences, quoted in ‘Simple Gestures’ by Laurent Jenny in 
Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 191.
301 Michaux, Jours de Silence, quoted in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 215.
302 Generally, within the concept o f ‘subjectivity’ propagated by Western Metaphysics, 
there is a constant time/space continuum where the subject ‘moves in a teleologica! 
fashion towards ‘death’. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari s notion of 
deterritorialisation or ‘ lines o f flight’, the process is not straight-forward in that there 
are multiple and uneven dimensions to such a ‘journey’, dimensions which ebb and flow, 
move back and forth, never arriving at ‘death’ . The dichotomy between life and death as 
that upon which the Western notion o f subjectivity is based ‘A person is either still 
alive or already dead’ [Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, page 
20] is thereby disrupted. Life and/or death can happen at any one moment, on any given 
dimension, as the tonal and the nagual are constantly in a state of uneven flux.
‘ ...mov[ing] so quickly that one can only be apprehended by the tracing of 
one’s disappearance. Tracing leaves a line in place: a cinematic thread 
beyond which the motion ‘follows itself in the hope o f never catching up to 
itself.’303 It is not a case o f Michaux being absolutely present or absolutely 
absent of/in these drawings - all or nothing - but a case of holding on just 
enough’ to attempt to articulate the traces of his own dissolving 
consciousness, which then enable us, the viewers as ‘non-users to access the 
similar.304 There are, however, obvious difficulties in trying to inscribe that 
which is largely indescribable; trying to give significance to that which 
escapes signification within accepted cultural narratives. As indicated in the 
introduction, the circularity o f discourse presumes an answer before the 
question is even muttered. However, the very instability of these images, 
their inability to cohere, attest to the intensity and multiplicity o f the 
nagual. There are no replicates only incomplete traces. The dialectic between 
question and answer belies the ‘fact’ that that the answer exists as soon as 
the question is posited.305 The idea that questions and answers can be 
separated is therefore a false one, and in a similar fashion the tonal and the 
nagual cannot be that easily separated in that they always penetrate and 
contaminate each other, they can never be separated because neither one 
constitutes the positive and/or the negative of the other, they encircle 
nothing and are themselves never encircled or contained. While attempting 
to articulate his intense experiences o f the nagual, Michaux remembers that 
his ‘sense’ o f any remaining ‘self’ was:
incredibly fast, hundreds o f lines o f force were combing my being, 
which never managed to pull itself back together fast enough, 
which at the moment o f coming back together was raked by a new
lennv ‘Simple Gestures', in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 191.
304 I say sim ilar instead o f same, as these traces can never be stable enough to follow r - 
trace in an identical manner, like an already well-todden path.
305 Deleuze on page 15 o f Bergsonism  states that ‘The truth is that in philosophy and 
even e l s e w h e r e  it is a questioning o f Finding the question and consequently o f positing 
it even more than solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is 
prooerlv stated. By that I mean that its solution exists then, although it may remain 
hidden and so to speak, covered up: The on ly thing left to do is uncover it. But staing 
the nroblem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing. Discovering, or uncovering,




row of times, and then again and again.306
Looking at Dessin de Mescalinien (figure 15) it is impossible to say whether it 
represents a particular307 intensive, nagual, experience. Such experiences, 
once re-membered,308 tend to be unevenly replicated as they mutate and 
swarm into each other. It could be argued that the seemingly incoherent, 
irregular lines - each one entire and unimpaired but also partial and weakly 
insufficient, swarming and vibrating, leaking off the edge o f the page - 
somehow resonate within their own naguality, as affective traces without 
memory. Each line indicates a ‘new row of times', repeating itself but never 
within the same spatial or temporal zone.
This does not mean that Michaux somehow ‘transferred’ his experiences 
under the influence o f mescaline onto (into) another medium, for to cite 
Michaux as ‘master’ o f his own experiences, know them, hold them in his 
memory and replicate them would be to merely address the tonal aspect of his 
being-in-the-world and fall into the trite modernist notion o f expression.309 
Primarily what I am arguing is that Michaux’s naguality contaminated his 
drawings as nagual traces without memory. All Michaux could ever do when 
he took drugs was try to re-position himself within the zone of 
indeterminancy, traced by the scratchy marks he left behind that resonate 
with such an attempt. Maybe the drawings are his attempt to keep connected 
with the world, to reinscribing himself, albeit agitatedly, onto paper. The 
metonomyic affects o f Michaux’s nagual flight fall back into each other 
without presenting a positive whole or complete reflection o f his 
subjectivity. Hegel’s fight until death is thus never won, the dual 
consciousness becomes incalculable; it is therefore not a case o f ‘binary
306 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page xvi.
307 Although ‘particularity’ would indicate a specific and isolated event within a 
sequence o f events.
308 In this context ‘re-membered’ does not mean reflection where a subject recalls his or 
her experiences as though they were complete and knowable entities. What I am arguing 
here is that in re-membering the ‘self’ attempts to reconfigure itself through the tonal; 
yet such attempts are constantly undermined by the nagual.
309In the second chapter o f this thesis I argue that the modernist method constantly 
attempts to reassert the nagual within the tonal, although in doing so reduce it to 
concepts o f the sublime, universal, etc., thereby rendering it ‘ safe’ .
oppositions or contradictions, b u t... resonating levels’310 which pollute each 
other. The very process Michaux went through in order to ‘create’ these 
images is therefore in itself problematic, in that whilst on mescaline his 
sense of self could be, at best, only ever partial never complete, and with no 
prospect o f resolution.311 Instead, what he had to try and do was to reformulate 
and somehow signify the nagual within the tonal, the indeterminate within 
the coherent, keep hold o f the construction o f ‘Michaux and somehow 
attempt to re-incorporate, rather than deny, the changeable/difference into 
his sense of self. These drawings are traces o f that struggle, whereby 
Michaux tries to limit the multiplicity o f sensations, brought on by taking 
mescaline, without a structure within which to select any sensations as 
primary. ‘Art is not a chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision 
or sensation, so that it constitutes as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a composed chaos 
„.’312 Chaos, within the experience of the drug comes before, indeed instead of 
the concept. Michaux has to wait until the concept of chaos kicks in, and 
then try to trace it on paper. Within such ‘normal’ circumstances therefore 
‘... for the vision of things and beings, one sees by excluding as much as by 
receiving ’ .31’ Michaux also states that:
The present drawings are, need I say? reconstructions. A hand two 
hundred times more agile that the human hand would not be up to 
the task o f following the speeding course of the inexhaustible
spectacle.314
Later drawings supply us with more evidence of this (for example figures 16 
and 17). They were all drawn some seven years after the event(s) of taking 
drugs. Within these drawings he attempts to re-articulate the lines which 
allowed him to travel chaotically within his endopsychic state. The tightly
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310 M assumi,‘The Autonomy of Affect’, page 226.
311 According to Deleuze and Guattari’s notions o f de- and re-terri totalisation the 
subject can never reconfigure as before. As argued in A Thousand Plateaus [page 226].
'If an image of the master [of subjectivity] ... it is projected outward to the limits of the 
universe, as if something had domination over flows as well as segments, and in the same 
manner, the result is a fictitious and ridiculous representation.’
312 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, page 204.
313 Michaux, Sasir, no page number given. 1Qoa> ^  n M .
314 Michaux Henri Michaux(Exhibition Catalogue: Whitechapel Gallery 1999), no page
number indicated.
packed squiggles allow the continuation of a series o f journeys, which in 
turn explore once more the affective sensory overload experienced on 
mescaline. These drawings are thereby constituted by both: “travelling” 
lines, which “don’t create objects so much as they create journeys, 
itineraries,” ... [and] ... “allusive” lines, “mad about enumerating ... creating 
microscopic palaces o f proliferating cellular life.” Such lines however 
cannot be easily distinguished or separated. Looking at Reaggregation 
Drawing (figure 16), for example, we can trace the frantic movement, or 
journey, of the hand, yet with(in) such a journey ‘microscopic palaces’ 
begin to form. Both the journey and the formation o f such ‘palaces o f 
cellular life ’ collide, yet any ‘life ’ they contain cannot be attributed to 
Michaux as they seem to buzz like a cinematic image of strange molecular 
life. The ‘stream’ on the left hand side, although creating a kind o f clearing 
through which both the artist and viewer can ‘manoeuvre’ , is rapidly 
‘filling up’. The lines are not static and any journey upon/within this 
drawing can be hazardous, as any viewer could be easily overtaken in this 
way, by the contingent. Michaux’s mescaline drawings ‘register a state of 
flux where there is virtually no intervening vacuum between images and 
marks, but rather a plenum of uninterrupted pulsations and oscillations.
Although Michaux stopped taking drugs in the late 1950’s he continued the 
theme of re-membering the effects of mescaline in his drawings almost to 
the day he died. Such images, seemingly as intense as his first, demonstrate 
how his perception o f himself and the world - the distance between the two 
had been irrevocably dissolved and displaced through his initial taking 
mescaline; the Unhappy Consciousness had been realised and never entirely 
shaken off. Again, this is not to grant Michaux some kind of transcendental 
‘realisation’, it is only to say how his experiences, and his [artistic]
articulations o f them, somehow demonstrate, both to him and to us, the
315 Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 193. Within the 
same texts Michaux’s lines which range from the’ travelling’, to the ‘penetrating’ and 
the’ allusive’ are seen as movement away from Klee’s strict trilogy o f ‘active’, 
‘ intermediate’ and ‘passive’ lines.
316 Sieburth, ‘Signs in Action: The Ideograms o f Ezra Pound and Henri Michaux. in 
Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 212.
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conflicting and transitory nature o f subjectivity in its many 
(non)manifestations. Michau; had experienced the nagual within the tonal 
but continued to have problems in articulating such intense experiences. As 
he himself realised ‘the image [could not] give matter to the concept, the 
concept, by giving stability to the image, would stifle its existence.
I have been relying on Michaux’s writings to the extent that I have, in an 
attempt to try in some way ‘explain’ his drawings. I am not relying them to 
re-present his experiences or indeed to present ‘Michaux’ as someone who 
knew exactly what and why he was producing the drawings. If I did I would 
be slipping back into the Hegelian mode of thinking, positing Michaux as a 
self-identical subject. What I am aiming to do is allow both the writing and 
the drawings to emerge in some symbiotic but protean relationship where 
the work of Michaux merges by folding ‘his writing into his drawing and his 
drawing into his writing, pushing the boundaries of each form ... into 
affect. Michaux himself ‘ ...dream[t] o f a language of pure lines that would 
communicate intimately or “murmour” without forming any ideas too 
definitely ...\319 Michaux spent many years trying to create such a ‘language’ 
mainly through the study o f calligraphy. This is evident in the Mouvement 
drawing project he executed just before he began his mescaline series. 
Untitled (Movements [Mouvements]) (Figure 19) demonstrates his use of 
pictograms, a process where he attempts to blur text and image, but cancel 
out any signifying function. ‘The sign, then, is given over to fiction, 
obeying the strange law without law which dictates how it should contrive 
itself, like the language it embodies, and thus represent itself as the image of 
its own enigma.’320 However utopian this idea was, what he manages to do in 
practice is coalesce, albeit in an equivocal fashion, the one-dimensionality of 
writing - the way in which the written word somehow grips onto, but never 
penetrates the page, or give the illusion o f space - with the gesturality of
317 Michaux, quoted in Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination and Reverie, page 21.
318 http://www.frenchculture.0rg/art/events/michaux-drawing.html#exhibiti0n.
319 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page xiii.
320 Bellour, Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 199.
drawing. These gestures once placed on the page begin to manifest 
themselves outside the body, as they ‘ ...involve gestures, interiors, for which 
we have no limbs at out disposal but only the desire of limbs, tensions, elans, 
all made up o f living cords, never thick, never swollen with flesh or encased 
with skin.’ 321 The pictograms scamper across the page, their vivacity avoids 
anchorage, both visually and semiotically. 'The sign scurries over the space 
o f [the tension between language and non-language] like a panic-stricken 
insect.’322 Michaux writes about the way in which the speed of making these 
pictograms confounded and resisted his own inertia, his slowness to (re)act 
or formulate on this way:
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The greater part o f my life, stretched out on my bed for 
interminable hours o f which I never tired, 1 imparted motion to 
one or two or three forms, but always one more quickly, more to 
the fore, more diabolically quickly than the other ... I instilled in it 
a quite extraordinary mobility o f which I was the counterpart and 
the motor, albeit unmoving and slothful. Electrified i t .... All I have 
done here is repeat, sort of, on paper, in Indian ink, some of the 
innumerable minutes o f my useless life ....323
It is the restlessness of the insomniac, the inertia and the inability to escape 
the speeds of contingency that 1 will now concentrate on in relation to 
Michaux’s later mescaline drawings.
321 Michaux, quoted in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 210.
322 Bellour, ‘The Utopia o f the Sign’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 201.
323 Michaux ‘ [From Postface, Mouvements]’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page
61.
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3.4 Lines, ba lls  and s leep less n igh ts.
The self experiences itself as a corpse to be reanimated, or as a 
cloud or as a gaseous planet. It extorts to find a form .2
Michaux writes of the speeding up and disintegration of the self , when on 
mescaline:
rapid, infernal combing-uncombing o f ... being - martyrised, 
penetrated, drawn out like wires, indefinitely.’23
The horror o f it was that I became a line. In a normal life one is a 
sphere, a sphere that surveys panoramas ... Now only a line ... the 
accelerated line that I had become.3 6
The images evoked by these quotations can be compared with the image of 
the Hegelian dialectic; as, when Michaux states that ‘in a normal life one is a 
sphere, a sphere that surveys panoramas’ , he imagines himself as a self- 
contained subject(ivity) that is separate from all that he perceived, one that 
relates to, but is not contaminated by the world within which he exists, and 
re-presents himself to himself as a self-identical subject accordingly. 
Michaux imagines that by taking drugs he could ‘become a line rather than 
a sphere.327 As far as he is concerned, the line belonged to nothing, was 
‘without filitation, infinitely unwinding the skein o f the ball. This line 
“transforms” the inertia o f the ball into a tenuous activity.’328 Giving birth to 
what Michaux called ‘the thin man’ .
Little and lacunary
in a hurry and knowing that quickly he has to know 
in his cockpit in his little galaxy 
on guard ... 
a pilot
pilot as long as he can 
pilot or nothing 32l>
324 Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 187.
325 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page xvi.
326 Michaux, Miserable Miracle, page 87.
327 Or a ball as he sometimes refers to it.
328 Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 192.
329 Michaux, Darkness Moves, pages 233 - 234.
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The line, ‘the accelerated line that I had become,’ is that which (un)folds at 
incredible speeds, unravelling the dialectic so there is no inside or outside, 
no subject or object division. It incorporates everything within its path. The 
struggle until death (o f the other, the material world), as the desire to negate 
the negative, becomes a double bind. Although death in its brutal, negative 
and differentiated sense is temporarily ‘conquered’ and deferred in ‘normal’ 
spherical life, it also inhabits the subject as an unwelcome but necessary 
‘guest’, biding its time until we let go of the tonal just enough so that it can 
propel us into the nagual.330 Subjectivity then, in its quest to escape from its 
own limits (i.e., through the ‘freedom’ o f taking drugs) becomes 
contaminated by that which it fears the most - difference.331 With the desire 
to cross the line between subject and object comes ‘exile’ and homelessness332 
constantly oscillating between its own desire for ‘pure’ consciousness and 
the brute materiality o f its existence-in-the-world (as contingency). 
Existence, as the constant movement o f the (attempted) overcoming o f its 
own materiality and otherness o f the outside world, is fraught with a paradox 
which manifests itself as anxiety, as subjectivity desires both blinding 
daylight (as freedom/absolute knowledge/truth) and the emptiness o f night 
(as the release from materiality/dissolution o f the outside, where subjectivity 
empties itself into the bliss o f nothingness). All or Nothing. As Blanchot 
would have it, consciousness exists in a space which accomplishes neither as 
it (blindly) negotiates its way through the plenitude o f the void - as the zone 
in-between:
330 According to Deleuze and Guattari [page 227-8] in A Thousand Plateaus ‘ [through] the 
existence o f a molecular perception to which drugs give us access .... we attain a visual 
and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar 
structure ... the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what 
used to be compact; and conversely, where before there were just before we saw end 
points o f clear cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, 
overlappings, migrations, acts o f segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid 
segmentarity [of the nagual].
331 Blanchot argues that ‘The values, morals, fatherlands, religions and private certitudes 
our vanity and self-complacency generously grant us are so many abodes the world 
furnishes for those who think on that account that they stand and rest amid stable 
things; they know nothing o f the enormous route they are heading for ... in flight from 
flight.’ quoted in A Thousand Plateaus, page 227.
332 The homelessness 1 am referring to here is not only Michaux’s as he crosses the line 
through taking drugs, but my own as I manoeuvre my way through such alien theories.
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If night suddenly is cast in doubt, then there is no longer either 
day or night, there is only vague, twilight glow, which is 
sometimes memory of day, sometimes a longing for night, end of 
the sun and sun o f the end. Existence is interminable, it is nothing 
but an indeterminacy: we do not know if we are excluded from it 
(which is why we search vainly in it for something solid to hold 
onto) or whether we are forever imprisoned in it (and so we turn 
desperately outside). This existence is an exile in the fullest sense: 
we are not there, we are elsewhere, and we will never stop being 
there.333
Simon Critchley, in Very Little ... Almost Nothing goes further by outlining 
Blanchot’s notion of the two slopes o f literature, a notion which can be also 
applied to our understanding of Michaux and his (visual and verbal) 
articulations o f drug taking. The first ‘slope’, in keeping with the Hegelian 
theory mentioned above, is where the artist (as the first viewing 
subject(ivity)) produces his artwork ‘through a work o f negation which is 
equated with death; it is “ ‘The life that endures death and maintains itself in 
death.’” 334 Death, therefore, enables the subject(ivity) of the artist and other 
viewing subject(ivitie)s to acquire freedom. An example o f ‘life ’ enduring 
through ‘death’ is provided by Rothko's work (figure 11) which proffers the 
promise o f a safe crossing by overcoming the negation o f Rothko’s own 
suicide, as the moment o f his no-longer-being-in-the-world.
The second ‘slope’ is not so safe. It is where terror comes into play. It is the 
moment of the ‘creative’ process where there is a partial realisation that 
freedom is not possible. The impossibility of the possible. It is not necessarily 
the terror felt when coming face-to-face with death as the end o f existing- 
in-the-world or the dissolution of the T . It is the terror of ‘being riveted to 
existence, the impossibility o f denth.’ 15 Consciousness without the safety of a 
unifying subjectivity becomes impossibly intimate with difference. Blanchot 
likens this to the restless experience of the night where:
all familiar objects disappear, something is there but nothing is
visible: the experience o f darkness is the presence of absence, the
333 Blanchot, Work o f  Fire, page 9.
334 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, page 66.
335 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, page 55.
peculiar density of the void, where the things of the day disappear 
into an uncanny ‘swarming o f points’ .... This is the night of 
insomnia, the passive watching in the night where intentionality 
undergoes reversal, where we no longer regard things, where 
they seem to regard us.336
The terror of the night produces shadowy figures, not quite formed. Looking 
at Untitled (Movements [Mouvements]) (figure 20) we can see how life 
‘forms’ begin to emerge, but not in any individuated sense, in Michaux’s 
drawings. Excessive, threatening, they are in a state of uncoordinated 
‘becoming’: ‘ ... from this opaque darkness [Michaux] foresees life being able 
to emerge. The black space contains images, just as the sheet of paper 
irresistibly attracts them.’337
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According to Blanchot’s theory o f the insomniac, even the daytime world is 
not one of freedom, but:
as fatality ...the day stupefied by lack of sleep, the day as 
something to which one is riveted, what Blanchot calls the 
madness of the day. The insomniac finds both day and night 
impossible .... Night also becomes the ‘diurnal activity ... where it 
turns over into the utter neutrality o f fatigue and sleepless 
exhaustion.338
Once insomnia has been diagnosed the innocent bliss o f sleep is no 
longer an option. Michaux himself describes one such instance:
Under the low ceiling of my little bedroom is my night, a deep 
abyss.
Constantly hurled down to a depth of a thousand feet, with a gulf 
several times that big below me, I  hang on by the rough spots with 
the greatest of difficulty, dead tired, mechanically, helplessly 
wavering between disgust and perseverance, the ant-climb 
continues with interminable slowness. The rough spots grow tinier 
and tinier, I can hardly make them out on the perpendicular wall.^ 
Abyss, night, terror, all fuse together, increasingly indissoluble.339
It is this second ‘slope’, the tracing o f the zone o f the insomniac, that now
concerns me with reference to Michaux’s mescaline drawings. For the
336 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, page 57.
337 Rodari, ‘L’Homme de Plume’, in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 179.
338 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, page 63.
339 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page 23
remainder of this chapter then, the first slope can be put in parenthesis. 
This second ‘slope’ ‘presents’ us with an artist for whom transcendence is 
always thwarted through the repetitive act of searching for it within the 
creative process. Even when he attempts to articulate his experiences of the 
‘other’ onto canvas/paper, he cannot negate such experiences or the 
materiality o f his tools and make them ‘his’ (as positive events with which to 
facilitate his freedom). Michaux uses force-full resistance o f his tools and 
materials to his own advantage.
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The ambivalence o f the gesture ... moves into the stroke. The stroke 
implies this ambivalence intrinsically. But it is also liable to spread 
beyond the stroke, to distribute itself among the different elements 
... I am thinking specifically o f all the processes [Michaux uses] 
diat use the conflict of different materials as a constructive 
force.340
Michaux (willingly) becomes an insomniac. Within and without him swarms 
the plenitude of the nagual void as a neutral and resistant ‘space’. The idea of 
work becomes worklessness, heavy as the restlessness o f a sleepless night. 
The quest for absolute freedom through creating art is always interrupted by 
the vacillating materiality of ‘his’ subjectivity and the objects he uses and 
which like him occupy the zone o f indeterminancy. This becomes even more 
evident, it seems, when drugs are involved, as the use of mescaline 
intensifies such an experience, further de-stabilising ‘ “ the slow beings” 
that we and he are.’341 Protection: What is needed when confronting this zone 
of indeterminancy is to somehow slow down the vertiginous acceleration of 
its immanent approach, retreat (albeit partially) into the sphere, and try and 
follow the lines of its dispersal by:
... managing] to fold the line and establish an endurable zone in 
which to install ourselves and confront things, take hold, breathe 
- in short, think. Bending the line so that we manage to live upon 
it, with it: a matter of life and death. The line itself is constantiy 
unfolding at crazy speeds as we’re trying to fold it to produce 
[again] “the slow beings that we are,” to get (as Michaux says) to 
the “eye of the hurricane” ,...342
540 Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 194.
341 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy1 page 36.
342 Deleuze, Negotiations, page 111.
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We could protect ourselves, as already indicated, by approaching Michaux’s 
work through the tried and trusted concepts o f modernist theory, in order to, 
as it were, maintain a distance, stand back and survey. Such a method would 
only gloss over the inadequacies and inconsistencies inherent in the 
narratives constructed around Michaux’s experiences of mescaline. As 
Deleuze and Guattari argue:
Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not 
aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their 
edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but 
rather the outcome of throws o f the dice.343
The sheer proximity o f his drawings and the invasive ‘quality’ o f his visual 
prose make theoretical capture difficult. Instead we need to somehow trace 
the various connections between concepts in their analysis, while 
acknowledging their various speeds, irregularity, insufficiencies and the 
dizzying possibility o f infinite combinations. The problems of articulation, of 
the interruption o f the tonal by the nagual, are inherent not only within the 
production, but also the interpretation o f Michaux’s work. So, in connection 
with this notion o f the zone of intermediacy as the space o f the insomniac, I 
also wish to explore Deleuze and Guattari’s plane o f immanence which, as the 
plane o f thought image(s), is where:
Concepts are multiple waves, rising and falling but the plane of 
immanence is a single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them. 
The plane envelops infinite movements that pass back and forth 
through it, but concepts are the infinite speeds of finite 
movements that, in each case, pass only through their own 
components. From Epicurus to Spinoza ... and from Spiniza to 
Michaux the problem o f thought is infinite speed. But this speed 
requires a milieu that moves infinitely in itself - the plane, the 
void, the horizon .... Concepts are absolute surfaces or volumes, 
formless and fragmentary, whereas the plane is the formless, 
unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always 
fractal.344
343 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 35.
344 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 36.
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The ‘speed’ o f concepts and their fractal connections, collide and spin off 
within and upon the plane o f immanence. It constantly leads thought to 
error, leaving its images (both visual and discursive) partial and unstable. 
The slick movement o f the Hegelian Spirit negating the negative in order to 
reflect consciousness back to itself is constantly thwarted, de- and re- 
territorialised in an incessant and neutral, non-progressive movement of 
doing and undoing: death constantly undermining life but never leaving it 
abrogated = t/error. Michaux’s images were constructed and are confronted 
within such a speed.
... there are many things ... that threaten thinking: stupidity, 
forgetfulness, aphasia, delirium, madness; ...[which] in principle 
have only one single effect immanent in thought - error, always 
error.... [which] is the infinite movement that gathers together 
the whole o f the negative .... th[is] movement given a negative 
sign is itself folded within other movements with positive or 
ambiguous signs.345
Error then, rather than the affirmative reflection intrinsic to the dialectic of 
transcendence, is the infinite, non-dialectical, asymmetrical and vacillating 
‘movement’ which corrugates negativity by folding itself into other 
ambiguous movements within/upon the plane o f immanence; and, as far as 
I’m concerned, it is the only way to think through, analyse, Michaux’s 
drawings. The negative, in all its manifestations, is neither static nor 
redeemable because it is ever metamorphosing into other values, the infinite 
realm of neutrality. According to Deleuze and Guattari, subjectivity does not 
have its boundaries set out within a Hegelian dialectic, where the negative is, 
gradually and systematically, overcome; it has an even greater ‘enemy’ 
beyond (yet folded within) as the threat o f the unstable, ambiguous sign, the 
constant threat o f error which is always ready to interrupt and disrupt the 
‘certainty’ o f the tonal. This can also be applied to the error of discourse as 
that which somehow circulates around but never penetrates the object of its 
enquiry. What I will argue instead is that the subject(ivity) and its corporeal
‘existence’, like the artwork and the concepts applied to it, constantly aim
345 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 52-3.
and miss each other, but in turn also inform each other through 
incongruous and often arbitrary connections. The non-movement o f error as 
the impotent, inert, beginning which can never gather the momentum of 
the dialectic will not afford subjectivity or indeed discourse, freedom from 
the material, or indeed free it into oblivion. It keeps subjectivity forever 
suspended and folded, weaves it into conflicting thought images, eternally 
transfigures it, layers it with different and converse aspects of 
consciousness, as well as incessantly alters its relationship with itself. As 
Deleuze adds:
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The plane o f immanence has two facets as Thought and Nature, as 
Nous and Physis. That is why there are always many infinite 
movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so 
that the return o f one instantaneously relaunches the other in 
such a way that the plane o f immanence is ceaselessly being 
woven, like a gigantic shuttle ... Every movement passes through 
the whole of the plane by immediately turning back on and 
folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing 
itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections 
and proliferations in the fractilization of the infinitely folded up 
infinity ....346
This plane o f immanence constitutes:
A veritable anampophosos this “planeology” is or appears to be: the 
“interval” [that] seems to extenuate into “zones” o f indiscernability; the 
“underviable double” into a “multiplicity without the unity o f an ancestor ... 
In zones o f indeterminacy, in movements o f becoming, a-subjective, 
impersonal intensities, compounds o f sensations couple, transform, vibrate, 
migrate, intersect, split apart, diverge, pass from one 
being/body/surface/flesh to another - without memory.347
This passing from ‘one being/body/surface/flesh to another - without 
memory’ - is crucial for my approach to Michaux’s drawings. Our 
experiences, images, the resonances of our sensations, as memories and 
actions live on within and upon the plane of immanence without, as stated 
earlier, an unified T  or a stable subjectivity. As Deleuze argues:
If art preserves it does not do so like industry, by adding a
346 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 39.
347 Baross, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, by way o f Blanchot’, in Angelaki, volume 2, number 2; 
August 2000, pp 33-34.
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substance to make things last. The thing became independent of 
its “model” from the start, but it is also independent of other 
possible personae who are themselves artist-things, personae of 
painting breathing this air o f painting. And it is no less 
independent o f the viewer ... who only experience(s) it after, if 
they have the strength for it. What about the creator? If it 
independent o f the creator through the self-positing of the 
created, which is preserved in itself. What is preserved - the thing 
or the work o f art - is a bloc o f sensations, that is to say, a 
compound of percepts and affects.34s
When trying to think through and interpret these images one places oneself 
on plane of conceptual immanence, watching it fold, spin off; the subject 
emerges, then is folded back into or over itself, only to re-emerge at a 
different and accidental point. Memory folds into matter, matter into 
memory, both merge and mutate, on and in the incessant wave o f the plane. 
Meanwhile, the tonal enables us to (albeit) partially reterritorialise within a 
social system of images and relations. The idea of the autonomous, individual 
subjectivity is thereby questioned, as is its distanced relationship with the 
material and/or the discursive world. There are no boundaries. The subject 
gets folded into object, object into subject, consciousness ebbs and flows 
within a non-progressive moment that is never static, never stable. Just 
incongruously vibrating. Consciousness, like every other entity in the world, 
is always fighting to maintain itself; parts o f it are constantly dying whilst 
others emerge and re-emerge. It struggles to know itself as it blurs into the 
realm o f others (which paradoxically are also part o f the ‘se lf when such a 
self is opened up on/into the plane). As Michaux himself claims: ‘we are not 
made for just one self. We are wrong to cling to it. The prejudice for unity .... 
There is not one self. There are not ten selves. There is no self. ME is nothing 
but a position „..’349 At anyone time then Michaux is ‘nothing but a position’ 
precariously born and easily destabilised; as having more than one self 
means to suffer the constant flow o f dis- and re-integration within/upon the 
plane.
348 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? pp 163-4.
349 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page x. My italics.
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3. 5 M ichaux b ecom in g -an im a l
Deleuze's idea of Thought and Nature 350 as the constituting facets o f the plane 
o f immanence can also be used to question the fundamental notion of 
‘verticality’ and ‘horizontality’ in relation to (self) perception and 
beholding others. Rosalind Krauss in Formless: A User’s Guide argues that:
...perceptual logic, “seeing” birurcates into two distinct functions: 
with the vision of animals focused on the horizontal ground on 
which they and their prey both travel, a vision that is therefore, 
in certain ways, merely an extension o f their sense of touch; but 
with the sightedness o f mankind recharacterized as “beholding” . 
Qualified by its acknowledgement o f the distance that separates the 
“beholder” from its object, the gap built into the human 
perceptual relation is what provides a space for all those varieties 
o f vision which separate man from the animals: contemplation, 
wonder, scientific inquiry, disinterestedness, aesthetic pleasure.
And in turn, the distance built into the very mechanism of 
beholding is a function o f the upright posture with its dissociation 
o f vision from the horizontality o f the ground.351
What I also want to argue is that, in questioning this ‘fundamental’ binary 
between human and animal, subject and object, sight and sense, we can 
begin to unravel and partially trace Michaux’s experience of/on drugs in 
relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘becoming’ (as becoming ‘other’ 
than an unified consciousness). When two upright beings behold each other 
their gazes are separate and distanced from each other; the dialectic can 
thereby work through the concepts o f space and time; yet animals, because 
their head are closer to the ground, have to rely on all the developed senses 
they possess. This also means that they can operate in the dark, instinctively 
sensing their way around uncertain and dangerous territory; they make 
quick connections at any time, speeding up, slowing down accordingly. Yet 
this lack o f self-formulating cognition and visual ‘distance’ from the world 
means that they can be accused o f ‘worklessness’, in the Hegelian sense - as, 
i f  we recall, all human action works in an attempt to negate the world, which
350 As discussed in the last section in relation to the plane o f immanence, and outlined in 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 39.
351 Krauss, 'Horizontality’ in Formless: A User’s Guide, edited by Yve-Alain Bois and 
Rosalind Krauss, page 90.
in turn distances any threat to its unified subjectivity: 'On Kojeve’s 
submission, within the general framework o f the teleological of Hegelian 
spirit through history, what Hegel’s account of the ‘spiritual animal 
kingdom’ sought to address was the moment of the inactive and uncreative
>352
To close o ff the distance between the subjective and objective ‘worlds’ is to 
allow the unworking o f subjectivity and ‘give it over to the infinite 
movement o f its own defamiliarisation, de-realisation, deconstitution, as the 
ground o f presence, as the dwelling of presence.’353
This idea of becoming(-animal), as consciousness unravelling itself, can be 
mobilised through Bergson’s ideas about duration and extensity. According to 
Bergson, when we think o f existence we have to think about subjectivity as 
being constituted by two radically different dimensions. The first is that of 
depth or duration (verticality) where ‘consciousness’ as presence is 
constituted: ‘Duration is the contraction o f all successive past events into 
point in the present...’ . The second dimension, extensity (horizontality), 
however, ‘ ... is the relaxation o f this point into the spatial coexistence o f 
these events.’354 According to Bergson consciousness is constituted through 
the contradictory ‘movements’ o f duration and extensity, o f the verticality of 
the distanced and steady gaze; and it is constituted through the (feared) 
horizontality o f its relaxation where ‘verticality’ collapses into a threatening 
sequence o f (yet unknown) events. This contradictory movement multiplies 
into differentiated folds which then become intensities, multiple ‘events’ of 
the ‘present’, as there is always at/in any one moment an unequal 
interaction between (and within) extensity in(as) duration and duration
in(as) matter. This means that duration is ‘differentiated within itself
352 Hill, Blanchot;extreme contemporary, page 104. The ‘inactive’ and the ‘uncreative’ can 
again be tied in with the nagual in that the nagual, according to Castaneda not only 
belongs to the animal kingdom, but is the realm o f inactivity and inarticulation. See 
Castaneda Tales o f Power, especially page 121.
353 Baross, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, by way o f Blanchot’ in Angelaki ,volume 5 number 2 
August 2000, page 27.
354 Lawlor, ‘A Nearly Total Affinity: the deleuzian virtual image versus the derridian 
trace’ in Angelaki, volume 2 number 2; august 2000, page 62.
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through an internal explosive force.’355 This ‘force’ as brute existence, is 
where the multiplicity o f extensity and duration incessantly collide, folding 
together and then pulling apart (but not totally). This collision then 
manifests (virtually) as ‘subjectification’. So when ‘ ... we perceive, we 
contract millions o f vibrations or elementary shocks into a felt quality’ .356 
Such ‘felt qualities’, although multiplicitous and disparate in nature, are 
‘endured’ as the uneven sense of subjectivity. We go on to construct complex 
philosophical frameworks through which to situate this ‘subjectivity’ . We 
theoretically separate our knowledge o f the world from our bodily sensations 
of it in an attempt to extract the subjective from the objective, the triumph of 
the tonal. The positive over the negative. Such structures ‘fix ’ the image we 
have o f ourselves in a process o f self-reflection which believes itself to be 
static and total, moving through a stable teleo-temporality within which 
consciousness slowly but surely becomes known to itself through a series o f 
dialectically (and safely) separated ‘events’. It is my contention, however, 
that the image o f self can never be assiduously stable, rather it is ever- 
changing, evolving along the irregular and intense pulses which punctuate 
duration. This duration is itself constituted o f multiple ‘durations’357 and 
constitutes the non-movement o f consciousness, which remains held by the 
moment and thereby folds at different speeds and intensities. The desire of 
the insomniac is that o f a movement towards an external horizon. But it is 
always caught in the zone o f intermediacy which can never move the subject 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’. This zone offers an infinite number o f ‘ ... potential 
movements ... [that] are in some way made present without being 
actualised’.358 Deleuze also argues that this leads to ‘A milieu o f events ...[that] 
is without interval: “even the void is sensation” .’359 This is not the linear
355 Deleuze, Bergsonism ,page 94.
356 Deleuze, Bergsonism, page 87.
357 Deleuze on page 79 o f Bergsonism argues that although time is multiple ‘ ... by virtue 
o f the relativity o f rest and movement, by virtue o f the relativity even o f accelerated 
movement, these contractions o f extensity, these dilations o f time, these ruptures o f 
simultaneity become absolutely reciprocal. In this sense there would be a multiplicity 
o f times, a plurality o f  times, with different speeds o f flow, all real, each one peculiar to 
a system o f reference.’ This indicates that the multiplicity o f duration indicates a 
difference in degree/quality rather than in kind.
356 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy as Affect’, page 233.
3S9 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 165.
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movement of the teleologically driven subjectivity where the horizon of 
events can measured, or where choice comes into play. The non-movement, 
or interaction, between duration and extension can be as fast and intense as 
it is slow and lethargic; events multiply and thwart the moment/movement of 
negation, of self realisation or identification.
So, again, what has this to do with Michaux’s drawings? Well, drug taking: 
‘ ....Even in its supple form ... can mobilise gradients and thresholds of 
perception towards becomings-animal, becomings-molecular ....’36° In fact he 
wanted to ‘appropriate a kind o f personal bestiary’ as a ‘painter-predator.’361 
This ‘becoming-other than’ precipitates a crumbling o f (the illusion of) 
verticality, as the distinct separation between ‘pure’ consciousness and 
‘brute’ materiality, as the erect human dissolves and folds into becoming- 
animal. Michaux himself ‘recognise[d] clearly enough that the ‘holes’ that 
make up his very being, the ‘absent column’ on which he has ‘built [him] 
self,’ are filled with ‘a wind, an emptiness’ o f ‘hate’. He says: ‘this is my 
health’ ( ‘I was Born Full o f Holes.’ ...)’ .362 These ‘holes’ undermine the 
duration o f his subjectivity and allow the multiplicitity and intensity of 
extension to unfold in(on) to his sense o f the world and o f himself making 
him weak and lethargic. Michaux’s idea o f ‘being full o f holes’ also relates to 
Brian Massumi’s notion o f intensity as affect which ‘breaks narrative 
continuity for a moment to register a state - actually re-register an already 
felt state (for the skin is faster than the word) .... expression can resonate 
with and amplify intensity at the price of making itself functionally 
redundant.’363 The affect o f an image or word is faster than its functionality, 
and drugs precipitate this ‘speed’ in their ability to confuse and dissolve 
consciousness’s belief in a unified self or, indeed, image of self. Drug- 
induced images resonate on a different register and constitute ‘a 
disconnection o f signifying order from intensity ... It is narratively de­
localized, spreading over the general body surface, like a lateral backwash
360 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, page 284.
361 Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 193.
362 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page xvii.
363 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy as Affect’, page 219.
200
from the function-meaning interloops travelling the vertical path between 
head and heart.’364
Michaux’s work can thereby be approached as the work(lessness) o f the 
insomniac; as ‘being’ confronted by (and within) the neutre; the swarm of 
the night. These images trace the multiple sensations o f the void. In 
becoming-animal Michaux’s desire for a distanced gaze becomes an organ o f 
touch, which resonates with intensity as he positions himself within the de- 
signifying zone of intermediacy. His drawings understood as ‘blocs of 
sensations’ , are without memory and so do not constitute ‘vehicles o f capture’ 
even on the plane o f immanence. This plane is where concepts can be 
utilised but quickly dissolve into infinite connectivity. Through these blocs 
o f sensations:
The subject is traced - in a state of destitution, deconstruction, 
deconstruction .... the hollowing out of time and space, the 
vertiginous depths ... are made to withdraw to the surface of the 
plane. Hugging closely to the surface o f the plane ... [Michaux’s 
drawing] becomes an art of surfaces.363
The surfaces o f Michaux’s drawings become blocks o f sensation. They occupy 
the same zone of intermediacy as Michaux does, as the distance of verticality 
dissolves into the intensity o f sensual proximity. Thus to declare Michaux’s 
drawings as ‘expressive’ in the modernist sense - as indicating an ideal line 
through which to follow him back to his being-in-the-world - is to render 
them mere vehicles. Instead I will declare them constituent o f intensities 
and/or extension upon the uneven plane of immanence which trace 
Michaux’s experiences within/upon the zone o f intermediacy. Each o f his 
drawings is as much ‘Michaux’ as the man himself. Multiple ‘events’ without 
a singular uniform memory. Unstable in their conceptual significance, they 
infinitely fold and unfold, becoming impossible to the grasp o f the tonal, 
‘disconnecting from any signifying order’ . This is the almost impossible way
that I am hoping to sustain a discussion o f Michaux’s drawings. This has
364 Massurai, ‘The Autonomy as Affect’, page 219.
365 Baross, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, by way o f Blanchot’, in Angelaki volume 5 number 2 
august 2000, page 33.
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meant that I have had to be irresponsible in my abuse of ‘standard’ 
interpretations of his art, but not in a nihilistic way. I have not reduced 
Michaux’s images to nothing. I have not rendered them worthless. Rather, I 
have tried to demonstrate how Michaux has attempted to re-present a glimpse 
of the void beyond the dialectic, as a ‘space’ which is full, swarming with 
infinite and intense points for/of becoming as well as infinite points for 
dissolving. Whether he did this purposely is open for debate, but what is 
evident is the (impossible) desire to go back and re-trace, both within his 
mescaline and his post-mescaline drawings, an already sequestered line of 
flight. Images, like those executed by Michaux constitute:
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... an infinite, unending movement without progress or advance 
... [setting] into motion the subject’s dissolution, destitution, 
deconstruction: “from the moment we are outside ourselves ... in 
that ecstasy which is the image ... the ‘real’ enters an equivocal 
realm where there is no longer any limit or interval, where there 
are no more successive moments and where each thing, absorbed 
into the void o f its reflection, nears consciousness, while 
consciousness allows itself to become filled with an anonymous 
plenitude.”356
Michaux himself tries to articulate this ‘anonymous plenitude’, this insomnia 
in words, when in Infinite Turbulence (a book written about his experiences 
on mescaline) he is confronted by:
Innumerable scales. Infinite segmentation ... [which come] rolling 
down on upon me, towards me, loops, and infinite number o f loops 
and twirls, and cables, plaits and braids, coiling and intertwining 
in twirls, twirls everywhere, intricately laced, lacework upon 
lacework, ceaselessly intertwined with yet more lacework, twisting 
and coiling, an infinity o f ornaments for the sake of 
ornamentation.367
I am arguing that each word written or each stroke articulated by Michaux 
create fragments o f experience (without memory). As marks of a 
discontinuous and uneven plane, partially constituting traces of an
energetic, ambiguous force o f infinite extension and intensity. This is not
366 Baross, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, by way o f Blanchot’ in Angelaki, volume 5, number 2, 
August 2000, page 27.
367 Plant, Writing on Drugs ,page 193.
strictly a case o f synecdoche, where the part indicates the whole, but where 
the unstable fragment, which partially escapes conceptual or dialectical 
capture, implicates other fragments which, almost imperceptibly, speed o ff 
into/onto the plane of immanence and in some way resemble (but not reflect 
or imitate) our (alienated) sense of self. It is metonomy. What is drawn by/of 
Michaux, then, according to this Deleuzian reading of Michaux’s work is 'the 
body,... in so far as it is experienced as sustaining ... sensation.’ 368 All that’s 
preserved, as stated previously is ‘ ... the thing or the work of art - [as] a bloc 
of sensations, that is to say a compound of percepts and affects ... [which are] 
beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceed any lived.’369 In this 
respect Michaux’s drawings exceed ‘Michaux’.
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368 Deleuze, The Logic o f  Sensation, page 23.
369 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? page 164.
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3.6 A possib le tra jec to ry : Tim e and space (d ) out
One issue that I have not directly dealt with, and unfortunately cannot 
do justice to within the limits o f this chapter, is the way in which 
Michaux’s drug-taking radically altered his sense o f time (and indeed 
space). This also can be related to Bergson’s notion of extensity 
(horizontality) and subsequently to Deleuze and Guattari’s nagual or 
‘becoming-animal’. Dialectical time (as past, present and future), and 
the space within which it is measured ‘belongs’ to the tonal, the 
vertical; where the plenitude o f the void belongs to the nagual - as the 
uncomfortable and horizontal ‘world’ o f the insomniac. Time and space 
collapse and expand into each other within a ceaseless folding, causing 
multiple lines o f (possible) flight which may take no time, or infinity, to 
undertake. The thoughts and visions of the insomniac are confused, 
phantasmic and can go into/onto a multitude of possible trajectories.370 
The night confounds the measured teleological time o f the day. Night is:
The time of the absence o f time is not dialectical. In that time, 
what appears is that nothing appears, that being that grounds the 
absence o f being, which is when nothing is nothing, and which 
us no longer as soon as there is something: as if there were beings 
only by virtue o f the ruination o f being, when being is lacking. 
The reversal which, in time’s absence, constantly refers us back 
to the presence o f absence, to this presence of absence, to absence 
as the affirmation o f absence, an affirmation where nothing is 
confirmed, in which nothing does not cease to be affirmed, with 
the monotonous insistence o f the indefinite, this is not a 
dialectical movement. Contradictions do not cancel each other out, 
nor do they become reconciled; only in time, for which negation 
is power, is the ‘unity o f contraries’ possible. It is time’s absence 
what is new renews nothing; what is present is no longer o f the 
moment; what is present presents nothing, represents itself, and 
belongs henceforth and for all time to the movement of return.371
According to this theory, time ‘renews nothing ... it is ... the moment of 
return’ . This indicates the layering up o f events and experiences, constantly
returning, being re-membered and re-articulated within the non-dialectical
370 Here I’m thinking o f the partial-dreams which invade your thoughts as you begin to 
fall asleep or wake up, or when you wake during the night and minutes seem like hours.
371 Blanchot, The Space o f Literature, page 30.
‘moment’ of the present, which is both ‘present’ but ‘no longer o f the 
moment’. It is a contradictory state o f temporal affairs that thwarts the 
narrative structure o f Michaux’s recollections and, indeed, our 
reconstituting o f them. We have to incessantly trace and re-trace the lines in 
order to ‘re/de-scribe’ that which cannot be wholly signified. Time is 
protean, vibratory, contradictory, and constantly returns/folds back onto 
itself, haunting consciousness with the disarticulated memory o f the zone, 
re-calling the ‘se lf back (forward) into its own dissolution/desolation. In 
this sense, Michaux is: “ ‘hardly a painter, hardly even a writer, but a 
conscience - the most sensitive substance yet discovered for registering the 
fluctuating anguish o f day-to-day, minute-to-minute living.’” 372 Massumi adds 
to this argument when he asserts that the zone o f intermediacy, of the 
insomniac, or as he calls it, the virtual has:
... a different temporal structure, in which past and future brush 
shoulders with no mediating present, and as having a different, 
recursive causality; the virtual as cresting in a liminal realm of 
emergence, where half-actualised actions and expressions arise 
like waves on a sea to which most no sooner return.373
Michaux himself said that he wanted to articulate all moments as 
experience by consciousness, not just those selected within a sequential 
and ideal time, one that excludes all others. Michaux wanted to ‘draw all 
the moments that little by little make up life, to let people see the 
phrase within, the phrase without words, a rope indefinitely unrolling, 
winding, accompanying in all its intimacy all that comes in from the 
outside and the inside too.’374 Michaux’s drawings attempt to articulate a 
series o f excessive and protean temporalities, as experienced when 
taking mescaline. But Michaux’s writings and drawings also 
demonstrate the asymmetry and multiplicity o f experienced time, and 
the way it often conflicts with the ‘official’ measured version. This 
discussion of temporal also ties in with the notion o f the insomniac and 
also that of the virtual, in that the visions o f the night are, as argued
372 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page ix.
373 Massumi, 'The Autonomy o f Affect,’ page 225.
374 Michaux, Darkness Moves, (ed. David Ball), page 320.
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above, multiple, and are experienced as inhabiting varied, and often 
contradictory, temporalities. Michaux himself argued: ‘ ... what appears 
when the evening has come and the film o f impressions created by day 
plays back to you (muted though, and shorter)’375 .
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To conclude this chapter I will return to the main argument: that perception 
and re-presentation are indivisible from matter, form and image, and not just 
re-presentations or articulations o f them. I will (briefly) develop this line o f 
thought with reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion o f ‘becoming’ . If 
Michaux’s perception o f space and time is affected by his ingestion of 
mescaline then so is his perception o f shape and size. No longer is the world 
measured through the (upright) observations of the (spherical and vertical) 
homo sapien. Instead, within the zone of intermediacy, the ‘self’ dissolves 
and perception becomes molecular: the lines, spores, vibrations and flows are 
concentrated into a non-space where perception multiplies at an intolerable 
rate and exceeds the grasp o f the tonal. The Mescaline drawings (figures 22 
and 23) resonate with the t/error o f the insomniac, where the swarm o f the 
night envelops the subject(ivity) and refuses to release it into the ecstasy of 
oblivion. The void within which Michaux falls is full o f intricate 
connections, ‘microperceptions [and] microoperations’: time returns, folds, 
slows down and accelerates within the same ‘moment’; relations become 
nonrelations, subject almost dissolves into object; the nagual intensifies and 
the universe contracts. Initially put forward by Michaux in his text The 
Major Ideals o f the Mind, and the Countless Minor Ones, 376 this theory was 
(later) developed by Deleuze and Guattari:
... if we confer upon perception the molecular power to grasp 
microperceptions, microoperations, and upon the perceived the 
force to emit accelerated or decelerated particles floating in time 
that is no longer our time, and to emit haecceities that are no 
longer o f this world: deterritorialization, [as Michaux said] “ I was 
disorientated ...” (a perception o f things, thoughts and desires in 
which desire thought, and the thing have invaded all of 
perception: the imperceptible finally perceived). Nothing is left 
but the zigzag o f a line ... shredding faces and landscapes. A whole 
rhizomatic labor o f perception, the moment when desire and 
perception meld.377
Accordingly Michaux asserts that mescaline gave him:
In the accompanying footnote Deleuze and Guattari state that in ‘The Major Ideals o f 
the Mind, and the Countless Minor Ones ... Michaux further develops the analysis of 
speeds, molecular perceptions and “microphenomena” or “microoperations’” .
377 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 283.
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The ability to separate out, to gauge, increases in the eye (which 
can see the most delicate reliefs, insignificant wrinkles) ....the 
imagination (where visual images flash by, with unheard-of 
intensity, far above ‘reality’ which weakens and diminishes) .... 378
The sensation o f the diminished subjectivity is here related to the (excessive) 
level of the molecular: the body is engulfed by the affective structures of 
brute materiality. ‘Normally’, when the subject(ivity) is spherical (and 
vertical) ‘Will and consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative, derived 
functions which reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed.’379 
Once these limits are lifted (in Michaux’s case through the taking of 
mescaline), the rich complexity o f the zone o f intermediacy becomes 
apparent and intense, almost too intense to be endured, the limit of 
endurance being the realm o f the insomniac. My aim has been for us, when 
looking at Michaux’s images, (impossibly perhaps) to ‘get comfortable with 
the productive paradox.’380 When while looking for meaning within the tonal, 
we should prepare ourselves to be folded (and unfolded) into and onto the 
immanent and nagual intensities, as traced by Michaux.
Sum m ary
In this chapter I have concentrated on the mescaline drawings o f the French 
artist and writer, Henri Michaux, whose drawings have not been discussed in 
any great detail outside France. In exploring the notion o f becoming through 
decomposition I have shown how Michaux explored, through both 
contemporary cultural discourse and by using drugs, the problems of 
existence, time and space in a way which was radically different to his 
modernist (American) counterparts. It is the idea, of decomposition and death 
within subjectivity and within the artwork itself, that has allowed me to 
address the work o f Michaux, an artist whose articulations are only ever 
almost there, constantly disintegrating and reforming before the viewer's
378 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page 106.
379 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy o f Affect’, page 223.
380 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy o f Affect’, page 221.
apprehensive gaze. This has allowed me to explore the concept o f temporality 
not as one which constitutes a teleological progression towards (and potential 
overcoming of) death, but as one which incorporates death within a 
multiplicity o f temporal and spatial coordinates. In exploring the theories of 
Blanchot, Deleuze and Guattari and Bergson (who describes the experience of 
time as varied and incoherent) I have demonstrated how teleological time, 
based on the idea o f the essential self, travelling towards death, decomposes 
within the work o f Michaux. This collapses the dialectic between life and 
death, consciousness and corporeality, and thereby questions the role of the 
transcendental signifier as the privileged figure o f mid-twentieth century 
artistic production and consumption. What has interested me the most is that 
Michaux operated at a time when the concept of death and disintegration took 
on a particularly interesting and multifaceted function, in order, it seems, to 
articulate several new approaches for understanding and interpreting life 
in relation to art. My ultimate aim in this chapter has been to look at 
important connections between French philosophy and the artistic 





Face to (de) face
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What is a face?
... the face is ... the original unity o f glance and speech, eyes and 
mouth, that speaks ... Thus it is also that which hears the invisible, 
for “ thought is language,” .... This unity o f the face precedes in its 
signification, the dispersion o f the senses and the organs o f 
sensibility. Its significance is therefore irreducible. Moreover, the 
face does not signify .... incarnate, envelop, or signal anything 
other than self, soul, subjectivity, etc. Thought is speech, and is 
therefore immediately face ... The other is not signaled by his face 
he is this face: “Absolutely present, in his face, the Other - without 
any metaphor - faces me .... The face is presence, ousia3S1
The figure of the face has woven itself into/onto the body o f this thesis as 
prosopopeia, as the light o f knowledge, and as the voice that speaks from a 
phantasmal space. The figure of prosopopeia, as it wraps itself around all 
possible thought, speech and sight becomes the primary signifier for a 
universal subjectivity which belongs to, and is acknowledged within, a 
community o f the same.
As argued in the first and second chapters o f this thesis, faciality is not 
necessarily represented by an actual physical face, that is physically seen 
and recognised, though it can and often does present itself as such. The face 
primarily represents itself as a complete or partial surface. Within this 
dissertation, the surface in question is that of the painting or drawing. The 
surface of the face either ‘ ... reflects light, or on the contrary, emphasises 
its shadows to the point of engulfing it[self].’382 Over the last two chapters I 
have argued that Rothko’s paintings attempt, through discursive strategies, 
to reflect back the light (o f knowledge) in order to illuminate the self­
identical subject(ivity). Michaux’s drawings, on the other hand, engulf the 
face; they attempt to de-face the art object as its ability to signify dissolves 
into the naugal. More o f this later.
381 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, pp 100- 01.
382 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 168.
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The face, as the figure o f prosopopeia, becomes manifest so that it can cover 
over the paradox of dis-embodied speech. This disembodied speech does not 
come from a corporeal body, live or dead, but through discourse. But 
subjectivity cannot acknowledge this fact, instead it raises spectres, names 
them, so that it can look at its own, ideal, reflection. The figure of 
prosopopeia also brings the other back to us re-membered; bringing him or 
her across our own proprietorial borders and resituating his or her 
‘presence’ within our own ‘present’ . Through the figure o f the face we can 
‘presentify ... make the absent present, as if that which returned were the 
same ,...’383 Faciality is, I have argued throughout this thesis, the spectral, 
superimposed, via discursive and visual structures, onto the objects (and 
subjects) we create384 and assemble around us. This face is, therefore, virtual; 
it is the (force-ful) animation o f (his) subject(ivity) through the spectrality 
of discourse.
The void is covered. But what is the void? Where is it situated? It is situated 
within discourse, as its own excess. It is also the (anti)foundation o f all 
discourses, that which is posited as bringing (forth) force to representation, 
but such force, I argue, manifests from/in an ontological fiction. The force 
o f being, as self-identical subjectivity, becomes a spectre that has been 
discursively superimposed onto its own non-being. Discourse interrupts 
death; the disintegrating corporeality o f the body; by constructing a semiotic 
space within which the subject(ivity) constructs its own stable and idealised 
image. However, as argued previously, death constantly undermines the very 
infrastructure of Being by introducing absolute and irreducible alterity.
absolute excess and dissymmetry [is] in the space o f what relates us 
to ourselves and constitutes the “being-in-us,” the “being-us,” in 
something completely other than a mere subjective interiority.385
Discourse disavows that which will always be excessive to its own structure
383 Derrida, ‘The Force o f Mourning’, page 1 82.
384 This includes the ‘natural’ world where the ‘real’ can only become manifest through 
its reappropriation by discursive and visual narratives.
385 Derrida, ‘The Force o f Mourning’, page 189.
and narratives. It does this by '... hollow[ing] out the living present that 
precedes ... death.’38€This is how excess is ‘removed’ so that meaning can be 
clearly illuminated and know as ‘true’ and ‘present’. This is the work of 
discursive strategies.
I have also argued that when we face the other,387 believing it to be an 
autonomous and identical being, we face another (and our own) spectrality. 
The dichotomy between inside and outside, subject and object, is thereby 
dislocated, albeit temporarily. The geometry o f gazes - between identical 
subject(ivitie)s - requires the lines to be drawn between their internal and 
the external world(s). However, this line is never stable, because a 
fundamental interiorisation has to take place so that subjectivity can 
consume its other. Distance thereby collapses and the two (subject and 
object) combine. Both the self and its other are - however, incongruously 
and irreducibly - different. Hence the impossibility o f both the subjectivity 
and its other being identified and incorporated by an idealised and mutually- 
reflective interaction. Discourse denies this impossibility by giving an 
idealised face, an identity, to both the subject(ivity) and to its other. But as 
the subject(ivty) in question is its own other, it already has within it an 
irreducible contingency. Death is always-present within the subjectivity’s 
constitution. Difference, as death therefore cannot be deferred into the 
future, permanently covered or interrupted. Although this deferral is 
promised through and by discourse, self reflectivity instead o f providing a 
self-identical image, becomes ‘the deadly mirror’388 within which subjectivity 
performs its own spectrality and believes that it is its own force-full being. 
However, such force is not based on any ‘real’ ontological foundation, but on 
a hauntological one. Within this hauntology comes all signification, conjured 
through and by discourse.
“Conjuration” signifies ... the magical incantation destined to 
evoke, to bring forth with the voice, to convoke a charm or a
386 Derrida, ‘The Force o f Mourning’, page 180.
387 The ‘other’ can be any subject or object. In relation to this argument, the ‘other’ is the 
artwork and/or the spectre o f the artist.
388 Derrida, ‘The Force o f Mourning’, page 190.
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spirit. Conjuration says in sum the appeal that causes to come forth 
with the voice and thus it makes come, by definition, what is not 
there at the present moment of the appeal. This voice does not 
describe, what it says certifies nothing; its words cause something 
to happen.389
This hauntology is a representative fiction, in that it represents that which 
cannot be re-presented. Hauntology confers power on the image through the 
conjuring o f significant force, but such force is semiotically generated and 
remains trapped within its own fictivity. Subjectivity faces the other, in both 
senses o f the term,390but the alterity it encounters de-faces that very process. 
This is where repetition comes into play in that, paradoxically, subjectivity 
can never realise its own (or the other’s) de-facement. So discourse sets to 
work and infinitely repeats the promise o f deferral, propelling any 
encounter with death, as absolute and irreducible alterity, into the ‘future’ . 
History becomes a series o f such repetitions, making spectres appear and re­
appear in an attempt to keep death, as the total dissolution of being, 
permanently deferred.
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He lived there, the house reconstructed itself around him, I saw 
him behind the window, waiting without hearing me, exhausting 
the overfullness o f our words through the wait.391
It can be argued that all (art) historians are undertakers in that they 
become:
... those who deal with cadavers but so as to seal them, to make the 
departed disappear, which remains the condition of their 
“apparition” .392
History is in a constant state o f mourning. It covers over the loss o f absolute 
and ontological force by creating a spectral, a hauntological one in its place. 
It repeatedly raising the dead through prosopopeiaic figuration. The spectre, 
made in the impossible image o f that which is irredeemably lost, dazzles and
389 Derrida, Spectres o f  Marx, page 41.
390 When subject(ivitie)s face each other they both give a face to the ‘other’ and turn to 
face the other in the hope o f self-reflectivity i.e. that the ‘other’ will reciprocate.
391 Blanchot, The Step Beyond, page 72.
392 Derrida, Spectres o f  Marx, page 46.
bewitches with the brightness o f light, the pharmakon is imbibed and for a 
moment the face o f the other comes into focus, their voice is heard and 
understood: Death is conceptualised, put in its place and given face. The 
promise of self-reflectivity is discursively made to the subject(ivity) by 
giving the spectre a name :393 The subject(ivity) is thereby force-d to believes 
in its own (reflected) immortality.
Transfiguration, the event o f the absolute visual that constitutes 
the ground without ground o f the foundation of power, the 
bedazzlement o f whiteness that is associated with the anticipation 
of death .... “as if” ... “the extreme, final, image, that o f the 
absolutely white figure or face, could only anticipate the taste of 
the exquisite death” .394
The force o f alterity, the lack at the very core o f being, posits another 
problem as the non-relation between an ontological origin and the 
phenomenological world, between being and action. What causes action and 
where does it take place? It is my contention that any action takes place 
through and by systems of belief, that it is considered necessary for action to 
be decided by an autonomous subject(ivity) who then carries out a 
predictable re-action. In my introduction I discussed Hegel’s circular 
epistemology within which every question already determines its own 
answer. Here I take this epistemological argument one step further by 
putting forward the proposition that no action, or question, can manifest in 
isolation. Within the wider complexities o f the excessive discursive strategies 
each action has innumerable causes and effects, many of which can never 
known or determined. Each action is always in excess o f itself; it can cause 
(and be caused by) an infinite number of often contradictory ‘events’. This 
excessive state o f affairs means that any action is volatile and excessive and 
can destabilise subjectivity at any moment. In an attempt to prevent this 
happening, any action is pre-performed, within a constant state of 
repetition, through the play o f spectres and within/upon the historical
393 This ‘name’ can be that o f the subject itself, or in the context o f this argument, that o f 
the artist.




... the past is empty, and only the multiple play o f mirroring, the 
issusion that there would be a present destined to pass and to hold 
itself back in the past, would lead one to believe that the past was 
filled with events, a belief that would make it less unfriendly, less 
frightening: a past thus inhabited, even by phantoms .... the 
appearance o f events that are there only to cover over the void, to 
enchant it in hiding it, while all the same announcing it through 
the mark o f irreversibility.
Modernism is, I contend, one such ‘repetition’ . It is constantly encircling 
itself, or being encircled within the post-modern discourse, as an 
irreversible moment. ‘Rothko’ is just one spectre trapped within such a 
moment and the tape-loop makes him play out the same old modernist 
routines, by semiotically articulating, but at the same time denouncing, his 
own death. It is, as I have demonstrated in chapter two, almost impossible to 
free him from such constraints, because in doing so, I can only declare his 
and my spectrality. When I de-face ‘Rothko’ and uncover his decomposition,
I become intimate with my own alterity and consequently my own death.
* * * * *
In exploring the notion o f faciality, to see where it will finally lead, I will 
return briefly to the theories o f Deleuze and Guattari. This I will do in order 
to argue that Michaux’s use o f figuration and faces within his drawings was 
an attempt to de-face the unified subject(ivity) at the very same time that 
modernism was facing its own image. Rothko’s paintings, in contrast, with 
their illuminosity and ambiguous form, can be seen as a facial construct, ‘ ... a 
visual percept that crystallises out o f “different varieties o f vague luminosity 
without form or dimension” .’395
Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is not one but two semiotic systems. One 
is a white wall, upon which is ‘inscribe[d] signs and redundancies.’396 The
395 Deleuze and Guattari, A  Thousand Plateaus, pp 168.
396 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp 167.
second is a black hole as ‘Subjectification is never without a black hole in 
which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies.’397 These 
semiotic systems are not discreet in that they penetrate and confuse each 
other and at their intersection a face emerges:
A broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a 
black hole. Clown head, white clown, moon-white mime, angel of 
death, Holy shroud.398
This face manifests between the white wall (upon which signification takes 
place as day-light, rationality, knowledge and life) and the black hole (which 
is the void, the confusion o f night-time, is dark, irrational, chaotic and 
deathly). A face can be, according to Deleuze and Guattari, any combination 
o f these two systems. As the combination is never static or stable it effects an 
infinite array o f faces, any o f which can be appropriated, especially when 
‘... you are just falling asleep, or into a twilight state or hallucination.’399 The 
dominant discourse, however, selects just one ideal face to give itself a 
significatory force. In the West this is the face o f Christ: he who rose from 
the dead in order to redeem man and offer him transcendence beyond the 
corporeal. This means that all other faces are disavowed, removed and 
assigned (in)to the black hole; as the ‘space’ o f t/error.
Michaux’s drawings can be located on/at the intersection between these two 
systems, between the whiteness o f the paper and the blackness o f his Indian 
ink. He constructs lines that are not quite signification or non-signification 
but struggling between the two. As Michaux battles to keep hold of the tonal, 
he is constantly re-absorbed by the nagual. The twilight zone that he 
inhabits by taking drugs and the insomnia that inhabits him, opens up the 
plenitude of the void and a plethora of unknown, and disavowed faces rally to 
take position. As argued in chapter three, this intersection between the 
white wall and the black hole opens up an indeterminate zone between the
397 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp 167.
398 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp 167.
399 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp 168-9.
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polarisation o f all or nothing, between the transcendence offered by the face 
of Christ and the vertigous void o f absolute nothingness. Within this space 
subjectivity is threatened by a multitude o f faces, any one o f which can be 
embodied by its destabilisation. This means that subjectivity can be, and is, 
established and disestablished within each and every moment o f its existence. 
The ideal face (mask) slips with every encounter with difference. The faces 
fragily contained within Michaux’s drawings are both individuated as other, 
and de-individuated as any-other (including the self). Within his constant 
struggle to keep some sense o f self, Michaux fights:
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... faces with faces. Facelessness which ‘tirelessly connects a 
wholly unfigurable origin to the parade o f faces in which it could 
have embodied itself.’400
According to this theory subjectivity becomes a nomad without a ‘stable’ face 
given through and by discourse. This stable, idealised, face however can 
never fully correspond with the neutrality o f faces that constantly parade 
before him (us). The incongruity o f faces: the aging face, the corporeal face, 
disturbs the idealised image presented to, for, and by us, through discourse. 
As the ideal and stable face is (momentarily) lost, within the swarm o f the 
twilight hours - between day and night - an infinite array o f imperfect and 
partial alternatives manifest before (and within us), welling up from the 
plenitude o f the void. Michaux, when writing about such experiences 
intensified through the taking o f drugs attempts to articulate the dissolution 
o f his own face as:
... not saying not playing 







slowing, budding toward us ... 
Lost face.401
400Jenny, ‘Simple Gestures’ in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, page 197.
401 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page 151.
The monstrous emerges within such experiences, as the light is not 
bright enough to illuminate the scene with its knowledgeable beam. The 
shadows, the creases that burrow into the surface o f the ideal face, 
become deeper, producing black holes from which a multitude o f yet-to- 
be-formed faces emanate. Michaux became obsessed with the fragility of 
the (ideal) face as: ‘.... the self can be stripped o f its ‘face’, its individual 
being, or it can haemorrhage out catastrophically. It can also be 
engulfed .,..402 As the horde o f monstrous faces come in and out of the 
shadows during the twilight hours, a partial memory o f them always 
remains, not as the idealised and petrified faces o f a re-membered and 
individuated people, but as a swarm o f ambiguous and spectral facial 
traits: ‘ ... the re-apparition o f the apparition that will never be either 
the appearing or the disappeared, the phenomenon or its contrary.’403
Looking at a selection o f Mescaline drawings (figures 24 - 27) we can see 
how Michaux attempts to ‘capture’ these monstrous faces as they emerge 
between their appearance and disappearance, from and into the 
shadows. As our gazes skim across the surface o f the drawings, faces 
emerge to greet us but then again, not quite.
Behind the set features, desperately seeking a way out, expressions like 
a pack o f howling dogs.
From the brush, in black blobs, somehow they flow forth: they 
liberate themselves ...
The first few times, one is surprised.
Faces o f lost souls, o f criminals, sometimes, neither known nor 
absolutely unfamiliar either (strange, remote correspondence!) .... 
Faces o f sacrificed personalities, ‘selves’ that life, determination, 
ambition, a propensity for rectitude and consistency, stifled, killed 
off.**
Within a stable and open geometry o f gazes, the self-reflecting 
subject(ivity) surveys the material world so that he or she can negate its 
negativity and then abstract its ideal qualities. However, when looking 
at Michaux’s drawings the viewing subject(ivity) cannot be sure as to
4t” Michaux, Darkness Moves, page xiv.
403 Derrida, The Spectres o f  Marx, page 54.
404 Henri Michaux, ‘En pesent au phenomenene de la peinture,’ reprinted in Untitled 
Passages by Henri M ichaux, page 196.
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who is looking at him or her, or why. The faces emerging from these 
drawings are unstable, protean and sinister. They are partial, homeless, 
without origin and without essence. The viewing subject(ivity) searches 
for the ideal stable face on the illuminous white wall, 405 but finds instead 
a series of fluctuating black holes, from which the faces emerge, and 
through which the viewing subjectivity could fall.
The mirror is not the place to observe yourself. Men,
look at yourselves in the paper.406
* * * * *
I have already argued that very little has been written about Michaux 
and his drawings. Although I believe that this situation is about to 
change, it is important to indicate how this lack o f a discourse on/of 
Michaux can cause problems when viewing Michaux’s drawings.
‘Rothko’ and his paintings are nestled within a discourse o f promethean 
proportions. The viewer can access, through reading texts on Rothko’s 
life and paintings, and visiting the artworks themselves, not only the 
discourse on Rothko, but also that on other modernist artists, practices 
and critiques. However, Michaux doesn’t have such a substantial 
discursive backdrop for his work, his personae (as artist) is not yet as 
‘formed’ as Rothko’s. This adds, in my opinion, to the instability of 
Michaux’s work; as a viewing experience and as an object for 
investigation/interpretation.
Michaux, I contend, as both an artist and a writer, traces a pre-post 
modern ‘moment’ at the same time as the dominant modernist discourse, 
we are lead to believe, was all pervasive. Because Michaux worked on the 
margins o f two disciplines, writing and drawing, he occupied a liminal 
space, a zone o f indeterminancy if you like. Although its not unusual to
4IK The ‘white wall’ in Michaux’s case was the paper he drew on.
406 Ball, Darkness Moves, page 36.
be both writer and artist, I believe that with the trauma still being felt 
in France after the second world war, and with the the social, political 
and cultural upheavals also occurring at the time, Michaux, along with 
many o f his contemporaries were using what today would be called 
‘deconstructive methods’ to try and understand their world and their 
position within it.
To finish I will make the following claim: Post modernism, through its 
deconstructive methods, believes that it has exorcised, or is in the 
process of exorcising, the ghost(s) o f modernism. But can it do this 
given that it presents and names it, albeit as the realm of self-deluded 
spectres? It is as if deconstruction conjures up the enemy so that it can 
conjure it away. Although the self-identical subject(ivity) has been 
unmasked, de-faced, so as to reveal the void underneath, this process of 
revelation has to be repeated in order to keep the spectres ‘in their 
place’ . This is, I contend the ‘triumphant phase o f mourning work,’407 
where discourse both celebrates and mourns the loss o f the self­
identical subject(ivity). It is my contention that at any one time 
discourse either celebrates (in the case o f post-modernism) or mourns 
(in the case o f modernism) the loss o f the self-identical subject(ivity). 
At any one moment, within any culture or discourse, both the 
celebration, and the mourning - o f the loss o f the self-identical 
subject(ivity) - are manifest. This means that within any epoch both 
modernist and post-modernist ‘moments’ and/or ‘traces’ coincide with 
and contaminate each another. Fred Orton makes a similar claim in 
relation to symbol and allegory:
As for the distinction between the Modern and the Post-Modern as 
epochal descriptions, though the basic forces and relations that 
determine material existence and the forms of consciousness we 
make o f it have changed, and continue to change, the presence of 
the symbol/allegory binary, unchanged in its meaning and value 
since the era o f Romanticism, probably indicates that no finally 
distinctive break has yet occurred that might be represented in 
practical consciousness as Post-Modernism. If this is not the case,
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407 Derrida, The Spectres o f Marx, page 52.
and the Post-Modern is with us, then what is claimed to be its 
defining impulse in practical consciousness is a residue o f the 
beginnings o f the Modern. The symbol/allegory opposition still 
structures practical consciousness. And Modernism’s structuring 
binary oppositions are still in place doing their work.41*
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I will end this dissertation with prose - as it has been so important 
throughout my writing - a quote from Michaux, which I think encapsulates 
many of the arguments made in this dissertation:
Like a bell ringing out a catastrophe, a note listening only to itself, 
a note piercing everything, a low note like a kick in the belly, an 
aging note, a note like a minute that has to cross a century, a note 
sustained through the discord o f voices, a note like a death 
warning, a note that has been warning me this whole hour 
through.409
Summary
In this last chapter I have concluded by drawing together, and considering, 
the problematics unravelled in the proceeding three chapters. My main aim 
was to take apart the division between modern and post-modern concepts of 
subjectivity, especially in relation to death, in order to show the similarities 
between the two, thereby arguing against the myth that the post-modern 
subject(ivity) is the antithesis o f its modernist predecessor. I have 
demonstrated how the art and theories of modernism were being questioned 
at the very time they were at their zenith. By utilising again the figure o f 
prosopopeia, I have demonstrated how American artists such as Rothko 
attempted to cover over, by creating a face (o f the artist), the threat o f the 
ambiguous, deathly and unpredictable materiality o f both the viewing 
subject(ivity) and the artwork itself. I have, however, concentrated on 
Michaux in this closing chapter to demonstrate how, in his work and in the 
theories that informed it, the impetus to de-face developed. By looking
408 Orton, Figuring Jasper Johns, page 13.
409 Michaux, Darkness Moves, page 321.
specifically at Michaux’s drawings o f faces and almost-human forms, I have 
demonstrated how he struggled with the attempt to privilege the 
contingency and multiplicity o f the corporeal, ( as the nagual that inhabits 
subject(ivity)), over the transcendental fixed and faced. I have also 
demonstrated how the dominant discourse(s) o f the West have attempted to 
cover and stabilise the nagual through the creation and implementation of a 
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